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The advent of Speculative Realist and object-oriented philosophies has drawn attention 
to how objects are understood and experienced, and stimulated renewed interest in the 
aesthetics of these encounters. Taking photography as the site of such encounters, this 
dissertation asked what implications do these philosophies have for objects or entities 
that are complex structures or systems made by humans?  
 
The writings of Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, and Timothy Morton informed 
an investigation of this question in the first three chapters: The first chapter The Object 
versus Post Object Question in the Australian Art World during the 1970s, considers how this 
question was addressed the context of a historical debate on the status of the artwork as 
self-sufficient object or relational social process. The second chapter, Something to be Seen, 
A Picture on a Screen, further asks if photographs can be thought of as self-sufficient 
entities, then why is a non-human centric approach to the photographic image desirable 
and what would it look like? The third chapter, Photo| Vision: Photographing Place, asks 
how do these perspectives inflect representations of place? This is discussed in 
reference to Walter Benjamin’s expanded concept of the Denkbild (thought-image) and 
applied to the project Konvolut K (Jo Law, Redmond Bridgeman). The fourth chapter, 
From Beyond, drawing upon Ian Bogost’s concept of a ‘practical ontography’ , seeks to 
formulate the outlines of a speculative and realist photography. This would be a 
speculative (notions incapable of analysis in terms of other notions) photography that 
via analogy, metaphor, and allusion, paradoxically encapsulates both an anti-realist 
epistemology (concerning the limits of human knowledge) and a realist ontology (the 
argument that aspects of our reality are independent of our conceptual schemes). 
 
The Conclusion of the dissertation suggests that if photography exists in its own right 
as an autonomous entity apart from human interpretations, acted upon and acting upon 
other entities, then historical occult photography, with its ambition of making visible a 
beyond, presents a model of such a speculative realist photography. The practical 
component of this dissertation is a photo-book. Twenty-five images are arranged on the 
twenty-six pages of a concertina book. With the exception of the twenty-first image—a 
panoramic photograph that spreads over two pages, each image occupies a single page 
 
 
and can be viewed alone, in pairs, or in concert with the other images as a sequence by 
unfolding the book. No details such as locations are given in the book; the images are 
simply labelled alphabetically with specific reference to Hollis Frampton film Zorns 
Lemma. Each photograph seeks to conjure up the realist conceits this dissertation 







 Research Parameters: The question 
 
Photographs were once understood as presenting an incontrovertible photographic 
truth. This was what one of its inventors thought. William Henry Fox Talbot declared 
that now ‘Nature would draw itself’.1 Photography was believed to employ a type of 
‘blind sight’.2 As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison explain, 'The mechanical, objective 
photograph had allegedly been traced by “nature’s pencil” alone and nature was entirely 
artless’.3 It was an objective optical and mechanical recording machine that obeyed the 
laws of physics and chemistry and ‘provided a new model for the perfection towards 
which working objects of science might strive’.4 
When nineteenth-century scientists called for objective photographs to 
supplement, correct, or replace subjective drawings, they did not, in the first 
instance, fear imposture, except perhaps in cases such as inquiries into 
spiritualism. Rather, they worried about a far subtler source of error, one more 
authentically subjective and specifically scientific: the projection of their own 
preconceptions and theories onto data and images.5 
 
Though the fear that the observer’s subjectivity may distort knowledge was temporally 
overcome with the advent of the photograph’s ‘mechanical reproduction;’ this new 
mechanical truth would also become suspect, opening a philosophical abyss in which 
truth and objectivity become increasingly difficult to pin down.6 A tension developed 
between the eye and its subjectivity and the objectivity of the mechanism. Photography, 
it was thought, would need to be constrained by a methodological system and be under 
the close supervision of the scientist. Luc Pauwels in Visual Cultures of Science warns, all 
recording devices tend to distort data and this distortion must be taken into account to 
achieve scientific objectivity:  
Instruments, in addition to capturing or recording data, invariably both reduce 
(or lose) data and tend to mold (and add) data in a particular way. These two 
                                                 
1 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007), 125-133. 
2 Ibid. 138. 
3
Ibid. 133. 






phenomena in themselves should warn against a naively realistic view of the 
merely technical aspect of representation.7 
 
Photography is understood as a social process of theoretical and empirical validation 
into which subjectivity inevitably enters. It's apparent objectivity does not arise from a 
process of adequation, between the thing and its representation, but inter-subjective 
agreement that is, in the final analysis, performative. Quentin Meillassoux, in After 
Finitude, describes the necessity of agreement between the universal and particular via 
the test of inter-subjectivity in these terms: ‘since Kant, objectivity is no longer defined 
with reference to the object in itself (in terms of the statement’s adequation or 
resemblance to what it designates), but rather with reference to the possible universality 
of an absolute statement’.8 As discussed in greater depth in the Overview, and as 
explained by Daston and Galison, this understanding of objectivity owes its origins to 
Kant’s transcendentalism:  
It was Immanuel Kant who dusted off the musty scholastic terminology of 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ and breathed new life and meanings into it. But the 
Kantian meanings were the grandparents, not the twins, of our familiar sense 
of the words. Kant’s ‘objective validity’ (objektive Gültigheit) referred not to 
external objects (Gegenstände) but to the ‘forms of sensibility’ (time, space, 
causality) that are the preconditions of experience. And his habit of using 
‘subjective’ as a rough synonym for ‘merely empirical sensations’ shares with 
later usage only the sneer with which the word is intoned. For Kant, the line 
between the objective and the subjective generally runs between the universal 
and particular, not between world and mind.9 
 
In this context, all recording information, including photographic images, though they 
may have a measure of objectivity guaranteed by an inter-subjective test, is, like human 
thought, unable step out of the context in which it is produced. Meillassoux describes 
this limit to human knowledge in the following way:  
We cannot access any form of the in-itself, because we are irremediably 
confined in our relation-to-the-world, without any means to verify whether 
the reality that is given to us corresponds to reality taken in itself, 
independently of our subjective link to it.10  
 
                                                 
7 Luc Pauwels (ed.), Visual Cultures of Science: Rethinking Representational Practices in Knowledge Building and 
Science Communication (New Hampshire: Darmouth College Press, 2006), 9. 
8 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, tr. Ray Brassier (New York: 
Continuum, 2010). 
9
Daston and Galison, 30. 
10 Rick Dolphin and Iris van der Tuin, ‘There is contingent being independent of us, and this contingent 
being has no reason to be of a subjective nature”: Interview with Quentin Meillassoux’, in New 
Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies (Michigan: Open Humanities Press, 2012), 71-115. 
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Recently two overlapping developments have opened up the conceptual horizons of 
how this limit is understood. Speculative realism and object-oriented ontology call 
attention to what we can know about objects. Parallel with this has been a renewed 
attention to the aesthetics of these encounters. Both of these developments have 
resulted in a focus on object-object interactions outside of the mediating factor of 
human perception. This dissertation aims to explore this issue with an emphasis upon 
the photographic image. Responding to the conceptual horizon opened up by the 
speculative realist critique of correlationism this discussion asks: how does the critique 
of correlationism impact upon our understanding of photographic realism? 
 
This introduction outlines the parameters of this dissertation’s research and its 
approach to the question outlined above. It does so in the following ways: First, in 
Theoretical Perspectives, I describe key thinkers and terms that have formed the theoretical 
directions explored here. The second section, Practice | Research: P and Not- P, describes 
the interaction between the practical and written components of this dissertation. Then, 
in the Chapter Outlines, a synopsis of each of the chapters is provided. The Conclusion 
tackles the question of the relationship between the theoretical and practical 
components of this dissertation.  
 
 
(i) Theoretical Perspectives 
 
In March 2007 Ray Brassier’s essay, ‘The Enigma of Realism: on Quentin Meillassoux’s 
After Finitude’, was published in the journal Collapse.11 Brassier reported that Meillassoux 
had devised unique arguments in support of a speculative materialist position. In order 
to address issues raised in Meillassoux’s book, Brassier suggested a symposium be held 
to discuss this new materialist, speculative, and realist direction. As the participants 
recall, the term Speculative Realism was suggested and adopted as a useful label 
describing a common tendency in what were otherwise highly divergent positions 
amongst the philosophers who attended.12 As the announcement of the conference 
                                                 
11 Ray Brassier, ‘The Enigma of Realism: On Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude’, Collapse, 11 (2007), 15-
55. 
12 See Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman (eds.), The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism 
and Realism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011). 
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itself declares: ‘Speculative realism is not a doctrine but the umbrella term for a variety 
of research programmes committed to upholding the autonomy of reality, whether in 
the name of transcendental physicalism, object-oriented philosophy, or abstract 
materialism, against the depredations of anthropocentrism’.13 The proposed conference 
was held in 2007 at Goldsmiths College. Brassier, Harman, Meillassoux, and Ian 
Hamilton Grant each presented papers that outlined what they argued were the 
characteristics of this new realist direction in philosophy. As such, speculative realism is 
still very much an evolving set of ideas and approaches without a single overarching set 
of philosophical values, but rather a broad descriptive term encompassing a 
reinvigorated realist tendency in contemporary philosophy.14  
 
Subsequently the publication of The Speculative Turn in 2011 sought to anthologize this 
renewed direction in thought. 15 The title was understood ‘as a deliberate counterpoint 
to the now tiresome “Linguistic Turn”…’ 16 and its focus on linguistic philosophy and 
the significance of language in the constitution of a knowable human reality. While 
there are as many varieties of what is meant here by realism and objects as there are 
speculative realists, what each speculative realist philosophy holds in common is a 
critique of the necessity of a correlation between thought and being. Meillassoux terms 
this linkage ‘correlationism’ and defined it in the following way: ‘By “correlationism” we 
mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between 
thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other’.17  
 
Graham Harman’s particular object-oriented critique of correlationism will be a focus 
for this project. Harman, in Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things, 
The Quadruple Object and elsewhere, argues that the unbridgeable gap between object and 
subject is not a privileged gap between humans and the world per se, but is rather a 
                                                 
13 See Continental Philosophy Bulletin Board announcing the workshop posted on 29 March 2007. 
Farhang Erfangi, ‘Speculative Realism’, Continental Philosophy Bulletin Board [webpage], (29 Mar. 2007) 
<http://www.continental-philosophy.org/2007/03/29/speculative-realism/>. 
14
Many of the philosophers who attended this conference or who have become associated with 
Speculative Realism, have subsequently rejected it as an entirely inadequate description of their position, 
and others including Harman and Levi Byrant have coined their own terms to describe their perspectives. 
To avoid terminological confusion I will use this term here except when more exact terms are required to 
describe specific positions. 
15
See Bryant, Srnicek, and Harman. 
16 Ibid. 1. 
17
Meillassoux, After Finitude, 5. 
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constitutive feature of any relation whatsoever. By critiquing what Harman has called 
‘philosophies of access’, what he terms his ‘object oriented philosophy’ resurrects the 
object as a central concern. In his words these objects include ‘those entities that are 
neither physical nor even real. Along with diamonds, rope and neutrons, objects may 
include armies, monsters, square circles, and leagues of real and fictitious nations. All 
such objects must be accounted for by ontology, not merely denounced or reduced to 
despicable nullities’.18  
 
Timothy Morton in Ecology Without Nature and The Ecological Thought, has investigated the 
conceptual and historical intersection between concepts of ecology, nature and 
aesthetics. Morton’s more recent Realist Magic: Object, Ontology, and Causality, further 
develops these themes to propose new understandings of realism. Morton’s perspective 
has been particularly helpful in developing an understanding of realism and what it may 
mean for a radically expanded concept of the ecological.  
 
In addition to the thought of Meillassoux, Harman, and Morton, networked 
communication and the ‘ecologies of knowledge’ it forms have played important roles.19 
Examining the role of telematic communication in any depth in the formation of 
object-oriented philosophies and speculative realism(s) is outside the scope of this 
dissertation. It is worthwhile to make a few comments in so far as this dynamic has 
helped give form to this dissertation and the theoretical perspective it explores. Harman 
updated blog readers daily on the writing of the The Quadruple Object, and while none of 
the materials in the book appeared on the blog, he would occasionally summarize the 
ideas he was working on at the time.. The release of Levi Bryant’s book The Democracy of 
Objects was preceded by its development on his blog, Larval Subjects, in response to 
readers’ comments and suggestions. Morton’s blog Ecology without Nature, and Steven 
Shaviro’s The Pinocchio Theory, as well as Adam Robberts’ Knowledge Ecology have, amongst 
others, helped develop a perspective on the issues raised in this dissertation. Thinkers, 
including Manuel De Landa, Brian Massumi, and Jane Bennett provided further critical 
and contextual literature. At another level, the work of philosophers including Alfred 
                                                 
18 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Winchester, Zero Books, 2011), 5. 
19




North Whitehead, Gilles Deleuze, Bruno Latour, and Alain Badiou provide a theoretical 
background that acts as both a resource and sometimes catalytic antagonist for the 
various speculative realists.  
 
From the above short discussion it can be seen that one of the difficulties with a project 
such as this is achieving reasonable consistency in the meaning of terms and how they 
are used. Realism, speculation and materialism are notoriously difficult to pin down and 
are used in a bewildering array of ways by the various authors discussed here. In order 
to achieve some measure of consistency, at least in how the key terms of speculation, 
realism and object(s) are understood in this dissertation, I have attempted to define how 
I have used them below.  
 
Realism and Objects 
Realism and materialism are often conflated. While the materialist believes (s)he can 
know things or objects outside of the mind-thing correlate, realists are not necessarily 
materialists, although often the materialist is a realist of material. For example, the 
idealist posits ideas as real, and may understand material as a mere epiphenomenon of 
an underlying ideal form, hence realism does not necessarily entail a realism of the 
material world. It is a claim that some ‘things’ or entities are more real, that is have 
ontological priority over some other entities. Lee Braver’s book, A Thing of this World: A 
History of Continental Anti-Realism, has been an important catalyst for speculative realist 
thinking and captures important elements of the meanings that ‘object’ and ‘Realism’ 
have in the first, and primary, component of his Realism Matrix: 
The first component of the Realism Matrix is metaphysical: a set of objects or 
states of affair, which does not rely upon us for existence or for essence, 
excluding trivial examples of things we have made or which depend upon us 
in relatively uninteresting ways, such as our thought or beliefs. The fact that 
these entities are—and that they are what they are—is unaffected by what we 
think, or say.20  
 
Speculation 
The most influential exponent of a philosophy of speculation was Alfred North 
Whitehead. Whitehead’s philosophy is notoriously difficult and his philosophical 
contributions are too large to be covered here. Nevertheless, a description of the nature 
                                                 
20
Lee Braver, A Thing of this World: A History of Continental Ant-Realism, (Evanston Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 2007), 15. 
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of his speculative approach, further discussed in the Overview, is relevant for its ability to 
capture the intended meaning of this term in this dissertation. Johan Sieber wrote this 
characterization of Whitehead’s speculative method and its implications for speculative 
philosophy more generally: 
Speculative thinking deals with ultimate notions, notions incapable of analysis 
in terms of other notions, more far-reaching than they. This means that there 
can be no definition of the notions we employ in speculative philosophy, at 
least not in the sense of providing an explanation of these notions in terms of 
other notions, which supposedly have a meaning that is fixed and clear, at 
least insofar as their use in the definition is concerned. Speculative ideas 
presuppose each other, and can only be elucidated by bringing out the ways in 
which they presuppose each other. Because each one of them presuppose all 
the others there is not privileged starting point, so the movement of 
speculative philosophy is not one of a linear exposition of ideas or theories in 
terms of clearly stated fundamental notions. It is a circular movement, going 
over the same notions and issues over and over again in order to explicate 
more and more what is contained in them. An exposition more geometrico is in 
the nature of the case impossible.21 
 
Whitehead understood speculation as entailing an essentially critical, creative, and 
cohesive approach. These steps are reflected in Whitehead’s discussion of his 
speculative method in the introduction to Process and Reality, where he argues a 
speculative approach to experience, properly understood, is akin to ‘the flight of an 
aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the 
thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation 
rendered acute by rational interpretation’.22 That is, it is a mode of thought that appeals 
to empirical evidence, formulates general observations, and tests them against 
coherence and experience. Crucially, it can be understood as a method of thinking that 
is closely associated with, and indeed, reliant upon experience. As such, it can be 
understood as a method of disclosure, one that deploys re-descriptive concepts that 
have the effect of disclosing the significance of experience. Isabelle Stengers, in Thinking 
with Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts, explains ‘that the interest of the 
speculative scheme he [Whitehead] has constructed resides in its applications, in the 
transformations it carries out in our way of explaining, or characterizing our 
experience’.23  
                                                 
21 Johan Siebers, The Method of Speculative Philosophy: An Essay on the Foundations of Whitehead’s Metaphysics 
(Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2002), 12.  
22 North Alfred Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay on Cosmology, ed. David Ray Griffin (New York: 
The Free Press, 1978), 5.  
23 Isabelle Stengers, Thinking With Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 




Whitehead’s critique of deductive reason as the sole test of truth can be understood as 
an example of the application of his speculative approach. Whitehead’s critique is not a 
call to unreasoned speculation or a call to disregard empirical experience, but an 
emphasis upon deduction’s proper context: ‘It will be observed that logical notions 
must themselves find their place in the scheme of philosophic notions’.24 Relied upon 
too avidly in philosophy it leads to incoherence and becomes inadequate in the sense of 
being unable to explain the logic of its own position. That is, it fails to open up 
adequately explanatory conceptual parameters:  
It has been remarked that a system of philosophy is never refuted, only 
abandoned. The reason is that logical contradiction, except as temporary slips 
of the mind – plentiful though temporary – are the most gratuitous of errors, 
and usually they are trivial. Thus, after criticism, systems do not exhibit mere 
illogicalities. They suffer from inadequacy and incoherence.25 
 
Understood from this perspective, speculation is a statement of method, not simply of 
orientation or tendency. It is a ‘method of imaginative rationalization’ of a cohesive, 
creative expansion of conceptual parameters in order to understand how experience 
coheres to discover ‘the obvious solidarity of the world’.26  
 
 
(ii) Practice | Research: Dialetheism 
 
My intention in this dissertation is not to try and arbitrate between the two poles of 
anti-realism and realism. It is to consider the practical consequences and possibilities 
represented by speculative realist and object-oriented thought. In this way, this project 
reflects Charles Sander Peirce’s empirical maxim: ‘Consider what effects, which might 
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. 
Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object’.27 
William James cited this maxim in his series of lectures Pragmatism: A New Name for an 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 3. 
25 Ibid. 6. 
26 Alfred North Whitehead, cited in Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed 
Understanding of the Place-World (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 66. 
27 See Charles S. Peirce, ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’, Popular Science Monthly, 12 (1978), 286-302. 
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Old Way of Thinking.28 James foregrounds the question of what is actually meant in practice 
when an epistemological question is asked. To illustrate his point he famously used the 
question of a person’s spatial relationship to a squirrel hiding behind a tree:  
the human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round 
the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the 
opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so 
that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem 
now is this: Does the man go round the squirrel or not? The question is 
answered by the practical question of what you mean by going around. Thus it 
is a question of the dissolution of a metaphysical problem of ultimate truth via 
the practical question of how to answer it. What are the practical implications 
of answering it? What do we mean by going around in this particular empirical 
experience?29 [Emphasis in the original]  
 
This fraught relationship between knowledge and action was central to James’s concept 
of ‘radical empiricism’, developed further by Alfred North Whitehead and discussed in 
Chapter Two. How John Dewey broadened Peirce’s and James’s empiricism with an 
even greater emphasis upon the relationship between knowledge and action is also 
relevant. This issue was a focus for Dewey’s lectures titled The Quest for Certainty:  
How has the separation of intellect from action affected the theory of 
knowledge? […] What forces are at work to break down the division? What 
would the effect be if the divorce were annulled, and knowing and doing were 
brought into intrinsic connection with one another? What revisions of the 
traditional theory of mind, thought and knowledge would be required, and 
what changes in the idea of the office of philosophy would be demanded? 
What modification would ensure in the disciplines which are concerned with 
the various phases of human activity?30  
 
Questions such as these have a continuing relevance and have been further investigated 
in the writing of social geographer and latter day pragmatist Nigel Thrift. Thrift usefully 
describes an understanding of practice that can help illustrate what I mean. For Thrift 
practice is ‘inherently dialogical and affectively charged’, a matter of social knowledge in 
use.31 No particular mode this knowledge takes—whether conceptual, written, and/or 
materially embedded know-how—can claim a monopoly on the descriptive verb practice. 
Practice, for Thrift, is a matter of knowledge in action within a social context, action 
that is temporally grounded in pragmatics and thus evolving.32 The question is one of 
                                                 
28 See William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York: Longman, Green 
and Co., 1922). 
29 Ibid. 27. 
30 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty; A Study of the Relation Between Knowledge and Action (New York: 
Minton Baltch, 1929), 6. 
31 Nigel Thrift, Spatial Formations (London: Sage Publications, 1996), x. 
32 Ibid. x. 
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how to find one’s way, the senses of why, what kind of experience does it encapsulate, 
and what does it mean or potentially mean? The question here then is not a matter of 
attempting to develop a novel theoretical object—a post-correlationist photo-object? 
Instead, it is more a matter of reflecting on the encounter with photography and how 
these broader questions intersect with it. This entails asking if there is a way of thinking 
about photographic imaging that is not itself simply reflective of either of the two poles 
of naive realism or dogmatic anti-realism; that is, is photography as always an inherently 
self-reflective practice in which humans are at the centre of knowing? The intention is 
to develop what Jane Bennett, following Steven K. White, describes as a weak onto-tale; 
that is, a cohesive account of a direction in thought oriented towards a problem of 
practice. 33 The aim of such an onto-tale is to provide a set of conceptual grid 
references, rather than proofs, for why one acts in one way rather than another, in 
ethical, practical and aesthetic dilemmas. Such a practice of a weak ontology can help 
address, if not answer, the question of how we understand objects and their relations. 
Bennett explains the concept of a weak ontology in the following terms:  
This is the name that White gives to an emerging genre of social theory that 
develops its political analysis in conjunction with a set of contentions about 
the fundamental character of human being and the world. The practitioner of 
weak ontology believes that “such conceptualization for the self, other and the 
world are necessary or unavoidable for an adequately reflective ethical and 
political life”. What distinguishes a weak ontologist from a traditional 
metaphysician is that the former emphasizes the necessarily speculative and 
contestable character of her onto-story and thus does not try to demonstrate 
its truth in any strong sense.34  
 
In the context of formulating a weak onto-story, the context of how the question of the 
relationship between art practice and research arises is more relevant for this project 
than trying to formulate a coherent response of what the relationship between art 
practice and research may be. To this end Scott Brook’s article Beyond Practice-led 
Research35 will now be discussed within the context of Timothy Morton’s treatment of 
dialetheism.36  
 
                                                 
33 Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 160. 
34 Ibid. 160-161. 
35 Scott Brook, ‘Introduction: Part 2. The Critique of Practice Led Research’, TEXT [online journal], 14 
(2012), < http://www.textjournal.com.au/speciss/issue14/Brook%20(Intro%202).pdf>. 
36 Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Michigan: Open Humanities Press, 2013). 
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Brook sees the issue of how knowledge is generated as central to understanding why the 
question of the relationship between art practice and research has become entangled in 
institutional, governance, economic, and ideological discourses. Symptomatic of this is 
how the words ‘led’ and ‘based’ have become interchangeable. This situation is linked to 
the history of policy agendas and talk of creative economies, as Brook explains:  
The former [practice-led research] has become the dominant term in Australia 
since 2005 when it was promoted as part of the creative industries policy 
agenda. At this time it could be confidently assumed that readers would 
understand the term as meaning ‘not research into, or about, creative practice, 
but research through creative practice’, with the corollary that outcomes of 
creative practice might be regarded as research outputs (Green 2006: 5, 
original emphasis). What was perhaps distinctive about this application was 
that the push for recognitive justice for creative arts lecturers that had been 
underway since the mid-1990s was now conjoined with policy rhetoric on the 
importance of creativity for an innovation economy.37 
 
 
To clarify what is at stake in this debate Brook describes four critiques of the 
relationship between art practice and research: the aesthetic critique, the academic critique, 
the bureaucratic critique and the educational critique. Brook believes the aesthetic critique is 
the central critique in these debates. This critique argues the status of knowledge is 
specific to forms of practice and cannot be translated. Art practice, because it is tied to 
forms of experience, cannot be translated into discursive conceptual forms. To do so 
threatens the integrity of art as art. Yet, as Brook points out, ‘Although such a critique 
might seem radical, this position is in fact in line with normative twentieth-century 
thought on creativity, where it inherits the Romantic account of aesthetics as a critique 
of knowledge’.38 Pragmatist Dewey, Brook notes, is often cited in support of this 
position. Dewey’s Art as Experience situates the artist as the paradigm of the situated 
practitioner who is able to overcome the gap between knowledge and experience by 
sublimating knowledge to a situated critique that engenders experience. In this way, art 
trumps research by demonstrating that research is practice and the artist is the 
practitioner par excellence. As Brook explains:  
The reflective practitioner internalises this radical doubtfulness of the world 
around them and discovers it within themselves as a failure of a priori 
concepts, thus overcoming the alienation of self from world produced by the 
presumption of knowledge and cultivating a self that is prepared for what the 
materials will reveal. The echoes of the Kantian sublime should be enough to 
remind us of what is at stake: the artist’s capacity to suspend foreknowledge 
                                                 
37 Brook, 2. 
38 Ibid. 3. 
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and remain open to contingency has become an ethically exemplary 
performance of the proper relation between self and world.39  
 
The next critique Brook examines is the academic critique, which foregrounds conceptual 
forms of knowledge and is suspicious of the romantic echoes within the aesthetic 
critique:  
[The academic critique] endorses the view that the university system is not a de 
facto form of arts patronage, and that art making and art objects are not 
research methods or outcomes, even if they can be informed by the research 
of those artists who are also scholars (‘research-led practice’). In its generous 
form, this critique might accept that art constitutes research if and when it is 
accompanied by legitimating practices that are accepted by a group of peers.40  
 
Brook argues that both these positions are subsumed within the bureaucratic critique; that 
is, they are deployed as instrumental means to enact policy objectives arising out of 
ideological dictates that are often framed as economic imperatives. The market and 
managerial imperatives of neo-liberalism are contemporary manifestation of these. 
Within this critique the creation of knowledge must, out of economic necessity, be 
subsumed by the needs of economic production. The practical problem then becomes 
how to ‘develop a new administrative lexicon and political settlement’ which would 
bring artists, art schools, universities, and students within the productivist ethos of a 
creative knowledge economy. 41 As such, the administration of this settlement is equally 
if not more important than any theoretical questions raised by the relation between 
practice and research. Consideration of such issues will be subordinate to more pressing 
concerns:  
Although discussions of practice-led research may involve claims about the 
status of art and knowledge, such claims are instrumental to a reformist 
project whose success does not wait on the final outcome of any intellectual 
debates concerning whether such claims are true.42 
 
Any practical outcome is determined by the alignment of art schools within a university 
setting wherein information production agendas are paramount. These include:  
the training and examination of higher research degree (HDR) candidates; the 
assessment of staff research outputs on annual PDR forms; the allocation of 
competitive research funding within the university sector. In each instance, 
intellectual principle needs to be tempered by institutional pragmatics.43  
 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 3. 
40 Ibid. 4. 
41 Ibid. 5. 
42 Ibid. 
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Notwithstanding this, the educational critique argues that none of this relates to what 
artists actually do: ‘The irony is that discussions of practice in practice-led research 
sublimate their object into a highly aestheticised mode of self-presentation that, 
although morally exemplary in the seminar room or PhD dissertation […] risks 
obscuring what creative artists actually do (i.e. “in practice”).’44 The practice of being an 
artist, actor or musician is subordinated to a setting, which is at least as much about 
producing research as it is about producing art. The temptation, Brook asserts, ‘to 
append hyperbolic claims of methodological ‘reflexivity’ to their work’ is just one of the 
dangers awaiting the artist researcher. 45  
 
Brook’s description of these four critiques broadly characterizes a field of contention 
rather than a theoretical question of the relationship between practice and theory. How 
the relationship between practice and research is formulated is itself symptomatic of the 
unstable, contentious context within which the issue exists. Any claim that seeks to 
answer how the relationship between the artwork and research is constituted, then, is 
likely to downplay or ignore other aspects of their relationship and thereby the 
institutional, governance, and policy context within which this issue has gained such 
urgency. Brook concludes that the context within which the question is posed ensures 
the question of whether artworks constitute research cannot be answered in an open 
way:  
But do artworks constitute research? As unavoidable as this question is, 
perhaps we need to read it as a demand rather than a real question. Whether-
and-how the terms of this statement are capable of prompting a credible reply 
is an important issue in relation to the administration of the tertiary creative 
arts sector – we learn as much from the bureaucratic critique. But what we 
learn from a range of other critiques is that this question is of limited value in 
relation to the requirements of teaching, understanding and appreciating 
creative practice. If the notion of practice-led research does seem capable of 
meeting the terms of this question, then we might reconsider whether this 
always counts in its favour.46  
 
 Arguments linking art and research, like many previous attempts to define the essential 
qualities of artworks, have a descriptive utility of qualities (discussed briefly in Chapter 
One) that may or may not be present in artworks. Brook’s analysis suggests it would be 
more helpful to describe the ecologies of knowledge and practice from which the 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 7. 




question of the relationship between practice and research has emerged. In this context 
a concept of the ecology of practices as knowledge, as a form of speculative pragmatism 
touched upon above, and geared towards not just understanding the outcomes of 
certain policies and practices but also the intentional invention of new possible(s) (as 
opposed to just probable(s)), would be useful. Isabelle Stengers’ concept of practice 
ecologies is thus relevant. In Cosmopolitics 1 Stengers writes: 
Ecological practice (political in the broadest sense) is then related to the 
production of values, to the proposal of new modes of evaluation, new 
meanings...they are about the production of new relations that are added to a 
situation already produced by a multiplicity of relations47  
 
The conditions for the emergence of new possibilities intersects here with Jamesian 
pragmatism, Stengers’ description of Whitehead’s ‘free and wild creation of concepts’—
and perhaps also with Jane Bennett’s attempt to create ‘weak onto-tales’—with the aim 
of creating ‘symbiotic agreements’ between the formation of new practices and 
knowledge and the communities of humans and nonhumans they conjoin or fragment.48 
It is this invention of new possibilities that the institutional modes of practice based or 
led research may have a problem. The possibility of a radical break with the actual in 
favour of new realities is central to Morton’s discussion of dialetheism in his Realist 
Magic. Realism is properly speculative, and hence ‘magical’, in Morton’s terms, partly 
because it refuses the current actual existing states of affairs, often a materialism or 
idealism claiming to be a realism, by dispensing with the principle of non-contradiction 
in favour of an ‘aesthetics as causation’.  
 
 
 (iii) Chapter Outlines 
 
In this dissertation the issue of how the artwork may be re-conceptualized from a post-
correlationist perspective provides a context for three questions, which are explored in 
the first three chapters. In brief, I approach these questions in the following ways: 
 
                                                 
47 Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics 1, tr. Robert Bononno (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 
32. 
48 See Isabelle Stengers, Thinking With Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts, tr. Michael Chase 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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First, How does the critique of correlationism help us to understand a self-sufficient art 
object apart from relational or social contexts? This is addressed in Chapter One, The 
Object Versus the Post Object Debate in the Australian Art World during the 1970s. 
 
Then the second chapter, Something to be Seen, A Picture on a Screen, deploys a post-
correlationist perspective to ask why is an anthrodecentric approach, (i.e. a ‘decentering’ 
of the anthropocentric), to the photographic image desirable and what would it look 
like? 49 
 
The third chapter, Photo | Vision: Photographing Place, asks how correlationism inflects 
representations of place. The focus of this discussion is the collaborative online work 
Konvolut K (Jo Law and Redmond Bridgeman), (Appendix 2.) and a photographic essay 
of ‘new urbanist’ spaces, titled Project X, (Appendix 1) that forms a companion piece to 
this work. This discussion is framed by the question of whether Walter Benjamin’s 
expansion of the literary concept of the Denkbild (thought-image) to include various 
artefacts, images and textual quotations can be further stretched to include objects that 
are not the product of human artifice.  
 
How the dissertation proceeds in these first three chapters is outlined in more detail 
below:  
 
Why is it important to understand an artwork as an independent entity, existing beyond 
its relational or social contexts? This question is addressed in the first chapter, The Object 
Versus the Post Object Debate in the Australian Art World during the 1970s. Here it is argued 
that much post-object art was trapped in a bifurcation between subject and object. This 
is, in part, a reflection of Donald Brook’s account of post-object art, which, it is argued, 
is firmly situated in what Meillassoux calls the ‘correlationist circle’ (touched upon 
above and discussed in more detail in the Overview). Because this bifurcation is left 
largely intact, rather than freeing art from the dictates of the arbitrary exercise of 
authority, as was hoped, such authority was actually affirmed. By positing an entirely 
relational and human view of the art object, and installing authenticity in various guises 
                                                 





as the real test of value, the hoped-for escape becomes impossible. Could the only 
alternative be, then, to argue for the irreducible otherness of art works, what Harman 
calls the withdrawal of the real object, so that art objects cannot be thought of as simply 
subject to a process that transfigures them into human things? Perhaps the only way out 
of this subject-object bind is, then, the recognition of the non-reducibility of the 
artwork to its varied relations, perhaps even including its origins in human praxis?  
 
The second chapter, titled Something to be seen, a picture on a screen, builds upon the 
previous chapter’s argument for the non-reductive object hood of artworks. 50 In order 
to do this I ask: why is an anthrodecentric approach to the photographic image 
desirable? This question is addressed in the following ways: In A Picture on a Screen, two 
perspectives on visual perception are sketched. These perspectives are James J. Gibson’s 
account of a anthropocentric perspective that he termed ‘aperture vision’ and Kinji 
Imanishi’s account of the perceptual relations between living and non-living things in 
The World of Living Things. The intention here is to illustrate the types of visual 
relationships that are produced by different concepts of nature. Alfred North 
Whitehead’s discussion of the ‘the bifurcation of nature’ in The Concept of Nature, is then 
outlined to help describe the origins of the anthropocentric perspective. Then, in An 
Ecology of Practice, how object-oriented philosophy (primarily Harman’s concept of 
vicarious causation and Morton’s account of the ‘ecological thought’ and ‘the mesh’ ’) 
suggests an anthrodecentric understanding of ecological relationships is canvassed.51 In 
the Conclusion, Alphonso Lingis’ claims about photography is presented as an example of 
how an anthrodecentric approach could be applied to the photographic image. Lingis 
argues that photography is brings about an encounter with the ‘images that the things, 
and not the human mind, engender’.52 For Lingis, photographs are capable of producing 
an anthrodecentic experience. They help us:  
recognize that the things themselves engender ‘images’ or doubles of 
themselves – shadows, halos the images of themselves they project on water, 
on the glass of windows – and also on the surfaces of the eyes of mammals, 
birds, fish. For example, the puddles of water that appears to be shimmering, 
on the surface of the road ahead in a hot day is not ‘subjective’ produced by 
                                                 
50 James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979), 
62. 
51 See Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
52 Jonas Shackauskas, ‘Interview With Alfonso Lingis’ in Tom Sparrow and Bobby George (eds.), Another 
Phenomenology: Exploring the Sensuous Earth, Volume 1 of Singularum: Lessons in Aesthetics, 2012, 2-15. 
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the mind; it is engendered by the road, and the sun, and everybody in the car 
that sees it.53 
 
The third chapter Photo | Vision: Photographing Place asks, how has correlationism 
inflected representations of place? Siegfried Kracauer and Ernst Bloch, amongst others, 
sought to describe contemporary experience using the short narrative essayistic Denkbild 
(thought-image). The Denkbild was concerned with the interdependence of parts that, in 
critic Karoline Kirst’s words, ‘…presents an image as an integral albeit not immediately 
recognizable part of the thought’.54 Walter Benjamin’s deployment and ‘intensification’ 
of this in, for example, One Way Street, and later in The Arcades Project, experimented with 
a materialist expansion of this device to include images, quotations, and artefacts. The 
German Baroque emblematic tripartite structure, Inscriptio (motto), Subscriptio (epigram), 
and Pictura (icon, device, image), provided Benjamin with a model for his method.55 
Benjamin produced a profane materialist version of the emblem in his attempt to find a 
form equivalent to the experience of modernity.  
 
How Benjamin’s expanded concept of the Denkbild can be deployed is explored in the 
following three ways: In the first section Inscription, Benjamin’s use of the Denkbild as a 
means of deciphering contemporary experience is discussed (through reference to the 
writing of Susan Buck-Morss, Howard Caygill, and Karoline Kurst). Then in Pictura: 
Project X a process of aestheticisation of urban space is described via urban development 
and public art works, in Perth, Western Australia. In the third section, Subscriptiao: 
Konvolut K: Dream City and Dream House, Dreams of the Future, Anthropological Nihilism, we 
address the work Konvolut K (Jo Law, Redmond Bridgeman) and how this work sought 
to employ some of the strategies of Benjamin’s expanded concept of the Denkbild. 
 
Analysis of the urban landscapes describe in chapter three often makes the point that 
any social reality is necessarily occluded by visual representations. But another 
conclusion is possible; perhaps photographs are capable of operating in what video 
game creator and theorist Ian Bogost, citing the photography of Steven Shore, describes 
as an ontographic mode, a mode, Bogost argues, which is able to present how the ‘tyre 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 Karoline Kirst, ‘Walter Benjamin’s “Denkbild”: Emblematic Historiography of the Recent Past’, 
Monatshefte, 86/4 (1994), 515. 
55
 Ibid. 514. 
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and the chassis, the ice milk and the cup, the buck shot and the soil […] exist not just for 
us but also for themselves and for one another, in ways that might surprise and dismay us’.56In 
the fourth Chapter, From Beyond, some of the implications of Bogost's claim and the 
possible features of a ontographic mode of practice are explored.  
 
First in A Speculative Photographic Realism, Tom Gunning’s argument for representational 
realism is discussed. My intention here is to contrast ontological realism with 
representational realism via an account of the intrusion of presence in photographs- to 
produce a kind of photographic realism. Then, in A Practical Onto-graphy, I draw upon 
Harman’s account of ‘ontography’ and Bogost’s concept of ‘practical ontography’ to 
explore a strategic practical framework for an ontographic photography. In the 
Conclusion Reza Negarestani’s account of ‘anonymous materials’57 and Eugene Thacker’s 
concept of occultism, are discussed as possible tactics for the practice of an ontographic 
photography. This discussion takes place in relation to two projects. 58 These are the 
short film A Natural History Primer (Jo Law, Redmond Bridgeman),(Appendix 3) and the 
project From Beyond wherein the role of speculation, realism, and how these may 
intersect with concepts of the preternatural is investigated in a current series of 
photographs. (Appendix 4) The aim of this project is to conjure up an encounter with 









The first chapter is a return to and reconsideration of a historical debate of the status of 
the artwork as self-sufficient object or relational social process. This chapter reconsiders 
ideas originally published as an essay in Australian Cultural History: Antipodean Modern.59 
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 Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology: Or What it’s Like to be a Thing (Minneapolis and London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012), 50-51. 
57 Reza Negarestani, Cyconopedia: Complicity with anonymous materials (Melbourne: re.press, 2008). 
58 See Eugene Thacker, ‘Occultural Studies Column’, Mute [online magazine], (2011-13) 
<http://www.metamute.org/editorial/occultural-studies-column>. 
59
 Redmond Bridgeman, ‘Avant-garde Attidudes: New Art in Austalia’, eds. Nevil Levi Tim Dolin, 
Australian Cultural History, vol. 25, 2006, Australian Public Intellectual Network, Perth, 291-314 
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The second chapter developed out of a paper, The Ethics of Looking, presented as a short 
discussion paper at the symposium The Aesthetics of Care: The artistic, social and scientific 
implications of the use of biological/medical technologies for artistic purposes.60 The third chapter 
concerns a collaborative photographic project with Jo Law set in Perth, Western 
Australia. The fourth chapter, in part, incorporates a forthcoming short essay (co-
authored with Jo Law) appearing in O-Zone: A Journal of Object Oriented Studies,61 and 
draws on the preceding research to explore a conceptual framework for a speculative, 
realist, and preternatural photography.  
 
In the context of the preceding discussion of the relationship between research and 
practice, the discussion in chapter four is not an attempt at an explication of the photo-
book that accompanies this dissertation. Rather the discussion formulates a future 
oriented approach to praxis, a term which, for Pascal Gielen, has a number of 
contemporary meanings: 
What matters is not only the correct balance between theory and practice, but 
also the way in which they interact. Ideally, material reality is explored through 
theoretical knowledge and theoretical insights are, when necessary, corrected 
in a tactile way. In Marxist jargon such correct interaction may also be referred 
to as praxis. Though it is not necessary to copy or subscribe to Marx’s 
ideological backdrop as such, praxis can be considered to be a sort of 
embodied knowledge. However, the term also refers to a bilateral relationship 
between theory and acting which may be referred to as acting through 
theoretical knowledge and through an acting theory. It is a relationship of 
continuous interpenetration of theory and practice.62  
 
Thus chapter four is not concerned with the production of particular works but of 
opening a conceptual space within which, by its very nature, there can be no predicable 
product. Maarten Simon and Jan Masschelein’s discussion of the aetiology of the word 
‘school’ further develops the meaning of praxis in this situation: ‘School is literally a 
place of schole, that is the space of free time […] Disconnected from both the oikos and 
polis, and hence freed from daily and economic and political occupations, the school was 
a real space with a real inner place and time, where people were exposed to real 
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 Redmond Bridgeman, ‘The Ethics of Looking’ The Aesthetics of Care? The Artistic, Social and Scientific 
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things’.63 In these senses this dissertation can be understood as striving to create space 
for an approach to praxis in the context of new considerations, such as object oriented 
ontology, of realism, ecology, and objects (or things). Simon and Massschelein explain: 
The school could be regarded as a particular medium, a means without ends, 
that is a free place and time where something is being offered without 
establishing a particular destination or orientation. Schole, then, is not simply a 
time/space of passage (from past to future, project time or initiation time). It 
is the time and space of attention.64 
 
Consequently, the last chapter in the dissertation is not structured solely around the 
explication of existing work. In addition, arising from the research described in this 
dissertation, the conclusion briefly describes a future oriented direction. This is 
primarily practice-oriented and will employ obsolete photographic technologies and 
image-making techniques such as cyanotypes, electro-photography (Kirilian 
photography), ambrotypes, and the remnant silver gelatine photography. Following on 
from the discussion of photography and the preternatural in chapter four, it will put 
forward the hypothesis, to be investigated via future research, that a historical model for 
conjuring up a realist beyond is offered by occult and spirit photography with its 
ambition of making visible various materialisations and other effluvia.
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If philosophy begins in wonder, then where does it end? What is its end? 
Aristotle said that while it begins in wondrous questioning, it ends with “the 
better state” of attaining answers, like an itch we get rid of with a good scratch 
or a childhood disease that, once gotten over, never returns. How depressing! 
[…] Wittgenstein once wrote that a “philosophical problem has the form: “I 
don’t know my way about” which was the symptom of he deep confusion that 
constituted philosophy for him. But Heidegger loved wandering aimlessly in 
the woods, following Holzwege or paths that lead nowhere, stumbling onto 
dead-ends which could also be clearings.65 
 
      Lee Braver  





This Overview refers to speculative and object-oriented philosophies to the extent that 
they are able to, in Lee Braver’s words, address ‘the issue of realism’ and the creative 
endeavour discussed in this dissertation. The terrain covered here is rather expansive 
and since the writing of each of the thinkers discussed is dense and complex, only the 
insights from each writer that are most relevant to this question will be discussed. 
However, by necessity neighbouring thinkers will be drawn on for support (Harman, 
for example, cannot be understood without some insight into Martin Heidegger). I will 
try and limit these secondary readings only to their most essential components. This 
overview will not adjudicate between these various thinkers, and where differences do 
arise, unless they are immediately relevant to the primary questions, they remain outside 
the scope of this Overview.  
 
In the first section, Philosophies of Access, a background for the subsequent discussion of 
correlationism and the critique of philosophies of access is provided. The second 
section, Correlationism and Philosophies of Access, outlines the impact of Meillassoux’s 
account of correlationism, the types of response it engendered amongst speculative 
realists and the important role that the necessity of contingency plays in Meillassoux’s 
argument. In the third section, Graham Harman and Timothy Morton: Object Oriented 
Philosophy, Graham Harman’s privileging of the human-world dyad (i.e. his agreement 
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with Meillassoux regarding the prevalence of correlationism), in particular Harman’s 
account of withdrawal and vicarious causation, in The Quadruple Object, are described as 
key components of any alternative to a human-centric ‘correlationist circle’. Then 
aspects of Timothy Morton’s argument in Realist Magic are canvassed for how they apply 
an expanded concept of ecological to our understanding of objects, relations and the 
implications this may have for aesthetic endeavour.  
 
 
(i) Philosophies of Access 
 
A central theme in this dissertation is the question of access; that is, can knowledge of 
being(s) be had as they exist apart from humans? This question of access has been at the 
forefront of philosophical questioning. It is beyond the scope of this section to address 
this question in any depth; rather the intention is to provide a context for Meillassoux’s 
account of correlationism and how it intersects with Harman’s and Timothy Morton’s 
perspectives on the question of access. The most useful place to start is Rene Descartes’ 
split between extended and mental substances, which he argued for in Meditations on First 
Philosophy.66 For Descartes matter possesses extension in space, but minds do not; but 
nevertheless our minds have a distinct existence greater than any external matter:  
And certainly the idea I have of the human mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, not extended 
in length, breadth, or depth, or having any other bodily properties, is much more distinct than 
the idea of any bodily thing.67 
 
The mind’s distinct existence creates a pivot point for Descartes. This condition is 
guaranteed by God because the mind’s existence is analogous to God’s own existence—
it is the Innate Idea that is self-guaranteeing and hence is able to establish firm 
foundations for knowledge of the external world because it exists in both space and 
time but is outside, or external to, these at the same time. This distinction between 
extended and mental substance, and how it is reconciled in the mind of both man and 
God, continues in John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Though he 
rejected Descartes’ concept of Innate Ideas as having no source in experience, Locke 
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asks: from what source could knowledge come? It comes from experience, impressing 
itself upon a tabula rasa, a blank slate. Locke explains:  
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all 
characters, without any ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes 
it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted 
on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason 
and knowledge? To this I answer in one word EXPERIENCE.68 
 
Locke argues this experience is produced from a correlation between primary and 
secondary qualities. Primary qualities are properties that objects have that are 
independent of an observer. These include solidity, extension, motion, number and 
figure. These are facts about the nature of reality and exist independently of subjective 
judgments. Secondary qualities are the affects or sensations that primary qualities 
engender in the observer. They are not objective facts, but are rather their subjective 
effects, in the mind of the observer produced by the nature of reality. Thus, knowledge of 
the external world depends upon the mind reconciling these facts of experience and 
providing reliable knowledge. Experience provides the material of knowledge quite 
literally via the causal relationship between it and the secondary, albeit subjective, effect 
on the mind. This reciprocal relationship between mind and the external world 
guarantees knowledge, as in the Cartesian relationship between extended and mental 
substance.  
 
For Locke the gap between mind and matter could be overcome via experience. But for 
David Hume this is problematic. At the commencement of his An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, Hume states that his intention is to describe ‘the secret springs and 
principles in which the human mind is actuated in its operations’.69 Yet he soon deduces 
that, at the very least, in so far as it is provisionally valid, what knowledge we have 
results from an interaction between perceptual experience and ideas. Ideas are 
secondary; combinations of the basic building blocks of perception that, as Hume 
explains, ‘compound, transpose, augment or diminish the materials afforded us by the 
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senses and experience’.70 Perceptual experience, the basis for these ideas, can be likened 
to a type of impression:  
Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them impressions; employing 
that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term 
impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, 
or feel, or love, or hate or desire or will. And impressions are distinguished 
from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, 
when we reflect on any of these sensations or movements above mentioned.71 
 
Yet, for Hume, scepticism was the only truly justifiable attitude to experience that, at 
best, could only provide a posteriori corrigible knowledge about the external world. For 
Hume argued that, while experience is the foundation of knowledge, it could never be 
certain knowledge. This was because the causal relations necessary for experience to be 
understood as such had no necessity of their own. That is, causal relations could not be 
described or predicted in terms of a priori reason. The mind, Hume argued, cannot 
apprehend any necessary relation between ‘a’ and ‘b’. A precedes b and indeed seems to 
cause b, but this is only via an inductive inference on the part of the observer as a 
matter of habit. The causal interaction can only be empirically verified; hence it is a 
matter of a posteriori knowledge arrived at by inductive reasoning. For example, while it 
is reasonably likely that for many Earthlings the sun will rise tomorrow, there is no 
necessary reason, that is a reason arising from logic alone, that it should. However 
unlikely, a situation where it fails to rise for all Earthlings can be imagined, as Douglas 
Adams amongst others have imagined.72 Its rising is a local, non-necessary event that is 
only inductively true in relation to our experience. This event, or conjunction of the 
earth, humans, and the sun in a certain relationship to each other, is not the same type 
of conjunction as 1+ 1 = 2, which cannot be imagined otherwise.  
 
The connection between mind and matter as the self-guaranteed relationship of 
Descartes and the empiricism of Locke was broken. It not only eliminated the idea that 
there existed a law of cause and effect but also brought into doubt the testimony of the 
senses altogether regarding the nature of the external world. Locke’s faith in the senses 
as a conduit for experience, and hence empiricism itself, was severely undermined. 
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Experience became merely a succession of sensations, yet Hume’s withering scepticism 
impelled Kant, who is discussed next, to ask: what then were the conditions necessary 
for us to know anything? 
 
The terrain of Immanuel Kant’s corpus is justifiably formidable and any adequately 
comprehensive discussion of it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The most 
important consideration, for us, is not the details of its logic as a system, but the 
dominance of his Copernican Revolution on subsequent thought. Two passages from 
the Critique of Pure Reason, the first concerning the nature of the Copernican inversion 
and the second what this means for what we can truly know about things and objects, 
can help illustrate what the new conditions for justified knowledge would be. 
 
In the first passage, Kant sets out to discover the extent and limitation of reason’s 
capacity to know anything about the external world. The problem Kant set himself was 
to ask how things or objects conform to our cognition rather than the reverse. By 
asking how objects conform to the mind, rather than how mind conforms to objects, 
the focus shifts from the nature of reality to how it could be possible for the mind to 
know reality in the first place. A question concerning the fundamental nature of things 
becomes an epistemological question concerned with the nature and limits of our 
knowledge concerning things. Under what conditions or framework of understanding 
does the mind know the world? Asking these questions, Kant develops his famous 
critique of the possible framing conditions and limits of knowledge. Kant likened his 
approach to a kind of Copernican Revolution in thought. This was because it is an 
inversion of the type of question asked. It was a move from questions concerning the 
nature of reality, to what state of affairs would have to exist for questions such as this to 
be possible in the first place. It is also, in the context of the discussion of 
correlationism, a situation in the which observers construct what they observe, though 
Kant argued that this was not wholly the case, as objects must conform to our 
cognition: 
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to 
objects, but all attempts to find something about them a priori through 
concept that would extend our cognition have, on that presupposition, come 
to nothing. Hence, let us once try whether we do not get further with the 
problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must confirm to our 
cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a 
priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before 
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they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, 
who, when he did not make good progress in the estimation of celestial 
motion if he assumed the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, 
tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer 
revolve and left the stars at rest.73  
 
In matters of causation following Hume, Kant argues the mind, it appears, has no 
reference point outside of itself to which it can refer. Any specific event once described 
is only a description of the event’s local causes. While such an event may be described 
via reference to mathematics or general laws, there is no general law in operation that 
explains causation in itself. Here the transcendental bridge of Kant’s system kicks in. It 
is the mind’s structure, Kant argued, that by necessity, because it is part of reality and 
shares its fundamental features, provides a framework that guarantees certain forms of 
knowledge:  
Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuitions of 
objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of objects, then I do 
not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an 
object of the senses) conforms to the faculty of our intuition, then I can very 
well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these 
intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer to them as 
representations to something as their object and determine this object through 
them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this 
determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the 
same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I 
assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which 
alone they can be cognized, (as given objects) conforms to these concepts, in 
which case I immediately see a way out of the difficulty, since experience itself 
is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to 
presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which 
rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience 
therefore necessarily conform, and on which they must agree.74  
 
In this way, Kant describes the constructive framework that determines the extent and 
nature of knowledge of the external world. It is within this context that objectivity gains 
its meaning. The claim of objectivity is not a claim to know objects apart from the 
framework; objects can only be known via the framework that makes human knowledge 
of anything possible. Justified knowledge becomes a type of provisional certainty about 
objects, things of which we have been able to apprehend a degree of factual, objective, 
if provisional, knowledge. Thus our knowledge of objects can be said to be different 
from our speculation about the nature of things. Objects are produced by our framework 
of objectivity, a form of knowledge that situates them in relation to us, ‘We suppose 
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that our representations of things, as they are given to us, do not conform to these 
things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as appearances, conform to our 
mode of representation’.75 
 
Science has a basis upon which it makes corrigible truth claims regarding objects and 
their possible causal relations. But it is a certainty about our knowledge of our 
intuitions, or what Kant called Sensibility. Descriptive facts about the world, Kant 
allows, are knowable to this extent, but can and do change because: ‘The order and 
regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could 
never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, 
originally set them there’.76 
 
Though we cannot know things-in-themselves this does not mean they do not exist. It is 
just because we cannot know them, that they remain noumena, outside of and unavailable 
to experience, and hence unavailable to the transcendental model of knowledge. 
Phenomena are, in contrast, sensible to our understanding in a way that is amenable to 
empirical verification via the scientific method. Kant’s is in this way a transcendental 
model of knowledge—justified knowledge claims about the external world are 
dependent on empirical experience, but because of the nature of the framework within 
which they occur, they are able to formulate inductive generalizations and describe 
objective, if corrigible, facts. All claims regarding objects are framed by this fact, they 
are only known in so far as they correlate with, or conform to, the human mind’s 
framework of understanding. The limits that the Kantian view places on the extent of 
our knowledge of the external world have profound and continuing consequences for 
continental philosophy. As Harman, in Guerrilla Metaphysics, writes: ‘Like all events of 
shattering genius, the Kantian revolution is so victorious that it is now taken for 
granted’.77 The next two sections outline how these limits have been recently contested, 
and some possible consequences for our conception of the artwork and aesthetics more 
generally. 
                                                 
75 Immanuel Kant, cited by Lee Braver, A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism (Illinois: 
Northwest University Press, 2007), 33. 
76 Lee Braver, A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism, (Illinois, Northwestern 
University Press, 2007), Kant, 33. 
77 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things (Chicago: Open Court 





(ii) Correlationism and the question of Access 
 
Quentin Meillassoux’s description and critique of correlationist arguments has had a 
significant impact within contemporary philosophy and beyond. As argued in After 
Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, Meillassoux hopes to disrupt the previous 
genealogy, outlined above, of Kantian transcendentalism by contesting the limits and 
conditions that the Kantian framework imposes on what can be known. My intention 
here is to introduce Meillassoux’s account of correlationism in order to lay the 
groundwork for an exploration of some of the implications it holds, reactions to it and 
counter models of access such as Morton's ecological account.  
 
In 2007 Ray Brassier reported that Meillassoux had devised a unique account of a 
particular form of argument. Brassier reported,  
Meillassoux has given it a name: ‘correlationism’. Correlationism affirms the 
indissoluble primacy of the relation between thought and its correlate over the 
metaphysical hypostatization or representationalist reification of either term of 
the relation. Correlationism is subtle: it never denies that our thoughts or 
utterances aim at or intend mind-independent or language-independent 
realities; it merely stipulates that this apparently independent dimension 
remains internally related to thought and language.78 
 
 
Brassier proposed a symposium be held to discuss the consequences correlationism 
held for materialist, speculative, and realist directions in thought. The conference, titled 
Speculative Realism: A workshop, was held in 2007 at Goldsmiths College. As the 
announcement of the conference itself declares, ‘Speculative realism is not a doctrine 
but the umbrella term for a variety of research programmes committed to upholding the 
autonomy of reality, whether in the name of transcendental physicalism, object-oriented 
philosophy, or abstract materialism, against the depredations of anthropocentrism’.79 As 
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such the term ‘speculative realism’ was simply understood as a useful label that helped 
describe a common direction in thought.80  
 
So what is correlationism? Meillassoux’s description of correlationism places emphasis 
upon the mind-dependent nature of the relationship between thought and being. Any 
distinction between inside and outside must collapse under the light of the pragmatic 
contradiction that is committed if it is held otherwise. Thought cannot catch itself in the 
act of observing unobserved: once something is thought it is always within thought. In 
Meillassoux’s words: 
By ‘correlationism’ we mean the idea according to which we only ever have 
access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term 
considered apart from the other. We will henceforth call correlationism any 
current of thought, which maintains the unsurpassable character of the 
correlation so defined. Consequently, it becomes possible to say that every 
philosophy that disavows naive realism has become a variant of 
correlationism.81 
 
The question for the correlationist is no longer what is the fundamental cause of things 
‘but rather to ask who has grasped the more originary correlation: is it the thinker of the 
subject-object correlation, The noetic noematic correlation, or the language referent 
correlation? The question is no longer ‘which is the proper substrate’ but “which is the 
proper correlate?’82 This leaves thought within ‘the cloistered inside.’83 confined to 
subjective or intersubjective verification. It is no longer a question of whether our 
concepts adequately describe the outside, a question of adequation;84 rather the correlate 
itself creates an inter-subjective actuality that renders any question of the outside 
redundant: 
For it could be that contemporary philosophers have lost the great outdoors, the absolute 
outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside which was not relative to us, and which was given as 
indifferent to its own givenness to what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether we are 
thinking of it or not; that outside which thought could explore with the legitimate feeling of 
being on foreign territory - of being entirely elsewhere.85  
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But this inside produces a paradox, for thought is both inside and outside at the same 
time. Language and consciousness, which act as the two principal correlates between 
thinking and being, create their own ‘object worlds’. 86 Thought is enclosed within itself 
but nevertheless looking out at the object world it has created:  
For we are well and truly imprisoned within this outside proper to language 
and consciousness given that we are always-already in it (the ‘always already’ 
accompanying the ‘co’ of correlationism as its other essential locution), and 
given that we have no access to any vantage point from whence we could 
observe these ‘object-worlds’, which are the unsurpassable providers of 
exteriority, from the outside. But if this outside seems to us to be a cloistered 
outside, an outside in which some may legitimately feel incarcerated, this is 
because in actuality such an outside is entirely relative, since it is—and this is 
precisely the point—relative to us.87 
 
 
Legitimate knowledge is now defined within these confines and anything outside of 
these internal relationships is considered pre-critical: ‘These postulates characterize 
every “post-critical” philosophy, i.e. every philosophy that sees itself as sufficiently 
faithful to Kant to not want to return to a pre-critical metaphysics’.88 Now that we have 
glossed Meillassoux’s general account of correlationism it is necessary to go into some 
of the details of his argument. By doing so two goals will be achieved. First, it allows a 
clearer idea of the concepts of realism, materialism and speculation and how they are 
deployed in this thesis. Secondly, as will be shown in the third section, Graham Harman 
and Timothy Morton: Object Oriented Philosophy, it enables important distinctions to be 
drawn between Meillassoux’s argument, and those of Harman and Morton. 
 
Meillassoux’s aim is to reinvigorate a materialism that commits itself to ‘two principles 
that belong to any materialism: being is not thought, and thought can think being’.89 In 
order to pursue this goal, he first sought to develop an account of the model of 
argument form that would be its main adversary. It was with these aims in mind that 
Meillassoux describes the argument form he terms correlationism; which is distilled into 
two forms, each of which will now be described. The first form he describes as the 
‘correlationist circle’. It is a circular argument from which there is no apparent escape: If 
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a person claims to know of something outside of thought he commits a pragmatic 
contradiction, for in order to state this belief in the first place or to think it, he or she 
must deploy thought even though it is impossible to be ‘acceding through thought to a 
being independent of thought.’90 Because our thought is inherently linked to our 
subjectivity, for the correlationist ‘thought cannot escape from itself so as to accede to a 
world not yet affected by the modes of apprehension of our subjectivity.’91 And our 
subjectivity, as Meillassoux explains, is tied to our thought: 
I call ‘correlationism’ every form of de-absolution of thought that, to obtain 
this result, argues for the closure of thought upon itself, and its subsequent 
incapacity to attain an absolute outside of it. I call ‘speculative’ every 
philosophy that claims on the contrary, to attain such an absolute. I call 
‘materialism’ […] every thought acceding to an absolute that is at once 
external to thought and in itself devoid of all subjectivity.92  
 
There is no stepping outside of this, one always steps into thought and thus into our 
subjectivity; ‘thus [I] call the “correlationist circle” the argument that consists in 
affirming that a vicious and essentially pragmatic circle is inherent in any materialism 
that posits the absolute existence of a reality outside all representation.’93 So within this 
schema the only question that makes any sense is: what is the correlate? What is the 
relation between thought and being? Is it the subject-object correlate or the 
‘consciousness-given, noetico-noematic correlate, being in the world, language-
reference, etc’?94 The correlationist circle forms its own inescapable circular logic, that 
seemingly rules out knowledge of the absolute, of anything outside the correlation 
between thought and being. Arguments that claim such knowledge of the outside are 
revealed as self-refuting pragmatic contradictions. Yet there is an escape from the 
correlate. This, Meillassoux argues, is the escape offered by what he terms 
‘subjectalism’. Subjectalism absolutises the correlate itself. It does this via overcoming 
the correlationist argument by accepting its main tenet. If no knowledge can be 
obtained of a materialist outside, then rather than indicating the finitude of human 
knowledge, or its limits, it actually indicates the absolute quality of human subjectivity 
itself. In this way the correlate does not mark a limit but rather marks an absolute. 
Meillassoux defines subjectalism in the following way: ‘We shall thus define as 
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subjectalism every metaphysics that absolutised the correlation of being and thought, 
whatever sense it attached to the subjective and objective poles of such a relation’.95 
How subjectivity is construed is then the issue of debate for the subjectualist. For 
Meillassoux, all the various non-fideist arguments for this owe their origin to the finality 
of innate ideas. These, in absolutising subjectivity, offer various ideas about what this 
consists of: 
The critical force of this word ‘subjectalism’ is to put into the same camp 
these currents that claim to be radically opposed, to put them all together - 
Hegel, Nietzsche, and Deleuze included - into the camp of Berkeley himself. 
For Berkeley, inventor of the argument of the correlationist circle, was not a 
correlationist, but a subjectalist: a philosopher for whom there existed only the 
subject-minds and their ideas.96 
 
In response to the logic of subjectalism, Meillassoux states his project in the following 
way:  
My project - a neo-materialist project - can be formulated as follows: how can 
we escape from both correlationism and subjectalism - from all of their 
historical variants, and even all conceivable variants. How can we carry out the 
conjoint recusal of skepticism, criticism, transcendental and existential 
phenomenology, and post-modernism (so many correlationisms), and 
idealism, spiritualism, and vitalism, in their various forms so many 
subjectalisms.97 
 
So if we wish to escape the correlationist circle, the question thus becomes how do we 
escape subjectalism? For the subjectivist what is unthinkable, that is the thing-in-itself, 
which is affirmed by the correlationist circle, does just not exist, it is impossible. The 
only absolute is the thought side of the correlation: ‘The strict necessity with which 
correlationism demonstrated that we can never think outside of subjectivity, is 
transmuted into the thought of an ontological necessity: subjectivity is always 
experienced as a necessary, and hence eternal, principle from which no one can 
escape’.98 Nevertheless, Meillassoux finds the means of escape within the correlationist 
circle itself. For in order for the correlationist to counter the subjectivist absolutising 
their own subjectivity, the correlationists have to affirm the non-absolute quality of 
correlationism itself. How do the correlationists do this? They argue that the correlation 
between thought and things is itself not absolutely necessary. That is, for correlation 
itself to operate it must posit the very possibility of the thing-in-itself as a possibility. 
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Even though the correlationist intention is to prove the un-knowability of what is 
outside the correlation, the correlationist argument requires this possibility for its own 
self-coherence. It needs to understand the correlation as itself non-necessary within a 
possible schema that includes the ‘unknowable entirely-other’. Meillassoux calls this the 
thesis of correlational facticity: 
Thinking can think its own absence of necessity, not only qua personal 
consciousness, qua supra-individual structure. It is only on this condition that 
correlationism can claim to think the very possibility of an unknowable entirely-
other of correlation.99  
 
If it does not accept this, as a possibility, it must accede to the subjectivist’s argument. 
For it indeed has then only become a form of subjectivism itself. If correlationism is to 
escape this it must exist within a realm of other, albeit unknowable, possibilities. Hence,  
Correlation may be unsurpassable, but it is not given in the manner of a 
necessary foundation; nothing in it indicates its own necessity, even thought 
we cannot think it being-otherwise, even thought we do not know how to 
escape from it to accede to its radical outside.100  
 
Within the decision process of the correlationist exists first the logic of the pragmatic 
contradiction that occurs if being is thought outside thought. The second decision 
process is that this framework itself requires the recognition of the principle of 
factuality itself, not as an absolute, but as a fact, that governs correlationism. That is, 
from the first it requires the recognition by correlationism itself of a latent ‘principle of 
facticity’. This principle allows correlationism to resist its absolutisation by subjectivists. 
By absolutising factuality itself—not specific facts, but the principle of facticity—
correlationism is able to stave off subjectivism. But in so doing, it is absolutising its own 
enabling condition, the principle of factuality that allows it to escape subjectivism. It 
needs to posit at least one absolute fact itself, as its own condition of not being an 
absolute:  
It is a matter of showing that the ultimate thesis of this de-absolutizing 
thought conceals a hidden absolute: facticity—indeed arche-facticity. Why 
does facticity constitute a hidden absolute of correlationism? Because the 
latter must admit that we are capable of thinking our possible non-being, so as 
to stave off the subjectivist absolute that declares it’s unthinkable.101  
 
The subjectivists by their own account cannot think the non-existence of the 
correlation. To admit the possibility of the absence of the correlation, like the possibility 
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that things can be known outside it, is to commit a pragmatic contradiction. ‘The non 
correlated is, according to him [the subjectivist], a wholly absurd notion, and thus just as 
inexistent as the square circle’.102 In contrast to the subjectivists, the correlationists, 
while admitting being trapped within the correlationist circle, observe that this fact is a 
fact of their observation of their situation, and that while they are unable to prove the 
absolute quality of the correlation or the absolute truth of things outside of correlation, 
the fact that ‘I cannot think the other of correlation […] represents the factual limits of 
my thought’.103 Or as Meillassoux suggests in the title of his book, After Finitude, it’s 
finitude. 
 
To summarise, the correlationist accepts the absolute possibility of our non-being, as it 
is this possibility that affirms correlationism itself and the limits that it describes on 
what can be known regarding the absolute. In contrast, the subjectivist cannot allow, by 
absolutising the correlation itself, the possibility of its non-existence. A condition of this 
absolutisation is the impossibility of its non-existence. Unlike the subjectivist, the strong 
correlationist must know one absolute, that of the principle of factuality that allows the 
absolute possibility of our non-being. Indeed, this possibility makes possible the 
framework of correlationism itself as a framework of knowledge, and a framework that 
can only exist within the context of other possible, if unknown, possibilities, so that 
‘there is indeed an effectively thinkable absolute, by the very admission of the correlationist, one that 
he can no longer refute since he presupposes it’.104 [emphasis in the original]  
 
To continue then, the principle of facticity, the arche-fact collapsed into one, enables 
Meillassoux’s principle of contingency: ‘we know that what is, could not be; and that 
what is not, could be’.105 Contingency is thus understood as necessary:  
Things, people, events, physical laws, correlation itself; to be is to be determinate—to be this or 
that—and thus to be able to change without any reason whatsoever, in perfectly contingent 
fashion, within a time capable of destroying every entity, whatever its mode of being. What we 
took to be the limit of thought—facticity—is an absolute and thinkable property of that which 
is.106  
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The correlationist, if wishing to avoid the charge of subjectivism, accepts the principle 
of facticity—‘to be is to be’ and rejects the principle of ‘to be is not to be’, which is the 
principle of in-consistency and is indeed the result of subjectivism which, in absolutising 
the correlate and hence only subjectivity, de-absolutises contingency. In this way 
Meillassoux’s materialism does not absolutise any material reality. It only absolutises 
contingency itself via the principle of facticity. It is a materialism that does not 
absolutise any one form of materialism or quality, which he argues are forms of 
naturalism. The only exteriority to thought that is encountered ‘is that of the radical 
contingency of our own world’.107  
 
Within this scheme speculative thought has a specific role. Its role is not to affirm any 
one particular state of affairs, material or otherwise as the Real. Rather, speculation is 
concerned solely with demonstrating the necessity of contingency itself and affirming its 
importance as a realm of possibilities in which anything (asides from infringing the 
principle of non-contradiction) can happen. In this context, Meillassoux affirms the 
necessity of an empirical approach to experience. For, he affirms, the empiricist ‘is 
absolutely correct’ but it is also here he finds his disagreement with the empiricist.108 For 
the absolute quality of empirical experience for the empiricist has an element of 
necessity. But it is not the empirical in itself that lends empiricism its importance. The 
encounter with contingency means that it is only via ‘regimes of experience’, in which 
the inherent absolute quality of the contingent within experience is encountered, that 
the empiricist’s efforts gain their validity.109 The question for Meillassoux is not to 
legislate on what is, but to affirm the right of such ‘disciplines of experiences’ to do 
so.110 For Meillassoux, while scientific knowledge is affirmed by the necessity of 
contingency, it is, nevertheless, always corrigible and open to amendment because of its 
contingent nature. The enemy of experience as the main font of knowledge is thus 
metaphysics. This is coupled to Meillassoux’s account of speculation as necessarily 
produced by the recognition of the absolute quality of contingency:  
For I call ‘speculative’ any philosophy that claims to accede to an absolute. 
But I call ‘metaphysical’ any speculation that claims to accede to the absolute 
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according to a more or less extended modality of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason.111  
 
It was just this principle of sufficient reason that Hume found wanting in our 
experience of causation and which he displaced by habit. It is also just this principle that 
Meillassoux finds inimical to contingency and its absolute quality. This is because it 
affirms a necessity where there is not one, the long search for a sufficient reason for 
things: ‘a necessary reason to be as they are rather than otherwise’ offends against 
correlationism because it argues that things should be one way rather than otherwise.112 
In so doing it presents an absolute, one that correlationism has always sought to 
contest. The door to the feidist is opened who simply wills things to be, whether 
justified by reason or empirical demonstration and which, Meillassoux explains, leads to 
dogmatic or absolutist positions, to which he  
oppose[s] an ‘absolutizing’ position, i.e. a speculative but non-metaphysical 
position; the factial position, maintains the absolute falsity of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, and thus relinquishes any right to intrude, with its necessary 
reasons, into the sphere of what actually exists.113  
 
The nature of speculation as conceived by Meillassoux therefore becomes clearer: 
For consider the effects of the thesis according to which materialism must be 
speculative, and not metaphysical, and thus should be prohibited of speaking 
of what is, and content itself with speaking of the contingency of what is. We 
are materialists in so far as we obey the two principles that belong to any 
materialism: being is not thought, and thought can think being. On one hand, 
I establish that the being of everything is its contingency - the fact that a being 
is rather than is not. In After Finitude, I try to prove (my materialist ontological 
proof) that if contingency is eternal, then there must have existed for all 
eternity contingent beings - and not nothing. For contingency is nothing 
outside of what is contingent - it is not a ‘free floating’ principle, but always 
the property of determinate beings.114  
 
Within this proof lies the consideration of dead matter in another way, other than as 
subjectivist anthropomorphic human projects. Its supplemental qualities are understood 
as simply radically contingent events. They mark the refusal of the principle of sufficient 
reason. These little miracles without reason are ‘founded on the principle of pure 
contingency of everything and of every world’.115  
 For in this world of dead matter, it turns out that there is a radical ex nihilo 
emergence of realities, (sensations, perception etc.) that absolutely did not 
exist before, not even potentially (for the potential combinations of organic 
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matter yield only physical complexes which never have any reason to 
supplement themselves with a regime of sensations).116  
 
As explained above, Meillassoux sought to answer the question of how is a materialist 
knowledge possible? He thereby seeks to develop a concept of radical contingency that 
is in turn absolutised. The concept of sufficient cause, which Meillassoux describes 
using the formulation ‘all x’s are y’s’, in favour of the formulation; all x’s are not ‘by 
necessity’ y’s. This formulation, he argues, is the guarantee that the ‘correlationist circle’ 
while it cannot just be stepped out of; can be refuted so that a new delimitation of the 
conditions of knowledge is possible. 
 
Meillassoux’s analysis of correlationism expands the question of our relationship to 
objects and what we can know about them. He sees two positions as the main 
opponents of his argument described in After Finitude: 
In my book I frontally oppose two positions: a) ‘strong correlationism’ which, 
in my opinion, is the most rigorous form of anti-absolutism, and therefore of 
contemporary anti-metaphysics, and b) a metaphysics I call ‘subjective’, which, 
conversely, is nowadays the most widespread philosophy of the absolute, one 
which consists in posing this or that feature of the subject as essentially 
necessary—that is, its status as part of a correlate.117 
 
Though these two positions would seem themselves to be in opposition, but for 
Meillassoux, they are closely linked. Indeed strong correlationism, in which the 
necessary correlation between thought and being rules out any independent knowledge 
of being outside of thought, produces an absolutizing subjectivity. While Kant’s form of 
correlationism, in which though the thing-in-itself cannot be known, it can at least be 
intuited, is rejected by strong correlationism:  
Kant claims that we know something exists in itself, and that it is thinkable 
(non-contradictory). ‘Strong’ correlationism does not even admit that we can 
know that there is an “in-itself” and that it can be thought: for this we are 
radically confined in our thought, without the possibility of knowing the in-
itself, not even its taking place and logicity.118  
 
Yet, Meillassoux argues strong correlationism is a form of inter-subjective Idealism. It 
does not allow the thing-in-itself because it is simply unknowable. The only objectivity 
possible is via inter-subjective agreement. Strong correlationism and absolutism 
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engender a metaphysics of the subjective as the only necessary absolute. Meillassoux 
continues, that by ruling out all metaphysics, independent of subjectivity, what was 
formally impossible from the strong correlationist perspective--the existence of God for 
example--moves from impossible (i.e. unthinkable) to simply unknowable, where this 
un-knowability becomes a matter of faith. Ironically, consequently faith is thereby 
recuperated as a valid critique of critical thought. Thought, which is inherently reliant 
upon its own enabling conditions of rationality—namely, the principle of non-
contradiction—is deemed to be itself ungrounded. In this way, Meillassoux argues, 
fideism, the belief that subjective faith alone has access to the absolute, returns via the 
back door as the thing that trumps thought, because thought, it turns out, understood 
here as rationality, has no right to rule on a faith that is, like the thing-in-itself, beyond 
thought’s legitimate domain. Thus thought’s own process of critique forces itself to 
recognize its limits.  
 
Meillassoux describes what he believes is the now dominant version of correlationism, 
as an onto-theology—an unexamined faith in the subjective constitution of reality. It 
construes subjective reality as the only possible, and hence absolutised, separated view. 
We are left with a form of inter-subjective Idealism in which adequation, that is, a 
correspondence between statements and the thing, is displaced by inter-subjective 
agreement. The subjectivist conflates what can be known with what exists, and thus 
produces its own ontological claims concerning the absolute. This produces an anti-
realism, the favourite target of which is naïve realism. A metaphysic of presence is 
created that entails human subjectivity as the only real that is knowable. Meillassoux 
explains: 
For the subjectivist the statement conversely means that the a-subjective is 
absolutely impossible: ‘it cannot be’ = ‘it cannot be in itself’. Metaphysics of 
Life or of Spirit, transcendental philosophy, or strong correlationism: all 
converge in the denunciation of “naïve realism” proper to an Epicurean type 
of materialism asserting that some non-subjective exists (atoms and void) and 
that we can know it.119  
 
 
For Meillassoux, what he termed ‘subjectalism’, absolutizes subjectivity and then 
projects it upon all things. Subject, will, and perception are projected onto matter, but in 
doing so the radical contingency of things is thereby domesticated and humanized. The 




project of de-subjectification, characteristic of much contemporary thought involving 
the critique of reason, will, freedom, etc., are in fact, Meillassoux concludes, monist:  
…these models are monist, even when they seek to be pluralist: in them, 
everything is universally subject, will, creative becoming, image-movement, 
etc. … And nothing can be distinguished other than by differences of degree 
(sometimes re-baptised ‘intensive differences’) that tie together all things with 
the same, sempiternal identity of nature.120 
 
Meillassoux continues by arguing that this position is achieved via an 
anthropomorphism that merely democratizes subjectivity. What we need rather, is the 
recognition of the ‘pure difference’ in nature, ‘numerous regimes of the real’ of 
factuality coupled to the absoluteness of their contingency. Meillassoux declares:  
 
We do not need a monism - or a Deleuzian mono-pluralism, a ‘monism = 
pluralism’ that ultimately comes down to a ‘pluralism = monism. On the 
contrary we need dualism everywhere - pure differences in nature, without any 
continuity whatsoever between that which they differentiate, between 
numerous regimes of the real - matter, life, mind, society, etc—whose possible 
coordination does not allow us to think their reconciliation, unless in the brute 
mode of blind facts.121 
 
He allows that there is nothing in his principle of factuality that would disallow such a 
monist-pluralist world: 
It is even possible - why not? That our world should be as unified in its 
diversity as the subjectalists think it is (one same subjectivity, indefinitely 
ramified, attenuated, diluted […] But it could be (and speculative materialism 
gives us the right to hope for this). That the world is infinitely richer, more 
absurd, more cracked and dualized everywhere, than is dreamt of in the 
philosophies of subjectalist hyper-physicists or metaphysicians.122 
 
In contrast, Meillassoux argues, no matter what form such subjectivities take, they are 
nevertheless forms of anti-materialism. For materialism ‘affirms that one can think that 
which is, independently of all thought, of all subjectivity’ no matter what form it 
takes.123 They all seek the same end: ‘that of abolishing the idea of de-subjectivized 
matter’.124 Nevertheless, in their subjectification of matter, rather than offering a critique 
of the subject and human anthropocentrism—in mind and matter—they are merely 
affirming the human subject. They do this by absolutizing human subjectivity itself that, 
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now apparently uncoupled with anthropocentrism, is made the absolute principle of 
universal existence:  
It is a question as above, of breaking (so we are told) with the derisory 
anthropocentrism in which man believes himself the sole repository of the 
subjective faculty that one intends to absolutize; of showing that man is but 
one particular representative, misguided by the prejudice of his consciousness, 
of a sensibility, of a life, that overflows him in every direction. He must, so it 
is insisted, go back down within himself to the infra-conscious level, to 
participate fully in this a-human subjectivity whose flux conveys him and 
transpierces him.125  
 
Such a realism, Meillassoux continues, cannot lay claim to be a materialism and would 
offend again his own concept of a speculative materialism. Why this is so is inherent in 
the difference between materialism and realism. Meillassoux’s formulation of this 
difference is useful: 
I call realism every position that claims to accede to an absolute reality - every 
speculative position then. But we now understand that realism can be either 
materialist or subjectivist. So every materialism is a realism, but not every 
realism is a materialism (it can be a subjectalism: Berkeley is a realist of the 
spirit and ideas).126 
 
But what would the artwork, if it was to escape correlationism, look like? Meillassoux’s 
perspective may mean that the art object with out a human observer consists only of its 
primary qualities, size, shape, mass, defined as mathematical qualities. But what of 
Graham Harman’s and Timothy Morton’s perspective on the art object? The next 
section will outline how Harman and Morton’s , perspectives can help develop an 
understanding of what an object oriented ontology may mean for our understanding of 
artworks and aesthetic endeavour as something other than materialist things described 
by their mathematical qualities albeit perhaps on Meillassoux’s account, as necessarily 
contingent and speculative. 
 
 
(iii) Graham Harman and Timothy Morton: Object Oriented Ontology 
 
Harman’s understanding of objects presents a response to correlationism and helps us 
to better understand the aesthetic qualities of an art object apart from its relations with 
humans. But Harman is not simply responding to Meillassoux; he had already theorized 
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his own relational account of real objects via Martin Heidegger, Bruno Latour, and 
Alfred North Whitehead prior to his encounter with Meillassoux. The question for 
Harman is not to finally account for the mind-world correlate and the gaps it generates. 
Rather, Harman argues, our perspective needs to be widened to answer two main 
questions: ‘(1) What is the medium through which different objects or poles interact, 
and how does this interaction occur? (2) What is the reality of these objects or poles in 
their own right?’127 Harman’s object-oriented ontology seeks to answer these two 
questions. For Harman the problem with correlationism, as Louise Morelle explains, is: 
the reduction of every statement to its epistemological preconditions, that is to 
say, to human knowledge; the original sin of correlationism is the implicit 
presupposition of the superiority of the epistemological relation of knowledge 
over all other relations.128 
 
For Harman an object-oriented ontology, because it downplays the epistemological 
relation over others, produces a realist account of things that reflects reality’s inherent 
weirdness once freed of the strictures of a correlationism defined by the human limits 
of access:  
Against the model of philosophy as a rubber stamp for common sense and 
archival sobriety, I would propose that philosophy’s sole mission is weird 
realism. Philosophy must be realist because its mandate is to unlock the 
structure of the world itself; it must be weird because reality is weird.129 
 
But what are the features of Harman’s account of this weird reality? As suggested, at its 
core is a de-centering of humanity. This is reflected in Harman’s unique response to 
correlationism. Harman describes correlationism thus:  
If we try to think a world outside human thought, then we are thinking it, and 
hence it is no longer outside thought. Any attempt to escape this circle is 
doomed to contradiction. This is not just a word trick: it is the tacit or explicit 
credo of a now lengthy tradition of philosophy that might be called the 
philosophy of human access.130  
 
Harman believes that taking account of this question of access is at the core of any 
serious philosophy. It is a question that cannot simply be dismissed by a return to a pre-
Kantian non-critical philosophy. Thus a re-construal of Kant’s things-in-themselves is at the 
centre of Harman’s own model of relations: 
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my own complaint against Kant is not that he preserved the things-in-themselves, 
but rather that he saw them as haunting human knowledge alone rather than 
relationality more generally. Like Whitehead, I hold that the in-itself is real. Yet, 
I also hold that this reality remains unattained by inanimate causal relations no 
less than by human subjects. For there is, in fact, a cotton-in-itself that 
withdraws from fire no less than from human awareness.131 
 
In this way, the strategy Harman employs is to argue that the unbridgeable gap between 
object and subject is not a privileged gap between humans and the world per se, but is 
rather a constitutive feature of any relation whatsoever. But what are these objects? In 
his words objects include ‘those entities that are neither physical nor even real. Along 
with diamonds, rope and neutrons, objects may include armies, monsters, square circles, 
and leagues of real and fictitious nations’.132 But objects are never the subjects of 
another; they always possess their own independent identity that accounts for the weird 
reality that is coupled to the object itself: 
My thesis is that objects and weirdness go hand in hand. An object partly 
evades all announcements through its qualities, resisting or subverting efforts 
to identify it with any surface. It is that which exceeds any of the qualities, 
accidents, or relations that can be ascribed to it: ‘an I know not what’, but in a 
positive sense.133 
 
By rejecting the connection between thought and being, the human centric aspect of the 
apprehension of objects within the correlate is removed. It is a de-centering of the 
correlation rather than an attempt to re-centre human knowledge by simply rejecting 
correlationism and the implicit finitude it places on human knowledge. For Harman, 
that there are limits on the possible relations between objects is in the nature of things, 
and all objects share these limitations. In this way, Harman’s model of the relationship 
between objects could be described as a re-assertion of Kant’s Copernican revolution, 
but one in which the human epistemological relation is no longer deemed to be the 
central one. Everything is an act of translation, all objects distort their relata and this 
cannot be overcome. Indeed, Harman’s complaint is that Kant’s epistemology remains 
essentially Ptolemaic, ‘whereas Copernicus drove the earth from the centre of the 
cosmos and put it into action, Kant restores humans to the centre in a manner more 
reminiscent of Ptolemy’.134 This approach, Harman argues, has had a profound impact 
on thought: 
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We might ask what is most typical of the Kantian position. It is surely not his 
theories of space and time or his doctrine of the categories, since few 
philosophers still adhere to these views and yet Kant continues to dominate 
mainstream philosophy anyway. […] No, what is truly characteristic of Kant’s 
position is that the human–world relations takes priority over all others […] 
What is always at stake for him is the relation between human subject on one 
side and the world on the other.135 
 
The consequences of this, Harman continues, is the transfiguration of objects into 
reflections of social constructs and relations outside themselves, so that their reality as 
entities is hardly acknowledged. The only meaningful question about knowledge claims 
becomes an epistemological one concerning the criteria by which we know something so 
that ‘the human-world relation takes priority over all others’.136 Two characteristic 
features of how objects are understood follow from this priority. The first is what 
Harman describes as ‘undermining’, which consists of the claim that objects are nothing 
more than the manifestation of deeper forces or substance. The second, which Harman 
calls ‘over-mining’, is the claim that they are merely symptomatic of greater forces such 
as relations, ideas or physical forces. Undermining is the reduction of objects to quarks, 
particles, waves, atoms, or in ancient Greece to fire, water, air, etc.; while over-mining is 
a reduction to history, ideas, social construction, cybernetics, linguistic systems, relations 
etc. Both stances devalue objects in themselves and hence disavow any knowledge of 
them in themselves. The essential question becomes what is the real essence, substance, 
force or relations that give form to this or that object? And this, Harman argues, is 
always from an anthropic viewpoint. A true Copernican revolution would remove the 
human at the centre of knowing so that, in Harman’s words, ‘All relations are on exactly 
the same footing’.137 But if they are all on the same footing then the question is not what 
are the relations between the human and objects, but between objects and other 
objects? Referring to Heidegger’s concept of tools in Being and Time, Harman, in Tool-
Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, puts forward a reinterpretation of the 
concept of withdrawal as a fundamental feature of this relation. Heidegger’s concept of 
ready-ness to hand is expanded so that the withdrawal of objects from human-centred 
thought is universalized. So Heidegger’s analysis is inverted with the object now 
defining the relationship.  
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But how does Harman describe this inversion? Harman begins with Heidegger the 
phenomenologist and argues all ‘objects are units that both display and conceal a 
multitude of traits’.138 Therefore objects make available or withdraw traits in the sense 
that no object could ever be entirely available to other objects no matter what kind of 
object they happen to be. From here he is able to show that objects (which he now 
describes as tool-beings) withdraw from both human perception and practical use so 
that no object can be exhausted by its encounter with a human being. Following 
Heidegger’s teacher Edmund Husserl, Harman argues that these inexhaustible tool-
beings are not just a series of profiles or adumbrations, but are unified entities 
possessing a series of intrinsic (though veiled) qualities. This means the object is split in 
two ways: the object as a substance is split apart from its relations, and the unity of the 
thing is split from its plurality of features. Harman explains in Guerrilla Metaphysics: ‘The 
thing torn apart from its relations is actually not an empty bare particular, but remains 
torn apart in its private vacuum between its irreducible unity and its colorful 
particularity’.139  
 
In order to describe the dynamics of the relationships produced via this process of 
withdrawal, Harman develops an account of what he calls vicarious causation. Vicarious 
causation is a post-Humean understanding of causation in which the subjective 
apprehension of cause via habit is displaced by an account of relations that ‘must always 
be indirect or vicarious, since no object can enter fully into interaction’.140 The two 
leading forms of interaction between objects are the real and the sensual:  
Real objects withdraw into obscure cavernous underworlds, deprived of causal 
links. Sensual objects, by contrast, are so inclined to interact with their 
neighbours that we wonder why they fail to do so at every instant. In other 
words, the only place in the cosmos where interactions occur is the sensual, 
phenomenal realm.141  
 
Harman’s model of the ‘quadruple object’ describes the set of relationships that is 
engendered in the interaction between real and sensual objects.142 Four tensions are 
produced between sensuous objects, sensuous qualities, real objects and sensual 
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qualities. These tensions are structured by forms of polarization between the real and 
the sensual, and between objects and their qualities. Described only in outline here, 
Harman develops the following model of these interactions: First, between sensual 
object and sensual qualities, wherein sensual objects are present but enmeshed within a 
‘mist of accidental features and profiles’;143 second, sensual objects or real qualities, 
whereby their structure of conscious phenomena is forged from experientially 
interpretive qualities intuited intellectually;144 third, the real object’s sensual qualities, in 
which a withdrawn object is translated into sensual apprehension via a ‘surface’ accessed 
by thought and or action;145 and finally, the real object and real qualities, a coupling that 
grounds the ability of objects to differ from one another without collapsing into 
indefinite substrata.146 
 
In this schema the human world correlate becomes just one measure of relations of 
interaction between objects. Husserl’s phenomenological catch cry ‘To the things 
themselves’ is taken literally at the expense of the human-world correlation. Now, 
object relations are multi-directional. They do not describe simply a human relationship. 
In Harman’s words, that:  
is certainly true of pitchforks, shovels, knives, tunnels, and bridges, which 
invisibly perform their labors while also sometimes existing as phenomenal 
images before the mind. But it is also true of entities not usually regarded as 
‘tools’: for even colors, shapes, and numbers all have a reality that is not 
exhausted by the exact way in which a thinker considers them.147 
 
That an object has a fourfold structure has important consequences: since the object 
cannot be reduced to its appearance(s) to human perception or use, and since the object 
is posited to have its own intrinsic qualities and features, the partitioning of the world 
into objects is not the unique achievement of human intervention into an otherwise 
unified cosmos. The cosmos is metaphysically plural at its basic level: no object fully 
encounters any other object; rather, each object with its array of parts and particularities 
encounters another object and its intrinsic parts and particularities only through these 
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particular features, and not as the other object is in itself. The interaction between two 
objects forms a medium: 
 A medium is any space in which two objects interact, whether the human 
mind be one of those objects or not. Human sense experience is only a 
particular zone or medium of the world, and possibly not even the most 
interesting. The medium between two objects is the glue that makes possible 
the entire carpentry of things—without it, the world would remain a set of 
noncommunicating crystalline spheres sleeping away in private vacuums.148  
 
This understanding of media is what Harman calls ‘vicarious causation’, and it serves to 
explain how the relations between real entities are fundamentally aesthetic. Ontography 
is the term that Harman adopts (from ghost story writer and medievalist M.R. James’ 
short story Oh Whistle, and I will come to you, my lad) to describe the description and 
engagement of these aesthetic relations between objects. Harman defines it in the 
following way: ‘Ontography would deal with the limited number of interactions that can 
occur between objects’.149 It would concern the practice of ontic engagement with things 
by mapping ‘the basic landmarks and fault lines in the universe of objects’.150 It seeks to 
account for differences and relationships by engaging with the tensions implicit in their 
interaction, producing a form of aesthetic entanglement:  
if we now say that the universe has an aesthetic or metaphorical structure, this 
has nothing to do with the shopworn theme of a conscious human artist 
projecting values onto an arbitrary perspectival universe. Instead it is an actual 
metaphysical statement about the way that raindrops or sandstorms interact 
among themselves even when no humans are on the scene. […] Causation 
itself as music, sculpture, and street theater.151 
 
Ecological thinking and its implications have been a central theme of Morton’s thought. 
For Morton what is original about object oriented ontologies is the orientation towards 
objects, broadly conceived, in such a way that the anthropocentric theme of the 
corrolate between human thought (or subjectivity) is democratised. But rather than 
seeing it from Meillassoux’s perspective as an entrapment, in which the Kantian finitude 
of the human-world correlate for thought defines human limitations, Morton 
understands it as an opportunity to radicalise and re-orientate out understanding of 
objects, relations, and hence ecology. To do so Morton propels causation, aesthetics, 
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and objects to the centre of our understanding of ecology in his recent investigation of 
these themes, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality152 Morton now universalizes 
aesthetics as sensuous interaction between all objects so that in his words ‘the aesthetic 
dimension is the causal dimension’.153 Morton declares, ‘As part of the project of object-
oriented ontology (OOO), the philosophy whose first architect is Graham Harman, this 
book liberates the aesthetic from its ideological role as matchmaker between subject and 
object, a role it has played since the days of Kant’.154 Morton does not mean perception; 
in the sense of human perception, rather he means how things encounter each other, 
their causal relations. Causality is not something that is observed by something or 
somebody watching. It is common to all things and their interactions. It radiates from 
objects: 
When the light-sensitive diode detects my shadow, it perceives in every 
meaningful sense, if we only accept that objects exert an aesthetic influence on 
one another (aisthēnesthai, Greek ‘to perceive’). When I am caught in 
another’s gaze, I am already the object of causal influences. Causality does not 
take place ‘in’ a space that has been established already. Instead, it radiates 
from objects.155 
 
The question thus is how do we get from humans being the sole bearers of aesthetic 
interpretation, to aesthetic interpretation being a feature of causality as such? The 
aesthetic interaction between things is not a one-sided apprehension of an object by a 
subject. Causal interaction is vicarious in the sense of its dependence on the nature of 
the quality of withdrawal of things. In Morton’s words, ‘Withdrawal isn’t a violent 
sealing off. Nor is withdrawal some void or vague darkness. Withdrawal just is the 
unspeakable unicity of this lamp, this paperweight, this plastic portable telephone, this 
praying mantis, this frog, this Mars faintly red in the night sky, this cul-de-sac, this garbage 
can’.156 Hence, Hume’s critique of causation is universalized and radicalised. It is seen to 
apply not just to human perception but also to the perceptual relationship between all 
things. Perception, Morton continues is simply causal interaction and no longer always 
requires the level of complexity that may accompany some of its forms, i.e. human 
sensual interaction with the world. This means that causation between things becomes 
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proper to the field of aesthetics. Therefore, it is concerned with the interaction between 
objects whereby the aesthetic dimension is now understood as the causal dimension: 
Realist Magic is an exploration of causality from the point of view of object-
oriented ontology. I argue that causality is wholly an aesthetic phenomenon. 
Aesthetic events are not limited to interactions between humans or between 
humans and painted canvases or between humans and sentences in dramas. 
They happen when a saw bites into a fresh piece of plywood. They happen 
when a worm oozes out of some wet soil. They happen when a massive object 
emits gravity waves. When you make or study art you are not exploring some 
kind of candy on the surface of a machine. You are making or studying 
causality. The aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension.157 [Italics in the original] 
 
A little further down some of the implications of this for human aesthetic or creative 
endeavour are listed:  
Paintings have always been made of more things than humans. They have 
been made of paint, which is powdered crystals in some medium such as egg 
white or oil. Now when you put the painting on the wall, it also relates to the 
wall. A fly lands on it. Dust settles on it. Slowly the pigment changes despite 
your artistic intentions. We could think of all these nonhuman interventions as 
themselves a kind of art or design. Then we realize that nonhumans are also 
doing art all the time, it’s just that we call it causality. But when calcium 
crystals coat a Paleolithic cave painting, they are also designing, also painting. 
Quite simply then, the aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension, which in 
turn means that it is also the vast nonlocal mesh that floats “in front of” 
objects (ontologically, not physically ‘in front of’).158 
 
By declaring that the aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension, Morton critiques a 
metaphysics of presence. He posits a rift between essence and appearance, and suggests 
the sum total of appearances between entities (their sensual or vicarious interactions) 
cannot account for the entirety of what is real. Rather, what does not become present is the 
driving force of causality (i.e. the withdrawn real objects). In this way, the conceptual 
horizons for creative endeavour are expanded into a field of perception that is no longer 
hierarchically defined by human aesthetics. For Morton there is the withdrawn real 
objects (one kind of entity) and the present sensual object (a different kind of entity). In 
this situation objects generate sensual traces even in their absence: 
Like a petrified slab of ancient mud with a dinosaur’s footprint in it. Like a 
glass whose shape was molded by blowers and blow tubes and powdered 
quartz sand. Every aesthetic trace, every footprint of an object, sparkles with 
absence. Sensual things are elegies to the disappearance of objects.159  
 






Within this situation causation operates in apparent mystery. The cause of something 
occurring and existing is not something that can be answered finally. ‘Causality is 
mysterious, in the original sense of the Greek mysteria, which means things that are 
unspeakable or secret’.160 One result is to question, as Morton argues in accord with 
much of modern physics, the notion of the object as a discrete entity that is acted upon 
in a direct way. This perspective can now only have a descriptive utility. This is because 
the object is both discrete and not at the same time. It is both withdrawn and present 
not only to itself but also to other objects as well, so that an object ‘is therefore both 
itself and not-itself, at the very same time’.161 Morton deploys the concept of 
dialethesim, the view that statements can be both true and not true at the same time, to 
describe this situation. Presence is not simply a matter of relations or of objects, but is 
both at the same time.  
 
Now we can turn to the question of realism and its weirdness. Once the question of 
realism is displaced from a human-centric account of objects and our access to them, it 
takes on new meanings so that its speculative nature is affirmed. However, this quality is 
no longer devalued because of an insistence on a fixed certainty that is simply not in the 
nature of things. In addition, both ecological interactions, that is the relationship 
between objects and objects themselves, are given equal ontological weight. In this 
situation the real, rather than becoming an irredeemable outside where only the non-
critical may venture, becomes an arena for discovery, albeit tempered by a non-human-
centric account of the real and its inherent persistence of mystery, of the yet 
undiscovered. Morton clarifies: 
The title Realist Magic is also meant to provoke thoughts about philosophical 
realism, the idea that there are real things. Realism is often considered a rather 
dull affair, with all the panache and weirdness on the antirealist side of the 
debate. We shall see that this is far from the case. The trouble with many 
theories of causality is that they edit out a quintessential element of mystery. A 
theory of cause and effect shows you how the magic trick is done. But what if 











Meillassoux’s, Harman's and Morton’s perspectives are applied and developed in 
thinking about a human-centric consideration of objects and relations in the following 
chapters via practical examples and historical situations. The questions these chapter 
asks are: First, Chapter One asks how do object-oriented philosophies help us to 
understand a self-sufficient art object apart from relational or social contexts? Chapter 
Two, explores why is an anthrodecentric approach to the photographic image desirable? 
Chapter Three investigates how could a critique of correlationism influence our 
conceptions of the photographic image? While Chapter Four investigates how both 
speculation and realism, can help develop the application of a ‘practical ontographic’ 
approach to photography. Finally, the Conclusion, referring to the proceeding 
argument, briefly touches upon how a re-conceptualized occult photography, in which 
causation and aesthetics are intertwined in a ghostly realism of the object, may 
demonstrate a mode of art making that intervenes in the problem of correlationism, and 




1: The Art Object Versus the Post Object Debate in the Australian Artworld 




In order to address the question of how object-oriented philosophies may help us 
understand a self-sufficient art object apart from relational or social contexts, this 
chapter revisits debates concerning object and post-object art that occurred in the 
Australian artworld during the nineteen seventies, and which were also part of a global 
movement associated with conceptualism. With the pervasive rise of an emphasis upon 
the social constitution of aesthetic experience, as well as the legitimacy of the situation 
generated by the artist facilitator or the dynamics of a specific aesthetic setting, the 
status of the art object has in more recent times received new currency.163 This is 
particularly apparent in Nicolas Bourriaud’s influential call for a ‘relational aesthetics’, 
and more recently in demands for situated art of various types that generally extend 
Bourriaud’s view.164 
 
The leading advocate on behalf of post-object art in Australia during the nineteen 
seventies was Donald Brook. Brook sought to identify a direction in art that he termed 
post-object. This direction characterized artwork as being brought into being by its 
viewers and participants—something constituted by an audience of participant 
creators—as a purely relational entity, defined by the social processes in which it is 
immersed. Brook placed emphasis upon what an artwork does within human praxis. 
Brook and others, have continued to advocate on behalf of such a conception of art. 
Brook argued, and has refined and expanded upon, the notion that the real work of art 
was not the art object itself, but rather its publicity and capacity for innovation. More 
recently, and deploying Richard Dawkins’ concept of memes, in The Awful Truth About 
What Art Is, Brook has developed his argument, continuing to contest the continuation 
of a separate activity called ‘art’ and ‘the art object’, arguing these are redundant and 
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historically specific categories.165 For Brook the social generation of creative meaning 
should be the object of critique rather than the art object itself.  
 
This chapter does not seek to defend a notion of art objects (or their validation via an 
artworld, which was the subject of Brook’s critique). Nor does it seek to affirm the 
tradition of post-object art on behalf of the everyday and life. The intention here is not 
to rehearse the various conceptualist arguments promulgated for or against this 
direction in aesthetic endeavour, but to deploy elements of the post-object critique of 
object-based art, a critique that has a continuing resonance within both an Australian 
and international artworld, to draw out an alternative perspective.166 Towards this end I 
suggest that Brook’s critique remains largely trapped within a bifurcation between 
subject and object. This bifurcation is left intact by a perspective that, while successfully 
critiquing the subjectivism of Idealist art, is itself enmeshed in an equally subjectivist 
model of art, albeit now in a dematerialised and post-object form. Consequently, rather 
than freeing us from the dictates of a subjective and arbitrary exercise of authority by 
the art critic and the artworld, —as was hoped—the arbitrary exercise of subjective 
authority continued to be affirmed in the transfigured form of subjectivity itself as an 
absolutised principle.  
 
This argument proceeds in the following way: first, in Post-object versus Object, I describe 
the post-object critique of the art object as articulated by Brook and others. Then, in 
Object versus Post-object, how this critique is itself caught up in a subject/object bifurcation 
that ensures that there is no escape from the subjectivist, and hence arbitrary, exercise 
of authority that Brook lamented is examined. Finally, in the Conclusion, I touch upon 
what a speculative yet realist stance, referring Bernard Smith’s writing, may involve. This 




 (i) Post-Object Versus Object 
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During the 1970s a number of claims were at the centre of debate in the Australian 
artworld. These included the questions raised by the notion of an Australian national 
‘identity,’ new models of avant-garde practice (described as a new avant-garde by 
Gregoire Muller, who was an influential commentator at the time) and whether a de-
centred internationalism was possible.167 A focus was on whether experience could (or 
should) be articulated through artistic objects and what an artwork actually is. Was it a 
discrete object brought into being by an artist? Was it the work that art did, i.e. a 
situated practice embedded in a social, political and communication milieu? Perhaps the 
answer lay in viewing the artwork as a socially constructed situation, event, or process? 
That is, was an artwork brought into being by its viewers, something constituted solely 
by an audience of participant creators—a purely relational aesthetic entity finally defined 
and produced by the human processes in which it is immersed and from which it 
emerges? 
 
In 1971 Brook believed that if art in Australia was to address questions such as these it 
would have to escape a provincial bind which created the centre it was trapped within. 
This bind created a centre that rendered anything outside of it marginal and thus 
ensured that the question of authenticity and legitimacy, of any particular provincial art, 
was always answered elsewhere, by a metropolitan centre. It seemed the only escape 
from this situation was somehow for the provincial to become a centre itself, whereby 
‘Australian art cannot in the nature of things produce a metropolitan art until Australian 
cities become international cultural centres with metropolitan powers of taste 
making’.168 But this, as Brook was aware, just reproduced the metropolitan provincial 
logic that created this situation in the first place.169 The most important strategy to 
escape this endgame of avant-gardism and provincialism was what Brook called post-
object art. Brook developed a particularly philosophical defence of post-object art that, 
while being unique in Australian criticism, proved very apt to the theoretical turn of art 
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at this time. This defence was articulated in contrast to the ‘Greenbergian Modernism’170 
that Brook retrospectively believed had dominated ‘advanced Australian art until well 
into the Seventies’.171  
 
The American critic Clement Greenberg’s concept of the avant-garde was first 
articulated in 1939. By the late 1960s Greenberg, very aware of the conceptualist threat 
to his conception of avant-garde art, sought to regain his embattled position in the 
Power Lecture presented in 1968 in Sydney entitled Avant-garde attitudes: New art in the 
Sixties.172 Greenberg described a distinction between a ‘popular’ avant-garde and an 
‘unpopular’ or a ‘real and original avant-garde’.173 The first of these, Greenberg argued, 
derived from the example of Marcel Duchamp and sought to rise above issues of 
quality. By turning the idea of difficulty back upon itself, this bogus avant-garde 
produced works that, instead of being new, created the impression of difficulty and 
newness. The avant-garde impulse towards renewal is thus reversed upon itself, and its 
function of making the new is transformed into the production of transient novelties. 
Greenberg argues, in contrast, that the authentic avant-garde is driven by the necessity 
of making things new, and innovates rather than rebels against tradition. It is an avant-
garde that gives priority to art activity that strives to define itself through the 
investigation of its formal means of being. For this authentic avant-garde, Greenberg 
provocatively argued, judgments of value are not simply a matter of arbitrary choice but 
are, following Kant, authentic and objective expressions of the mind’s freedom.  
 
As Greenberg often acknowledged, his argument proceeded from a Kantian 
understanding of aesthetic judgement. Kant’s third Critique claimed that free beauty, as 
opposed to ‘dependent’ beauty, depends upon form alone. It was a position that 
delimited aesthetic judgement as inherently disinterested in the specificity of the 
situation and dependent upon the working out of an inherent logic.174 Kant developed 
the concept of a transcendental logic, that is a self-sufficient logic, to place ‘any future 
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metaphysics upon a firm footing’.175 The mind’s rationality, while providing the 
framework within which the phenomenal world was apprehended, also offered a facility 
that projects its inherent rational form upon the material world and takes delight in this 
process. In this way, the Cartesian dualism between mind and matter was bridged by an 
act of Judgement. The mind’s freedom, as set apart from the causal world of things, 
was thereby confirmed. Historian Michael Podro explains the relationship of aesthetic 
Judgement in Kant’s schema as one of the mind recognizing its own universal essential 
disinterested rational capacity, and hence its freedom in the phenomenal world of 
things: 
Kant sustains the distinction between the satisfaction of appetite - part of our 
causally conditioned relationship to the world - and the aesthetic judgement’s 
free relation to the world, not only by pointing to the universality of the latter 
(which would be rather inconclusive) but by the way he relates aesthetic 
judgement to material objects: for Kant the satisfaction expressed by pure 
aesthetic judgement is satisfaction in a spontaneous activity of the mind 
concerned with itself, it is not concerned with the material outside the mind, 
except insofar as the material provides the occasion for the mind’s exercise.176 
 
The task for art then is the progressive realization of this awareness and the isolation of 
those formal qualities that are able to embody or reflect the mind’s recognition of its 
own freedom. This task marks the historical and material evolution of avant-garde art: 
[It must] perform in opposition to bourgeois society the function of finding 
new and adequate cultural forms for the expression of that same society, 
without at the same time succumbing to its ideological divisions and its refusal 
to permit the art their own justification. The avant-garde, both child and 
negation of Romanticism, becomes the embodiment of art’s instinct of self-
preservation […] The arts, then, have been hunted back to their mediums and 
there they have been isolated, concentrated and defined [...] The purely plastic 
or abstract qualities of the work of art are the only ones that count. Emphasise 
the medium and its difficulties, and at once the purely plastic, the proper, 
values of visual art come to the fore.177  
 
For Greenberg Kant established the theoretical ground of Modernism:  
I identify Modernism with the intensification, almost the exacerbation, of this 
self-critical tendency that began with the philosopher Kant. Because he was 
the first to criticise the means itself of criticism, I conceive of Kant as the first 
real Modernist.178 
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For the Modernist the task is to ‘establish and maintain the intrinsic capacities and 
limits of particular practices’.179 By realizing the essential rationality that underlies their 
being the artist is able to give form to that rationality. The realization of the formal 
truth of things becomes the goal of a purified art. As Podro explains, Kant’s conception 
of aesthetic experience as a means whereby we obtain a new freedom in an otherwise 
causal and determined world of things echoes earlier Platonic writings. The connection 
it highlights the importance that essentially Formal qualities take on in opposition to the 
particularity of things. Judgements of value in this context are autonomous. They are 
the expression of a universal and a-priori necessity that has no other agency or cause. It 
involves isolation of the judging capacity and determination of value from other 
historical, intentional, social and other contextual concerns. For Kant, then, the whole 
function of the aesthetic faculty is to create an arena of freedom outside the material 
world of cause and effect. However, for Greenberg this material world, specifically the 
materiality of the medium, frames the artwork’s internal logic. This developmental 
principle and the question of judgement are stated emphatically in Greenberg’s essay 
Modernist Painting: 
for the sake of its own autonomy painting has had above all to divest itself of 
everything it might share with sculpture. And it is in the course of its effort to 
do this—I repeat—to exclude the representational or the ‘literary’, that 
painting has made itself abstract.180 
 
Brook responded to Greenberg in two main ways, first by critiquing the basis of 
Greenberg’s authority and secondly by proposing a new model for artistic practice. His 
first response was in an article titled ‘Art Criticism: Authority and Argument’, the 
second was in his own Power Lecture titled ‘Flight From the Object’ delivered in 
1969.181 In his second lecture, Brook described how the objectification that 
representation was believed to involve could be stepped out of by dismantling a divide 
between art, conceived as autonomous representational processes, and life. Brook 
enumerated the various types of flight from traditional notions of the art object, and the 
rationale behind them, by setting up a series of oppositions to describe the types of 
objecthood possible. These included the public object (in contrast to the subjective), the 
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material object (in contrast to Ideal entities), the real object (in contrast to hermetic 
objects, context-sited, or observer-related entities, viewers, settings etc.), elevated 
objects (in contrast to commonplace things), proper objects (in contrast to dimensional 
illusion or deceit), and immutable objects (in contrast to processes). Finally, Brook 
detailed the traditional notion of the art object, 
Ozymandias notwithstanding, there is a paradigm of the work of fine art that 
would have it as a public object, a physical object; a perceptually unambiguous 
object; hermetically indifferent as to context; specially attractive of reverence; 
dimensional proper and immutable. The Great Pyramid probably fits all 
counts.182 
 
Brook contrasted ‘fine art objects’ such as these, which he equated with Greenbergian 
formalism, with two principles by which he hoped to describe how the flight from the 
object would be in his words ‘commendable’.183 The two principles he outlined are, first, 
the principle of publicity, and secondly, the principle of exploration. By publicity, Brook 
means communal interaction—an interaction that must be coupled with creative 
exploration and engagement. The two principles, he argued, displace these features of 
the traditional or non-traditional art object by foregrounding the essential role that art 
fulfils within culture more broadly. Together they undermine, he believed, the status of 
the art ‘object’—whether an actual or Ideal object—as something that is static, object-
like, representation, and can accumulate exchange value. These two principles, Brook 
believed, lend art an inherently creative, and hence radical, function. Art is thus able to 
fulfil its proper role—the generation of creative meaning within a broader system of 
meaning of which it is an essential part. Consequently, phenomena that demonstrate, or 
potentially demonstrate, these attributes should be the real ‘object’ of criticism. Art 
would then take its proper role, Brook argued, in the transition from an object-oriented 
to a system-oriented culture, where ‘change emanates, not from things, but from the 
way things are done [because] the priorities of the present age revolve around the 
problem of organization’.184 
 
Brook maintained that the significance placed upon the art object was tied to the 
importance placed upon the artist as hero—an idealist who gives Being to Ideal and 
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Transcendent Forms, and to the continuing existence of a specific institution called Art 
and its associated social forms. Conversely, Brook claimed that post-object art proceeds 
from a more fundamental premise than this.185 The concept of post-object art offered a 
more radical model of contemporary practice that stepped outside of the existing 
importance placed upon objects, whether Ideal or actual. Brook explains,  
The proper sense of ‘post-object’ needs to be spelled out not in terms of any 
artist’s motivation but in terms of specifically identified components of the 
notion or conception of an art object as this sort of entity was generally 
understood around and a little after the mid-century. […] Post-object art 
might have developed before or after any of the ‘-isms’. It is not parasitic by 
reaction upon any previous particular style, but responsive to a concept of art 
going much deeper than style.186 [Emphasis in the original] 
 
Brook’s account of post-object art sought to make the centre/margin framework 
redundant. It rejected Modernism, equated with Greenbergian Formalism, and sought 
to replace its imperial qualities by the personal, the local, and the everyday. Brook’s 
conception of creative endeavour was more fundamental than any specific style, 
artwork, or social form (i.e. the artist performs a specific social role, in galleries and 
various institutions). Brook displaced the ‘object’ by focusing upon the attributes and 
relations that the object holds within a system of aesthetic or social interaction, 
interactions which Brook argued are more fundamental, and hence more real, than the 
art object itself.  
 
 
(ii) Object versus Post-Object 
 
Here, I push against Brooks’ analysis and ask, is this really an escape from the ‘object’? 
Is it not, rather, a reduction of the art object’s meaning and purpose to a solely human-
centred context of meaning and purpose? By tying the object exclusively to its human 
contexts (i.e. its human-centric situations and systems), and thereby viewing relations 
and processes as fundamental, is not the object’s own irreducibility devalued? 
Irreducibility is central to Harman’s arguments for withdrawal and vicarious causation. 
Because no object directly experiences any other object, no object can be translated into 
any other object without a remainder. Harman takes this view from Bruno Latour. 
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Harman quotes Latour in Prince of Networks: ‘Nothing can be reduced to anything else, 
nothing can be deduced from anything else, everything may be allied to everything 
else’.187 Harman continues: ‘An entire philosophy is foreshadowed in this anecdote. 
Every human and nonhuman object now stands by itself as a force to be reckoned 
with’.188 
  
So, is it a regressive move to simply affirm the subject side of a bifurcation between 
subject and object? This is a shift away from the artwork’s own existence as an entity in 
its own right to something the meaning of which is entirely constrained by an 
anthropocentric valuation. It is also a shift in the artworld’s authority, away from the 
critic and market, and towards that of human subjectivity. The problem here is that the 
latter judgments can also be arbitrary and authoritarian. In Meillassoux’s terms, the 
post-object perspective runs the risk of absolutising human subjectivity itself by 
conflating what we know via our ‘authentic’ experience with what actually exists. The 
object in-itself is lost. 
 
Thus Brook’s contestation of Greenberg’s authority in the name of an open concept of 
the artwork meant, in practice, a greater emphasis upon subjective experience. This shift 
in emphasis, from an institutional authority to an individual (but still subjectivist) 
authority, can be detected in the transformations that define what is authentic and 
legitimate art during this period. I will now trace this transformation.  
 
In Brook’s second response to Greenberg, recorded in an essay titled, ‘Art Criticism: 
Authority and Argument’, he explained that his motivation was a desire to contest the 
authority of ‘what English language philosophers call The Institutional Theory of Art’ in 
Australia.189 It was a theory of art that, in the end, relied upon institutional validation 
(i.e. through ‘the artworld’) as the prime court of appeal by which questions of 
authenticity and legitimacy were decided. Brook’s article set out to critique not only 
Greenberg’s championing of the art object (as the embodiment of a Kantian aesthetic), 
but also the arbitrary authority such a position relied upon. For Brook, Greenberg’s 
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appeal to the authority of his taste, which on his own admission derived from a 
subjective and innate Kantian apprehension of rational Form, is in reality an attempt to 
legislate on relevance and legitimacy by a member of a dominant artworld who has been 
consecrated to do so. For Brook, it seemed such power had no basis and was hence 
illegitimate; in Brook’s words, ‘the heart of my disagreement with Mr. Greenberg [is] the 
authority of his nose for relevance seems to me no more final, nor even persuasive, than 
the authority of his eye for goodness’.190 Art, Brook continued, may be a matter of taste, 
but it cannot be merely a matter of taste.191 
It is not true that there is no disputing matters of taste. On the contrary: 
matters of taste are pre-eminently disputable. Matters of taste are not matters 
of science or logic that is true and one cannot compel the acceptance of this 
or that conclusion for this or that evidence, example or argument. But it does 
not follow that we are in principle doomed never to persuade each other to 
change our minds [and] look at things differently; to see what we previously 
missed; to find excellence where we had thought that there was none; to count 
as relevant considerations that we had once dismissed, or overlooked.192 
 
Brook calls for a form of art criticism that would take such distinctions into account. 
Brook’s contestation of Greenberg’s authority is thus a broader critique of the 
stipulative or definitional authorities that ‘metropolitan artworlds’ are described as 
possessing. A particular emphasis of Brook’s argument centred on how he believed this 
process of definition reinforced a conceptual hierarchy of culture. Given Greenberg’s 
rejection of all relativist accounts of quality, and his insistence that the only judgment 
that matters is a Kantian judgement, it was Brook’s view that Greenberg was committed 
to articulating a narrow account of value. Brook’s critique is thus aimed at the authority 
of the ‘artworld’ to define what the legitimate art of the moment is, and then to claim 
that this particular judgment has universal validity.  
 
In this sense, Brook appears to draw parallels between his analysis and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s critique of essentialist definitions. Proponents of essentialist definitions 
‘maintain that all and only these things actually share certain features and that this 
shared set of real features—their essence—warrants our calling them by a common 
name’.193 Roger Fry’s Formalist definition of art, still influential at this time, is an 
example of an essentialist definition. In contrast, for Wittgenstein there is only a set of 
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family resemblances between how terms such as art are applied. You can appeal to 
history, facts, and specific cases to show how a concept is used in language, and thereby 
decide whether a particular descriptive application of a term is appropriate. In this 
context, art is seen to be an ‘open concept.’ Its openness, it is argued, is a precondition 
of creativity and novelty commonly associated with the concept of art. An open 
concept is one for which the conditions of its application are always amendable and 
corrigible. It is a matter of stipulation, but not merely stipulation. Rather, the 
determination of whether something is art is a social act, a practice, in which the word is 
defined according to how it is used in a social context. Wittgenstein termed this type of 
definition an ‘honorific definition’.194 
 
Yet the very institutional definitions of art that Brook critiques also owed a great deal to 
Wittgenstein’s approach with its emphasis upon meaning as determined by use. 
However, the question of use is not arrived at by an appeal to common use, but by 
appealing to specific and authoritative use. The emphasis upon authoritative use can be 
seen in what is perhaps the most influential formulation of the Institutional Definition 
of Art—that of George Dickie. Dickie’s Institutional Definition of Art was an attempt 
to formalize Wittgenstein’s model concerning how definitions operate, and apply them 
to the identification of genuine works of art. Dickie argued that the term art is a matter 
of stipulation, and always involves an appeal to an ‘authority’ such as an ‘Art-world.’ 
Such definitions are descriptive or operational definitions, whereby the final arbiter is 
the institutional authority that determines the status of what Dickie called ‘candidates of 
appreciation’—that is, all those objects, events, and acts that are proposed as art works. 
Dickie’s definition seeks to define how, and in what contexts, the term ‘art’ can be used, 
in contrast to defining an essential condition common to all art. However, Dickie’s 
definition, like all essentialist definitions, relied on an appeal to authority, but this 
authority was contingent and historical rather than universal and essentialist, which is 
characteristic of the Kantian approach. Dickie’s original definition reads: 
A work of art in the classificatory sense (1) is an artifact (2) a set of the aspects 
of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by 
                                                 




some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the 
artworld).195 
 
The emphasis that Dickie placed on the concept of a dictionary encapsulates the 
authoritative process of definition he seeks to describe. For example, Dickie described 
his revised 1983 definition as a ‘small dictionary’ of five deliberately circular definitions. 
These are: 
1) An artist is a person who participates with understanding in the making of a 
work of art. 
2) A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld 
public.  
3) A public is a set of persons the members of which are prepared in some 
degree to understand an object which is presented to them.  
4) The artworld is the totality of all artworld systems.  
5) An artworld system is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by 
an artist to an artworld public.196  
 
Such a process of definition, aside from forming a description of the artworld’s powers 
of consecration, is useful for its ability to show aspects of what is at stake in the process 
of definition itself. Nevertheless, it is a tautological definition because it defines 
‘artwork’ in terms of ‘artworld’ and therefore ‘art’ in terms of itself. This is not a 
problem in itself since tautological definitions can help clarify what is meant by a term 
and how it is used. However, the institutional definition of art clearly articulates the 
basis for the artworld’s exercise of its authority, and hence also provides a basis for 
understanding a critique of this authority as merely tautological—an arbitrary definition 
of what is and is not legitimate art worthy of consecration.  
 
In the difference between Wittgenstein's honorific and open definition, and the process 
of definition put forward by Dickie, the continuities between Brook’s open concept of 
post-object art and definitions of art that relied upon an appeal to some authoritative 
definition can be seen. Crucially, Brook’s concept of post-object art sought to displace 
any substantial art object by shifting the emphasis to processes and relations (such as 
innovation), which were formally seen as the art object’s proper attributes. However, 
the definition of the art object as solely constituted by its relations involves a regressive 
move to an essentialist definition of the artwork. What were formally possible qualities, 
which were always within the honorific criteria open to amendment, now become the 
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defining and authentic, albeit fluid, attributes and Process becomes the only authentic 
art object; but, by defining the art object as solely consisting of its qualities, and 
disallowing any ‘substance’ to the art object’s qualities, humans become the limit of the 
artwork. By doing so, the quality of authenticity itself becomes a defining attribute; 
possession of this quality becomes a matter of authoritative stipulation. Thus by 
defining artworks not simply in terms of qualities that are currently valued, but as being 
essentially constituted by those values, the ability of art to operate outside of a 
predetermined set of values becomes vanishingly small. This is precisely the problem 
with an entirely relationist, situational, or process-oriented interpretation of art objects. 
 
The concept of post-object art rejected the basis upon which Greenberg exercised his 
Kantian judgment, revealing it to be tautological. It turned out, however, that much of 
what came to be termed post-object art relied upon a similar act of value judgment that 
was also a tautological expression of the subjective exercise of taste.197 The importance 
of the subjective judgment of the artist was re-inscribed; however, now the artist, 
audience, and respondents to an aesthetic situation became the self-referential judges of 
authenticity. In this way, responses to Greenbergian Formalism in art remained within 
the framework of an internally apprehended subjective judgment, and hence determined 
solely via recourse to the authority of the individual’s (and/or artworld’s) claim of 
relevance and legitimacy. 
 
Brook had recognized the problem of subjective judgment and authority, and proposed 
a theory of art that sought to overcome this problem, yet his theory of the post-object 
artwork remained within the Kantian framework. Subjective judgments were by 
necessity a matter of stipulative judgment. There was no other appeal since the 
bifurcation between subject and object that informed Kantian and Post-Kantian models 
remained in place. There was no access to objects, particularly aesthetic objects, outside 
of the context of human relations and so the contradictions in Greenberg’s account that 
Brook recognized could not be stepped out of. His theory only displaced the reality of 
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the art object onto the qualities themselves, defining the work of art only in terms of 
those qualities, the artwork itself now having disappeared from view entirely. 
 
One consequence is that the art object becomes solely a subjective object—that is 
wholly on the human side of the correlate between thought and being. In this way 
Brook’s apparent definition of the qualities of innovation and communication—now 
voiced as the proper ‘objects’ of criticism—marks at least a partial return to Kantian 
essentialism. This can be seen in practice, where the institutions of the artworld 
continue to define the process of bestowing legitimacy and value to new works of art. 
By making the final arbiter of value the subjective judgments of a ‘community of 
individuals’ (as distinct from Kant’s transcendental a priori concepts), the role of a 
tautological exercise of authority remains in place. This tautology seemed to be 
confirmed in the rapid institutional embrace of post-object art. Post-object art, by 
largely limiting its ambition to the transformation of the institution of art, was unable to 
effect a change in the underlying role that authority played in the exercise of the 
artworld’s consecrating power. The centre-margin framework of power that the 
artworld operated within—at the level of culture, politics, and economics—remained in 
place, and hence also the artworld’s power to define what was and was not legitimate 
art.  
 
The details of the co-option of post-object work by an international and institutional 
avant-garde appeared to support this diagnosis of the situation. Following his support 
for artists Christo’s and Jeanne-Claude’s Wrapped Coast, Little Bay, One Million Square Feet 
(1969), art patron John Kaldor sponsored I Want to Leave a Nice Well Done Child Here: 20 
Australian Artists, curated by Harald Szeemann, and held at Sydney’s Bonython Galleries 
in April 1971 followed by the National Gallery of Victoria in June 1971. 198 Critic Ross 
Lansell argued this exhibition represented the continuation of the ‘metropolitan and 
provincial’ divide at the level of style, at the level of artworld politics, and a continuation 
of artworld dependency: 
Szeemann thought that ‘this show proves the autonomous art character of the 
local scene.’ Unfortunately, he explains no further this important, and 
probably crucial, point, of what he meant by autonomy. Instead we’ve been 
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 65 
left with his fairly insipid selections on which to meditate uneasily, unsure of 
whether Szeemann really thought this was great stuff or whether he had 
defective taste or whether it was all a colossal if terrible circuitous send-up of 
provincial pretensions.199 
 
In support of Lansell’s argument, the events surrounding the creation of the Entropic 
Matrices Kit by the Tin Shed’s collective Optronics Kinetics are instructive. This story is 
related in the catalogue for the exhibition The Situation Now: Object or Post-Object Art? 
(1971). As explained by Brook, the Entropic Matrices Kit was originally conceived by 
David Smith, and consisted of a gridded formation of sugar cubes placed in various city 
locations: 
We made the Entropic Matrix Kit, incorporating order/disorder ideas, but as 
well formal ordinary objects, the washers. It is a thing, which I gave away, it 
had an element of group participation, and it incorporated the idea that the 
artist isn’t in complete control of the work. That’s why I worded the 
instructions as openly, least demandingly, as possible.200  
 
Accompanying the cubes was an instruction sheet intended to involve the public in the 
realization of the work. Alex Tzannes, an architectural student, saw the work and 
reproduced essential elements of it for inclusion in I Want to Leave a Nice Well Done Child 
Here. In response to Tzannes’ blatant copying of their work, the members of Optronics 
Kinetics broke into the Bonython Gallery201 and replaced the handmade Perspex circles, 
which Tzanne had substituted for the sugar cubes, with ordinary tap washers.202 Kaldor 
threatened legal action unless the Perspex disks were returned forthwith. They were not 
and, consequently, while legal action did not eventuate, new Perspex discs were 
hurriedly manufactured, and the instruction sheet for the public, an idea that Tzannes 
had retained, was removed. 
 
This event encapsulates characteristic features of the maintenance of the idea of copy 
and original entailed in the binary formation of centre and margin, or authentic and 
inauthentic. The work had moved from a joint project undertaken in a public space 
(requiring the participation of the public for its successful resolution) to the product of 
an individual artist. Though Tzannes argued, repeating what was to become an artworld 
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orthodoxy, that authorship no longer matters, maintaining ‘that the concept of any 
work of art was of prime importance and that the originator (author) was irrelevant’203 
and that ‘it is the concept not the object’204 that counts, yet he was happy, as Optronics 
Kinetics were quick to point out, to be identified as the author of the work in the 
catalogue for the exhibition. It seemed for Optronics Kinetics that a reversion back to the 
authority of the artworld and individual artist had occurred that simply re-inscribed their 
role in the art market:  
The exchange of the steel washers for the Perspex disks was a comment on 
the authorship of the concept, but not necessarily an assertion that steel 
washers are only the objects proper to the situation. The subsequent 
substitution of Perspex disks for the steel washers seemed to assert—at 
enormous expense—that it is not the concept but the object which is being 
exhibited. If that was the intention, and the absence of a set of instructions at 
this stage seems to bear this out, then one wonders what the original 
instructions were all about. What was it Szeeman selected, an object or a 
concept?205  
 
Moreover, as demonstrated by the exhibition I Want to Leave a Nice Well Done Child Here, 
the art object had simply reformed itself into ‘authentic life situations’.206 In a familiar 
pattern, whereby art moves from critiquing artworld institutions to being promoted by 
them, the work was exhibited in an established gallery as part of an exhibition that 
claimed to survey the state of conceptual art in Australia. In addition, this exhibition 
was curated by a pivotal overseas figure in the promotion of Conceptual Art as the 
foremost international avant-garde style. At the time, debate about this event focused 
on whether Tzannes or Optronics Kinetics could claim to be the works’ authors. In this 
way, the notion of author as originating source, a concept that the original work sought 
to undermine, persisted. This event testifies to the continuance of a legitimating 
framework, one that owed its existence to the centrality of subjectivity as the 
inescapable source of aesthetic judgment (itself framed by the bifurcation of subject and 
object), and ensured the notion of an authentic, if not original, contemporary art 
remained dominant. Coupled to this was the whole notion of an originating author and 
the art object’s status as a uniquely human created object. Brook’s and many others’ 
dream for a new type of art, in which the fundamental relationship between artwork and 
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market, and between centre and margin (governed by an apparent arbitrary exercise of 
authority), seemed to be stillborn.  
 
While the art object may well have dematerialized during this period, as Lucy Lippard 
argued, it remained no less real.207 But it was now a dematerialized spectral set of 
qualities. In the absence of an identifiable art object for sale, the question of aura and 
authenticity perhaps became even more important. By necessity the status of the artist 
shifted from inspired Artist, albeit with their power validated by the critic, to 
shamanistic facilitator or impresario of aesthetic situations, the legitimacy of which is 
determined by their authenticity, itself a matter of deeming by their social situation. 
That this shift in power has occurred is shown by how the creators of such situations 
have, in their turn, received their own telling, if sometimes unfair, condemnation as 
inauthentic. This can be seen in critic Adam Geczy’s assertion (that takes a cynical view 
of the audience as victim and hence re-inscribes the artist as author) that the 
authenticity claimed by much relational art is bogus: 
[T]he interventions that are undertaken with their own brand of aesthetic 
piousness and à point rectitude demand a certain naiveté from their audience, 
by placing them in mildly embarrassing situations, in sequences in which the 
artist plays the role of svengali-orchestrator, or if you like, is master of the 
proverbial game, in which the ‘interactors’ are more like gormless ciphers or 






So how does correlationism intersect with relational accounts of art objects and object-
oriented accounts of art objects? What type of metaphysics of presence is created? And 
what alternatives does it suggest to the seeming cul-de -sac described above? The 
operation of this in the case of the art object versus post-object question can be seen in 
how they both fail to describe how secondary qualities of the artwork intersect with the 
artworks’ primary qualities independently of the subjectivity of their audience or 
participant/viewer. Accounts of the artwork as primarily object-based, as Brook points 
out, position it as withdrawn, the embodiment of qualities that are only available to the 
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appreciative audience suitably attuned to the ineffable. Similarly, the situated, relational 
artwork is likewise only subjectively available to those suitably acculturated or situated 
within a social milieu that is able to recognize the extra aesthetic dimensions of the 
everyday, of life, of a meal, or an aesthetic generated between social relations. In both 
accounts, the object and post-object, arguably, the artwork only exists insofar as it has 
an aesthetic human function. Both offer a metaphysics of presence that subjectively 
brings the art object near but at the same time distances it. Arguably both accounts fail, 
because of the subjectivist underpinning, to capture the primary as well as the secondary 
encounter with the object. In both accounts the art objects disappear into the subjective 
side of the human world correlate and from there become subjectivist objects. As 
entirely subjectivist, there can be no wider human relationship with them as objects in 
themselves. They simply become internal, solipsistic, albeit inter-subjective within the 
specific artworlds, whether as the refined taste of an object of contemplation for the 
suitably qualified connoisseur, or the subject of social engagement for a social cabal 
enjoying a binding relational aesthetic experience.  
 
The conflict between object and post-object art can be described as a conflict between 
the form of the artwork as representational and object based, versus its form as a 
socially constructed, relational, and situational entity. Nevertheless, both of these types 
of works were often inflected with the question of identity and authenticity, whether it 
was by regional concerns over the domination of the margin by the centre, or anxiety 
associated with past and present colonization and invasion in Australia.209 In this sense 
the bifurcation between centre and margin, the authentic and inauthentic, continued a 
representational logic; a logic that posited a gap between subject and object, nature and 
culture, and hence the idea that there was, in the first place, a centre and margin.  
 
Consequently, this chapter has suggested that the choice between object versus post-
object art was a false one, and that, as presented, both positions in fact stem from a 
common, underlying subject-object ontology that presents a significant problem in 
terms of what a work of art is, and is capable of doing. Could the only alternative be, 
then, to argue for the irreducible otherness of things, objects that cannot simply be 
                                                 




thought as a process of something else? Is the only way out of this representationalist, 
subject-object bind is, then, the recognition of the non-reducibility of the artwork to its 
varied relations, perhaps even including its origins in human praxis? Consequently, 
contrary to the claims of relational aesthetics and situated art, it is worthwhile revisiting 
the idea of the art object as a real, if not always material, object not reducible to its 
relations, one with a ‘life’ of its own. This would be an argument for a form of 
realism—following Morton, an understanding of the work of art as a self sufficient 
entity insofar as it contains an irreducible and non-given gap between what is is and 
how it appears, independently of how another entity translates it.  
 
A touchstone for this discussion is Bernard Smith’s call, at the conclusion of the 
Antipodean Manifesto, for a focus on ‘the experience of both society and nature in 
Australia for the materials of our art’.210 Smith’s argument for the importance of an art 
that sought to articulate a specific type of experience—the experience of place—has 
often been misconstrued as the endorsement of an exclusively social realist (e.g. socially 
constructivist), white Australian art. In 2005, Smith affirmed that non-indigenous artists 
in Australia have yet to come to terms with the fundamental question the Antipodean 
Manifesto of 1959 posed: what kind of work should art here, and now, (that is 
contemporary art) do. Stripped of its nationalist, identitarian and communitarian 
connotations (or intentions), the Antipodean Manifesto’s final statement poses a still 
relevant challenge to contemporary art. From the perspective of this discussion, Smith’s 
realism offers an alternative avenue for exploration. The focus of his realism on 
location-specific and time-specific encounters foregrounds creative endeavour as being 
concerned with a speculative aesthetic encounter with experience211 —a type of 
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encounter that is not reducible to any of the relations that produced it, including social 
constructivist aestheticism. 
 
Such an art would require a form of realism able to articulate the experience of what 
Edward Casey calls implacement: 
[O]nce bodies are found or even merely posited, they require places in which to exist. There are 
no “actual occasions” (in Whitehead’s composite term for objects as well as events) without 
places for these occasions. Although there may be displaced occasions, there are no nonplaced 
occasions, i.e. occasions without any form of implacement whatsoever. To exist at all as a (material 
or mental) object or (an experienced or observed) event is to have a place - to be implaced, 
however minimally or imperfectly or temporarily.212 [emphasis in the original] 
 
Failure to be aware of the importance of this, on Casey’s account, can lead to forms of 
displacement (he recounts the discovery of longitude which is discussed further in 
chapter three), which could be characterized by a generalized perceptual agnosia, one 
that is not orientating—a mis-comprehension of the relationship between place, time, 
and space so that ‘here’ becomes ‘there’, ‘now’ becomes ‘then’, the future becomes the 
past, and so on. (The relationship to Casey’s concept of place is further explored in the 
third chapter.)One way of thinking about place from an object-oriented perspective, 
then, would be to see the various places that ‘implace’ beings as themselves a kind of 
object (i.e. the implaced beings are objects, but so is the place doing the implacing). This 
object can be understood as acting in a way not dissimilar from Casey’s description of 
‘places’ as opposed to ‘spaces’; that is, they are finite, bounded, and transitional, and so 
on. In turn, implaced objects are themselves the places for smaller objects (e.g. my body 
is both ‘in’ a place, and ‘the’ place within which my cells, organs, and systems are 
implaced). While any further discussion of the implications of Smith’s realism may have 
to wait for another time, the question of the relationship between vision, realism, 
ecology and place are further explored in the next chapter, Something to be seen, a picture on 
a Screen. This chapter asks what would an anthrodecentric approach to nature 
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photography entail? Following chapter two, chapter three, Photo Vision: Photographing 
Place, continues to address the question of place, realism, and implacement in the 




2: Something to be seen: A Picture on a Screen 
 
Ever since someone peeled off the back of the excised eye of a slaughtered ox 
and holding it up in front of a scene, observed a tiny, colored, inverted image 
of the scene on the transparent retina, we have been tempted to draw a false 
conclusion. We think of the image as something to be seen, a picture on a screen. You 
can see it if you take out the ox’s eye, so why shouldn’t the ox see it? The 
fallacy ought to be evident.213 
James Gibson 





This dissertation is particularly interested in the imaging of nature, and further, how we 
are to think representations of nature non-reductively, apart from their relation to 
human interpretations. With this question in mind, this chapter asks what would an 
anthrodecentric approach to photographs entail? The term anthrodecentrism was first 
used by Mathew David Segal and refers to the way humans are placed on equal 
ontological footing with other objects.214 It is a ‘decentering’ of the anthropocentric. 
How would this decentering apply in the case of photography? These questions are 
approached in the following ways:  
 
First, in A Picture on a Screen, I briefly describe James Gibson’s account of what he terms 
‘aperture vision’ and the type of visual interaction it engenders. A possible alternative 
account of ecological relationships from the perspective of Japanese ecologist Kinji 
Imanishi is then explored. Imanishi’s essay, The World of Living Things, prioritizes the 
experiential interaction of both living and non-living things, yet Imanishi’s concept of 
ecological relationships creates a form of holism in which relational form is the only real 
reality, where beings only exist insofar as they are perceived by other beings. It seems to 
require a mind to know and constitute these relations. The next section, An Ecology of 
Practice?, asks what would be required to overcome the limitations of holism models 
such as Imanishi’s. As a first point of reference Alfred North Whitehead’s The Concept of 
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Nature and its account of what Whitehead termed the bifurcation of nature is examined. 
Then, the object-oriented philosophies of Timothy Morton and Graham Harman are 
canvassed as possible solutions. To finish I outline Alphonso Lingis’ argument that, far 
from being essentially human self-reflections, photographs are capable of bringing 




(i) A Picture on A Screen 
 
In The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, James J. Gibson describes the model of 
vision to which he contrasts his own as ‘aperture vision’.216 Gibson argues that this type 
of vision is actually ‘a peculiar result of trying to make the eye work as if it were a 
camera at the end of a nerve cable’.217 According to this theory vision is believed to be 
akin to a rapid series of photographic snapshots. The camera obscura, a box-like structure 
with a small hole that enables an inverted image to be projected in its interior, was the 
favoured explanatory model of how these images are perceived. This leaves vision as a 
matter of representations apprehended internally. This being, ensconced in his camera 
obscura, sees pictures on a screen. But, Gibson asks, if the homunculus can see these 
pictures, who or what is watching the internal images they are generating? In Gibson’s 
alternative model of vision, the eye is understood as one component within broader 
processes of visual perception, which are themselves nested within a system of senses of 
which the kinaesthetic sense and touch are necessary parts. Together the senses form a 
sensory array. This array is predicated on motion and dynamic interaction with the 
environment. A distinction is drawn between the world of physics and the environment. 
The first is apprehended conceptually, whilst the second is apprehended via interaction 
with sensory inputs. Visual perception ‘begins with the flowing array of the observer 
who walks from one vista to another, moves around an object of interest, and can 
approach it for scrutiny, thus extracting the invariants that underlie the changing 
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perspective structure and seeing the connections between hidden and unhidden 
surfaces’.218 Objects are not simply perceived, but the environment affords the conditions 
for perception to occur.219 Because the environment provides the opportunity for seeing 
‘something’ in the first place, there is no separate vantage point from which this 
environment could be observed by a beholder. In contrast, aperture vision suggests that 
the ‘external world’, thought of as ‘a picture on a screen’, is knowable only to the extent 
that an internal viewer, often thought of as a ‘homunculus’ or ‘little man’, is able to 
draw a correlation between their own knowing and the images on the screen.  
 
What kind of ecological model, in which all parts, while they may not play equally 
important roles, at least possess equal ontological status, would offer an alternative form 
of perceptual interaction to the situation Gibson describes? Kinji Imanishi’s remarkable 
book, The World of Living Things , describes such an ecological relationship. The English 
title is a translation of the Japanese Seibutso no Sekai.220 The two Kanji characters for Sei-
butso literally mean living | things. As Parmela Asquith explains, this is a significant 
conjunction. Imanishi did not set out to write a study of organisms as living things. 
Instead, Imanishi initiated a study of the interaction between things—living and non-
living—and how they give form to their world. A number of implications flow from 
this stance. The first one for this discussion is Imanishi’s rejection of the 
substantialization of the self. The idea of the existence of a self with its own clear 
conscious awareness and surety of its existence, such as the Cartesian ‘I’, implied 
apprehension of the world from a distinct and separate vantage point. But this position 
of privileged observation, according to Imanishi, is not possible. The self, Imanishi 
argues, is an act or event that is constituted through actions in relationship to the total 
environment, of which it is an integral part. Nothing could exist outside of this 
environment, as it is self-constituted: ‘The perspective that everything developed and 
differentiated from one thing is absolutely fundamental to Imanishi’s views on the 
relatedness of all things, living and nonliving, in the world’.221 
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A second implication is that it is only in the context of such an environment in which all 
things, via a structured relationship of difference and similarity, give form to the world 
of which they are a part. That is, the world of the living thing recognizes its life in its 
world. For example, being non-sentient is not a lack—being sentient is simply 
meaningless for animals and plants that do not live in that particular kind of world. This 
is the field that Imanishi argued was the proper realm of shingengaku or nature study. He 
did not mean by this that nature is a separate thing that can be either preserved or 
destroyed. Such a position has no meaning for Imanishi since the existence of nature, as 
an abstract yet substantiated thing, like the self, simply does not make any sense. How 
could it? It would entail, Imanishi argues, that living things somehow arrived into their 
world from elsewhere. Shingengaku is a way of thinking or studying nature from the 
inside rather than thinking about it from the outside, from a privileged point of view, 
looking on.  
 
Imanishi’s criticism of the notion of the survival of the fittest can help illustrate this 
point. Imanishi accepted Darwinian competition as an important component of species 
interaction, but rejected it as a primary causative principle. Relationships are co-adaptive 
between living things and the world they formed, and, consequently, causal 
relationships must be multi-directional. It was this multi-directionality, Imanishi 
believed, that was fundamental to interactions between living and non-living things. For 
example, the unit of change was not an individual species but what he termed specia. 
These are grouped species occupying a certain habitat. This concept was generated from 
his study of the ecology of mayfly larvae in the Kamo River near his home. Specifically, 
he asked how do different life forms, or species of these larvae, partition or occupy 
specific niches in their world? He answered this question by appealing to a process of 
differentiation from an original life form, driven by habitat segmentation, which could 
describe the similarities and differences in the world of the mayfly.  
 
Imanishi’s account describes the formation of a holistic organic structure that is 
constituted by an anthropomorphic perspective that gives it form. Imanishi’s model of 
structured relationships between the ‘life’ of both the living and non-living, and how 
their interaction in-forms or structures worlds is a precursor account—though clearly 
 
 76 
emerging out of a specific historical milieu—of Jacob von Uekull’s concept of the um-
welt, an ecological model of interlinked experiential encounters between various 
subjectivities which create specific habitats. Imanishi’s self-creating ecological habitats 
still seem to require an internal picture on a screen, albeit one watched by self-creating 
subjectivities. The problem is that this creates a split between the experience of the self-
created subjective habitat and anything outside of it. Experience is bifurcated between a 
known subjectivity with its intersubjective relations and external outside objects. In his 
essay Consequences of Object Oriented Ecology: Ethology, Strangers, and 
Cosmopolitics, Robbert describes Uexkull’s model of ecological worlds (‘Umwelten’) as 
a form of bio-constructivism in which individual agents, via their relational experience, 
give form to and assemble their world(s), creating a holistic experiential unity. Yet, a 
consequence of this is that nothing outside of these worlds and their intersections can 
exist. For things to be otherwise would be to admit that individual beings can pre-exist 
(or exist outside of) the Umwelten of the organisms doing the perceiving. Uexkull’s, 
perspective Robbert contends, produces a form of holism or relationism, creating an 
assemblage of worlds in which relational form is the only ‘real’ reality. We end up with a 
set of ecological relationships where beings only exist insofar as they are perceived by 
other beings. A relationist world is created that is not realist enough, because it is unable 
to lend real existence to anything outside self-creating Umwelten. 
  
This leaves us with the question of what would constitute a truly ecological model in 
which the experiences of inside and outside inhabit the same ontological level? The next 
section investigates this question more closely, commencing with a discussion of Alfred 
North Whitehead and his account of the bifurcation of nature, before returning to the 







(ii) An Ecological Practice? 
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Perhaps with the exception of Morton222 object-oriented philosophies are heavily 
indebted to the thought of Alfred North Whitehead. By following Whitehead it will be 
possible to develop an understanding of nature that is non-bifurcated, which is essential 
for fulfilling the conditions Robbert lists. This discussion will focus on Whitehead’s 
analysis of the bifurcation of nature in his Tarner Lectures, The Concept of Nature.  
  
So what does Whitehead mean by the bifurcation of nature? Whitehead’s discussion of 
the origins of the bifurcation can be situated historically. Because substance in itself is 
not perceived, there is a division between what we perceive and its substance. The 
question for early empiricists was how to account for this gap and thereby explain what 
is actually experienced. As Whitehead explains, John Locke sought to account for this 
by the theory of primary and secondary qualities:  
Locke met this difficulty by a theory of primary and secondary qualities. 
Namely, there are some attributes of the matter which we do not perceive. 
These are the primary qualities, and there are other things which we do 
perceive, such as colour, which are not attributes of matter, but are perceived 
by us as if they were such attributes. These are the secondary qualities of 
matter.223 
 
This approach was symptomatic of a bifurcation of nature between secondary qualities, 
subjectively knowable, and primary qualities, knowable as a matter of conjecture from 
the evidence provided by secondary qualities. However, Whitehead contends, primary 
and secondary qualities have over time become increasingly conflated. Because they are 
only experienced by human apprehension of them as measurable aspects of physical 
reality via secondary qualities, primary qualities have become subsumed or conflated 
with secondary qualities. The result is a further bifurcation, a fundamental division 
between human and non-human experience. This leaves humans as the only entities we 
know of as capable of experience. This is not because other entities are incapable of 
experience, but because this framework of possible knowledge means that humans are 
the only experiencing beings we can know of. The result is that Locke’s division 
between primary and secondary qualities, and subsequent philosophies that conflate this 
division, leave subjective human experience as the only knowable experience, thereby 
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cutting the relational nature, which Whitehead argues is the defining quality of all 
entities within experience. For Whitehead this situation has meant that the true 
continuum of experience is bifurcated between human experience and experience more 
generally.  
 
Whitehead responded by expanding the concept of experience so that it is at the centre 
of all relations, not just human-object relations. This entails the radicalization of 
empiricism that moves from presuppositions regarding objects from a human 
perspective to the fundamental quality of the experiential process. This expansion 
entails dissolution of the concept of primary and secondary qualities. Experience is no 
longer understood as present to something or somebody who is independently aware of 
their experience because they are aware of themselves as being aware. Returning to the 
original question of experience, the question Whitehead seeks an answer for is what are 
we aware of in perception? Whitehead clarifies this question by noting that awareness 
precedes consciousness of something as something, so that perception proceeds 
concepts.224 By not taking into account the originating moment of awareness itself, a 
false conjecture arises: that the question of what we are aware of in perception concerns 
the nature of reality. From this false question, there arises ‘the bifurcation of nature into 
two systems of reality’.225 Two realities are created ‘which, insofar as they are real, are 
real in different senses […] Thus there would be two natures, where one is the 
conjecture and the other is the dream’.226 The conjecture is arrived at via conscious 
deduction or induction about what is real, while the dream is what conjecture has no 
access to via either deduction or induction. Both realities are already entrapped in a 
theory of knowledge that has now trumped actual experience. In this way they are 
abstractions of what we are already aware of, but the question of awareness itself is left 
unanswered. The result is misplaced abstractions that result from conjectures about 
what these theories of knowledge tell us about experience:  
In the first place, it seeks for the cause of the knowledge of thing known 
instead of seeking for the character of thing known: secondly it assumes a 
knowledge of time in itself apart from events related to time: thirdly it 
assumes a knowledge of space itself apart from events related in space.227 
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Because subjective experience is constructed from abstractions such as, these the 
fundamental conditions of experience that make these abstractions possible is passed 
over. Steven Shaviro, with Kant’s logical categories of experience in mind, notes that for 
Whitehead the world is experienced prior to any logical categories, it is a process of 
pure experience: 
The subject emerges out of constructive experience, rather than being 
presupposed by it […] Whitehead thus replaces Kant’s ‘transcendental 
idealism’—his ‘doctrine of the objective world as a construction from 
subjective experience’ with something more of the order of William James’ 
‘radical empiricism’. 228  
 
Empirical experience and thought are understood as entwined in a fundamentally 
relational way that radicalises experience itself. Experience itself is understood as 
primary rather than the product of an empirical encounter, solely via the medium of 
sense data or secondary qualities, with otherwise independent things. Therefore the 
primacy of relations, and therefore experience, is asserted over our apprehension of 
things as the occasion for the sensuous reception of an empirical datum. The question 
of consciousness is not an epistemological problem to be solved. It is simply the ground 
for any awareness altogether. That there is knowledge—or awareness—answers this and 
is presupposed by any possible answer. Thus knowledge is itself a ground and not 
something to be explained. Isabelle Stengers explains that, for Whitehead, ‘Knowledge 
is ultimate. There can be no explanation of the “why” of knowledge; we can only 
describe the “what” of knowledge’.229  
 
As Shaviro notes, Whitehead’s empiricism can be situated within a tradition of 
empiricism, albeit a radical one. William James formulated an account of ‘radical 
empiricism’.230 However, while James is not cited, Stengers argues, his ‘terms appear 
unexpectedly, without commentary, which point out that Whitehead is thinking with 
James’.231 James absolutises experience as such, where experience (rather than the being 
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of things, or causal relations, or atoms) is the fundamental explanatory cause. The 
perceptual flux of experience between all entities lends experiential form to things so 
that experience is the common element of all things. James’ term, ‘specious present’, 
seeks to describe this. It is determined neither objective or subjective measures, though 
these may describe how it is experienced. It is undivided, yet divisible, present, which in 
the words of Stengers ‘does not designate an external, clocked measure, but a concrete 
range, thick with the number of events it includes in a way that is divisible but 
undivided’.232 James argues, in The Stream of Consciousness, that the experience of the 
specious present is the concrete fact from which our understanding of experience 
proceeds:  
The first and foremost concrete fact which every one will affirm to belong to 
his inner experience is the fact that consciousness of some sort goes on. ‘States of mind’ 
succeed each other in him. If we could say in English ‘it thinks’, as we say ‘it rains’ 
or ‘it blows’, we should be stating the fact most simply and with the minimum 
of assumption. As we cannot, we must simply say that thought goes on.233  
 
This experience, however, is not confined to human subjective awareness; rather, the 
‘specious present’ is characteristic of all experience and plays a fundamental role in the 
pure experience of all things: ‘Radical empiricism is the idea that the world’s essentials 
are all found in the flux of intuited or perceived experience; this concept transmuted the 
stream of consciousness of James’s psychology into the pure experience of his 
metaphysics’.234 This expansion of human conscious experience as simply one element 
in the fundamental metaphysical flow of experience itself is apparent in Whitehead’s 
own emphasis on relations as encapsulating experience itself. As Bruno Latour explains: 
Now the originality of James, which was clearly recognized by Whitehead, was 
to attack this situation—but not (as had been done for two centuries) in the 
name of subjective values, transcendence, or spiritual domains, but quite 
simply in the name of experience itself. It is undignified, says James, to call 
oneself an empiricist yet to deprive experience of what it makes most directly 
available: relations.235 
 
Whitehead scholar David Ray Griffin describes Whitehead’s philosophy as a ‘pan-
experientialist’.236 Pan-experientialism means that all entities, both living and non-living, 
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share no ontological priority in experiential capacity. This includes experience itself. Its 
radicalisation of experience renders relations as integral to experience. They are 
entwined in such a way that the division between subject and object, as a problem of 
knowledge, dissolves, as does any division between primary and secondary qualities. For 
Stengers experience dissolves the bifurcation of nature between precepts and 
conceptualized spatio-temporal reality: 
From the exploration of what we are committed to by the refusal to make 
nature bifurcate between percepts, on the one hand, and a reality that is 
essentially spatio-temporal and functional on the other, to the exploration of 
what is required by the way we relate to experience.237 
 
How is an object-oriented approach useful in this discussion of relations and objects? 
How is it a corrective to the forgoing emphasis upon relations and process in 
Whitehead’s account of experience? How could it produce a sufficiently realist account 
of objects that nevertheless gives equal priority to relations? I next explore Timothy 
Morton’s understanding of ecology, encapsulated in his concepts of ‘Strange Stranger’ 
and the ‘Mesh’, and Harman’s account of ‘vicarious causation’. We begin with Harman’s 
concept of vicarious causation. Harman considers Whitehead a pre-eminent critic of 
philosophies of access:  
the greatest of recent Anti-Copernicans is surely Alfred North Whitehead. 
This remarkable thinker abolished the Kantian prejudice by saying that all 
human and non-human entities have equal status insofar as they all prehend 
other things, relating to them in one-way or another.238 
 
Yet the convergence between Harman and Whitehead on the question of access is also 
marked by an important divergence. This centres on how relations between objects are 
construed. Whitehead’s relational ontology appears to do away with Kant’s concept of 
noumena altogether. In contrast, Harman displaces the bifurcation of nature, which 
Whitehead overcomes by developing a model of continuous process and organic 
relations, via his understanding of a non-human-centric account of relations between 
objects. Harman seeks to radicalise Kant’s concept of noumena, by rendering noumenal 
an insurmountable withdrawn quality hidden away within every object’s relation to 
every other object, rather than being defined in contrast to the phenomenal human 
experience of things. Harman shifts the emphasis from relations between objects to the 
objects themselves. That is, Harman’s ontology shifts attention back to the object, but 
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not now as a subject of human knowing, because human subjectivity itself becomes an 
object amongst other objects.  
 
Harman’s concept of vicarious causation plays a useful explanatory and descriptive role 
here. Vicarious causation entails an ontology wherein relations are co-determined by 
forms of withdrawal and interaction that determine the nature of materials’ interact-
action. The irreducible quality of the alterity of objects becomes integral to their ‘reality’, 
rendering their materiality second to this quality. In this way vicarious causation, 
because it incorporates the non-relational as an integral part of relations, attempts to 
explain ecological interaction. Objects are irreducible to the relations that form them 
because they both withdraw from other objects and yet form relations. That is, they are 
irreducible, and thus cannot be described solely in terms of their relations, yet at the 
same time, they form integral parts of an environment so that, in the words of Adam 
Robbert, ‘each object, each entity, is simultaneously itself and environment for some 
other object’.239 However, a complementary concept of ecological relations is still 
needed, one that shows how these withdrawn objects interact. This would be a model 
of ecological relations that radicalises relations themselves in which the human and 
human concepts of holism are de-centred. Morton’s concept of the ecological thought 
offers an intriguing direction. So what is the ecological thought?  
The ecological thought does indeed consist in the ramifications of the truly 
wonderful fact of the mesh. All life forms are the mesh and so are all dead 
ones, as are their habitats, which are also made up of the living and non-living 
beings.240 
 
To begin with Morton’s concept of the mesh: Meshes are formed both via their linkages 
as much as their disconnections or negative spaces which together constitute them. 
Morton argues that the way entities do not connect is as important as the ways that they 
do. Understanding these kinds of relationships produces truly ecological thinking. In 
Morton own words the: 
ecological thought is the thinking of interconnectedness. The ecological thought is 
a thought about ecology, but it’s also a thinking that is ecological… It’s a 
practice and a process of becoming fully aware of how human beings are 
connected with other beings—animal, vegetable, or mineral.241 
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If ‘ interconnectedness’ here means that ‘nothing is fully ‘itself’,242 our encounters with 
other beings are both of them and not, they are both familiar and strange, they are 
‘strange strangers’.243 This suggests a ‘realism’ of relations rather than a ‘materialism’ of 
relations. It is realism without matter, for the same reason that he posited ecology 
without nature; for Morton, ‘Nature’ and ‘Matter’ are both abstract concepts that 
cannot in any sense be encountered in experience (either by humans or any other 
animals). Morton illustrates it in the following way: 
Have you ever seen or handled matter? Have you ever held a piece of ‘stuff’? 
Sure, I’ve seen lots of objects: Santa Claus in a department store, snowflakes 
and photographs of atoms. But have I ever seen matter or stuff as such? 
Aristotle says it’s a bit like searching through a zoo to find the “animal” rather 
than the various species such as monkeys and mynah birds.244 
 
These terms, Matter and Nature, also suffer the dual misfortune of reducing the 
ecological (‘Nature’) to a certain form of its presence to certain humans, and the real 
(‘Matter’) to a certain conception of materiality—which, historically, it is known, has 
always been an evolving and contested category. Both are kinds of metaphysics of 
presence in which one aspect, a materialist one and Nature, with a capital N, is 
designated as the sole reality—that is, a realism of relations whereby materialism is one 
component within relations. In this way Morton’s position bypasses the object versus 
relations debate by refusing to designate one of these terms as the essential real 
definition. In Morton’s expanded concept of ecology every object becomes its own 
medium and is itself at the same time. Thus a condition of its own possibility is an 
ability to translate other things, that is act as a medium. The problem then of how mind, 
medium and matter relate is solve by recognising that they in face co-exist. The 
photographic object, from Morten’s perspective must be fundamentally ecological 
because it inherently translates images, traces of its encounter with other objects, in 
ways that are not solely determined by humans. That is photography is already a 
medium – with its own powers of translation – prior to acting as a medium for human 
translation of the visual environment. The next section discusses Alphonso Lingis’ 
unique application of the Kantian imperative and how it applies to his concept of levels 
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in the context of one particular medium - photographic technologies and its capacity to 
translate things on its own terms.  
  
 
(iv) The Levels 
 
In The Imperative Lingis puts forward a unique application of Kant’s famous 
imperative—the principle of non-contradiction underpinning reason as a universal basis 
for right action.245 Visual perception, for Lingis, is understood as a process of 
multivalent interaction so that ‘A perceived thing is not simply an amalgamation or a 
synthesis of the appearances it shows in the course of our exploration of it’.246 Indeed, 
things are not just the passive recipients of our perception. Recalling Gibson’s concept 
of affordances, a condition of their perception in the first place is their designation of 
themselves as something, which ‘is to be accomplished’.247 Perceptual interaction is 
driven by an imperative that does not derive from human concepts at all.248 It is simply 
the command of being, the way inter-objectivity must be if it is to occur at all. Lingis’ 
concept of ‘levels’, by which the world is made up of numerous self-contained mutually 
external levels, makes this clearer. Humans needed to adjust their perception and ideas 
to these levels or different modes of existence. Ethical imperatives, like his 
universalization of the Kantian imperative, come not only from other humans, but also 
from animals, plants, and inanimate objects within these levels. The command of the 
imperative is not disembodied reason, that imparts form to nature given this, but is 
inherent to things having form as something rather than nothing. Seeing then could not 
be just be an image of something:249 
Our awakening to a field is not a succession of discrete acts that are so many 
spontaneous initiatives. We do not open our eyes, capture a flake of the 
visible, and then start again to capture another. With the first step a gait is 
launched; upon opening our eyes our look slides onto the misty or crisp level 
of the visible morning. Our awakening stylises itself at once. The level of the 
visible is a directive that advances by unfolding its gradations and variations. 
Each move of the look varies the prior one and launches further variations. 
The look slides back and forth, seeing the visible from reversed and displaced 
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directions. Each look takes form as one of a range of ways of looking, 
equivalent and interchangeable.250 
 
Visual perception is such a form of motile sensuality in which, for example, what we see 
also sees us as a condition for us seeing in the first place.251 So that: 
A thing is not simply a set of internal relations with all the other things. It 
pushes back the other things and clamors for all our attention. It is not simply 
a relay for a movement that stakes out directions and paths beyond it. It is 
also a terminus for our perception. Things are ends and not means only. The 
tasks they present to us designate themselves as what is to be accomplished.252 
 
Lingis admits he did not think of still cameras as a technology that facilitated these 
forms of interaction. They seemed to embalm the lived movement of experience, 
leaving only collections of inert images: 
I had long resisted buying a camera, thinking that there was something false 
about collecting images of things seen and people encountered and who have 
passed on, trying to retain the past. I thought that what was real was what 
from a trip left one changed.253 
 
Lingis changed his mind regarding the camera when he realized that photography is a 
complex system that, though made by humans, nevertheless ‘push[es] back and 
clamours for our attention’ and thus is capable of changing how we see things in its 
own right. It is capable of confronting us with unknown perspectives that were not 
human: 
I soon realized that the camera had changed my perception. The light: it was 
no longer just cleared space in which things took form; it had direction, it led 
the gaze, its shafts excavated situations isolated in the dark, sometimes it 
spread in a scintillating, dazzling, blazing medium without boundaries. 
Shadows took on substance; they stretched, flowed, condensed things in 
themselves […] the legs of a child in an arabesque she will never be able to do 
once grown up, the grin of a passerby at something inward. The landscape is 
abruptly splintered; a segment isolates, magnetizes and pulls the glance into 
it.254 
 
This can be seen if the glance and not the gaze is understood as the paradigmatic form 
looking takes. The gaze issues from a fixed point, it is a matter of close study that is 
given form in visualizing technologies such as the microscope, telescope, or CCTV 
surveillance. The glance can be said to be incidental, a product of negotiating 
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relationships with others, including other animals and is tied to forms of interaction. 
Both the gaze and the glance play important roles in everyday seeing, but the glance is 
the form of looking that is more fundamental.255 While drawing an analogy between the 
camera and the gaze describes a specific way of looking, this particular way of looking is 
not true of all photographic seeing or of seeing more generally. Lingis acknowledges 
this when he writes that photography helps us:  
recognize that the things themselves engender ‘images’ or doubles of 
themselves – shadows, halos the images of themselves they project on water, 
on the glass of windows – and also on the surfaces of the eyes of mammal, 
birds, fish. For example, the puddle of water that appears, shimmering, on the 
surface of the road ahead in a hot day is not ‘subjectively’ produced by the 
mind; it is engendered by the road, and the sun, and everybody in the car that 
sees it.256 
 
This returns us to the image as a ‘picture on the screen’ in the quotation that prefaces this 
chapter, and to the recognition that to insist upon the existence of this mode of seeing 
is to remain in the solipsistic cul-de-sac that Gibson succinctly describes. Michel 
Montaigne’s description of playing with his cat elicits just this type of recognition: 
‘[w]hen I play with my cat, how do I know that she is not playing with me rather than I 
with her?’257 As Sarah Bakewell reports, this was not how Rene Descartes would have 
experienced such an encounter:258 
Montaigne cannot look at his cat without seeing her looking back at him, and 
imagining himself as he looks at her. This is the kind of interaction between 
flawed, mutually aware individuals of different species that can never happen 
for Descartes, who was disturbed by it, as were others in his century.259 
 
Descartes sought to formulate a concept of clear consciousness, one that would provide 
a foundation upon which justified knowledge of the external world could be built. The 
favoured metaphor, deriving from Descartes, of how these images are perceived was of 
a homunculus or little man watching them on an internal screen.260 This is in contrast to 
Montaigne’s variety of speculative scepticism, appropriate for an encounter with a 
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‘strange stranger’, by which he was happy to cheerfully wonder what his cat thought of 
him. But how do Lingis’ proscriptions work in practice? What kind of practices are 
important in deciphering how objects possess meaning apart from being directly 
accessible via the senses and hence as things of the human mind? The next chapter, 
drawing upon Walter Benjamin’s ‘intensification’ of the literary strategy of the Denkbild 
(thought-image), seeks to address this question in the context of Project X (1999) (Jo 










Perth is the state capital of Western Australia. Perth’s generic skyline can easily be 
mistaken for any other city and in many ways it is an unremarkable metropolis. Yet, 
Perth has its own idiosyncrasies. Buildings disappear seemingly overnight and are 
subsequently reconstructed as façades, the new is made to appear old; the Perth City 
Council continually engages in attempts to ‘breathe life back into the city’261, and its 
citizens worry that it is dull262 (Plate 2. 2 ). A recurrent theme of these concerns is a self-
perception of isolation. Perth is understood as a place in which space and time are out 
of synchronization with the less isolated, and therefore ‘implaced’ east coast urban 
centres.263 This perception of isolation is closely connected with a parallel sense of 
disorientation. As this chapter seeks to show, this sense of disorientation can be 
characterized as a generalized perceptual agnosia - a mis-perception of the relationship 
between place, time, and space, so that ‘here’ becomes ‘there’, ‘now’ becomes ‘then’, the 
future becomes the past, and so on. A marked manifestation of this perceptual agnosia, 
is the belief the city is always on the verge of becoming; yet the visions of this becoming 
are retrospective now projected as future visions. 
 
This chapter describes the photo-documentary project, Project X (1997-2003) (Redmond 
Bridgeman, Jo Law) and Konvolut K (2006) (Redmond Bridgeman, Jo Law) and how they 
responded to this sense of disorientation and its accompanying visions. In undertaking 
Project X and Konvolut K, instead of travelling to new landscapes we set out to explore 
this slippery place where we lived. As the collection of photographs grew, several types 
came to prominence: memorial statues, public art (sculptures), hoardings, signs, façades, 
and construction sites. In Project X these are documented with photographs, while in 
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Konvolut K, which is discussed in the concluding section of this chapter, they are 
rendered with materials fragments including photographs, illustrations, diagrams, 
animations, sound recordings, newspaper clippings, advertisements, and quotations. An 
important guide for this exploration was German critic, Walter Benjamin, in particular 
his expanded treatment of the Denkbild (thought-image).  
 
This chapter proceeds in the following way: In the first section, Inscriptio: Denkbild, 
Karoline Kirst’s account of Benjamin’s intensification of the Denkbild as a means to 
decipher contemporary experience is outlined. Susan Buck-Morss materialist account of 
Benjamin's’ method is important here. In the second section, Pictura: Project X, aspects 
of Benjamin’s interpretive methodology are applied to describe a process of the 
aestheticisation of urban space via urban development and public art works. In the 
concluding section, Subscriptio: Konvolut K, it is argued that Benjamin’s account of the 
auratic and his recasting of Immanuel Kant’s concept of experience suggest how his 
method may be applied more generally. In this context the photo documentary, Konvolut 
K, can be understood as employing aspects of Benjamin’s method to depict the 
aesthetics of the representational agnosia these spaces possess.  
 
 
(i) Inscriptio: Denkbild  
 
Like Siegfried Kracauer and Ernst Bloch, amongst others, Benjamin sought to describe 
contemporary experience via the short narrative essayistic Denkbild (thought-image). He 
developed this mode in One Way Street, wherein descriptive imagery is juxtaposed with 
speculative observation in short essayistic form but with no explicit narrative 
determination. Following on from One Way Street, Benjamin sought a ‘fiendish 
intensification’ of the Denkbild, to include artefacts, quotations and images.264 This 
broader concept of the Denkbild would be concerned with collecting, the archive, and 
non-didactic accumulation. An important influence on Benjamin’s Denkbild was the 
German Baroque emblem, that, Benjamin explains, 
combines visual and verbal material. It displays a tripartite structure consisting 
of the pictura (icon, device or impresa), containing one main pictorial aspect, the 
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inscriptio (motto) above, which describes or enigmatically shrouds the image, 
and below, the pictura, the subscriptio (or epigram), the explanatory poem or 
text.265 
 
In Karoline Kirst’s words, Benjamin was concerned with the interdependence of parts 
that ‘present an image as an integral albeit not immediately recognizable part of the 
thought’.266 For Kirst, the tripartite structure of Inscriptio, Subscriptio, and Pictura of the 
Baroque emblem offered a model for Benjamin’s aim of presenting the hidden 
meanings of contemporary experience in his Arcades Project:267 
Like the Baroque emblem the Denkbild is a heuristic trope. The Baroque 
emblematists presented their images as suggestive signs, as traces of the 
hidden Divine meaning of the world. By means of emblems the Baroque 
thinker was taught to inspect the world speculatively. The objects in 
Benjamin’s Denkbilder become signs for the hidden fabricated human meaning 
of the world and human history.268 
 
 
The Arcades Project was divided into 36 alphabetized sections or Konvoluts. This term 
refers to a bundle, an assemblage of printed material that belongs together. These 
Konvoluts consist mainly of citations Benjamin gleaned from research, conducted over a 
period of some thirteen years, on the arcades and industrial culture of nineteenth-
century Paris. Benjamin’s intention, write the translators of the recent English edition of 
the Arcades Project, was 
to grasp such diverse material under the general category of Urgeschichte, 
signifying the “primal history” of the nineteenth century. This was something 
that could be realised only indirectly, through “cunning”: it was not the great 
men and celebrated events of traditional historiography but rather the 
“refuse” and “detritus” of history, the half-concealed, variegated traces of the 
daily life of the “collective,” that was to be the object of study, and with the 
aid of methods of the nineteenth-century collector of antiquities and 
curiosities, or indeed to the methods of the nineteenth-century ragpicker, than 
those of the modern historian. Not conceptual analysis but something like 
dream interpretation was the model. The nineteenth century was the collective 
dream which we, its heirs, were obliged to re-enter, as patiently and minutely 
as possible, in order to follow out its ramifications and finally awaken from it. 
This, at any rate, was how it looked at the outset of the project, which wore a 
good many faces over time.269 
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Susan Buck-Morss, in The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project, 
describes Benjamin’s Arcades project as a materialist investigation of the aesthetics of 
experience closely coupled to his political and cultural critique.270 Aesthetics, Buck-
Morss argues, meant for Benjamin the whole of the modern physis, that is the whole of 
physical experience given form by the aesthetic. Buck-Morss’ understanding of 
aesthetics is important in her interpretation of Benjamin’s work.271 She is concerned 
with Benjamin’s widening and deepening of the Kantian concept of disinterested 
beauty, as when she describes aesthetics as embracing the whole ‘corporeal sensorium’:  
Aisthetikos is the ancient Greek word for that which is ‘perceptive by feeling’. 
Aisthesis is the sensory experience of perception. The original field of 
aesthetics is not art but reality – corporeal, material nature. Hence, Aesthetics 
is born as a discourse of the body. It is a form of cognition achieved through 
taste, touch, hearing, seeing, smell, - the whole corporeal sensorium.272  
 
 
This broadening of the arena of aesthetics includes changes in perceptual experience 
brought about by visualizing technologies, new modes of transportation, and 
organizational processes. All these shape aesthetic experience, which is now understood 
as the whole of the ‘corporeal sensorium.’ The speed of the production line and train 
travel, for instance, involved the adaptation of the eye to increasingly rapid and 
rationalized forms of movement. This fundamental shaping of experience via embedded 
perception within ‘reality--corporeal, material nature’ in-forms, in the sense of 
constituting how they are experienced, the meaning things come to hold.273 The 
influence of Benjamin’s understanding of the aesthetic as fundamentally shaped by and 
shaping experiential encounters between the objects that constitute reality, can be seen 
in Buck-Morse's account of the Arcades Project.  
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Buck-Morss, drawing parallels between Benjamin's dissertation The Origins of German 
Tragic Drama and the Arcades Project, explains that the latter echoes the Baroque use of 
pagan ruins: 
When Benjamin conceived of the Arcades project, there is no doubt that he 
was self-consciously reviving allegorical techniques. Dialectical images are a 
modern form of emblematics. But whereas the Baroque dramas were 
melancholy reflections on the inevitability of decay and disintegration, in the 
Passenger-Werk the devaluation of (new) nature and its status as ruin becomes 
instructive politically. The debris of industrial culture teaches us not the 
necessity of submitting to historical catastrophe, but the fragility of the social 
order that tells us this catastrophe is necessary. The crumbling of monuments 
that were built to signify the immortality of civilization becomes proof, rather, 
of its transiency. And the fleetingness of temporal power does not cause 
sadness; it informs political practice.274 
 
According to Buck-Morss, in the seventeenth century pagan ruins and the figure of the 
skull were appropriated by artists and writers as allegorical emblems of the 
fragmentation and chaos of everyday experience in many areas of Europe. These 
‘hollowed out’ remains were used to signify the transitory nature of human and natural 
history.275 Benjamin also found himself in the midst of a culture of crisis and 
fragmentation. He responded by adopting a philological approach to the study of 
history that included the whole range of artefacts within the scope of analysis to expose 
the ‘threatening and alluring face’ of myth:276 
Benjamin’s central argument in the Passagen-Werk was that under the 
conditions of capitalism, industrialization had brought about a re-enchantment 
for the social world and through it, a ‘reactivation of mythic powers’... 
Underneath the surface for increasing systemic rationalization, on an 
unconscious, ‘dream’ level, the new urban-industrial world had become fully 
re-enchanted. In the modern city, as in the ur-Forest of another era, the 
‘threatening and alluring face’ of myth was alive and everywhere.277 
 
Benjamin discovered the image of the urban environment in the shopping arcade, 
where the consumer was brought face to face with the commodities produced by the 
capitalist economy. Once given an allegorical dimension, these arcades are 
metaphorically transformed from the depository of the debris of capitalism, as they 
appeared in the twentieth century, to reveal their true meaning as a ‘worlds in 
miniature’, emblematic, like the use of pagan ruins in Baroque Mourning Plays, of 
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modernity itself.278 Louis Aragon, whose book Paris Peasant was a significant inspiration 
for The Arcades Project, refers to these arcades as ‘human aquariums’ that embodied the 
mythological realm of modernity.279 Aragon claims that this realm forms an enchanted 
new nature’,280 and that in this new nature objects such as gas pumps were ‘the idols of 
today, and have the same totemic power for the modern world as Apollinaire’s beloved 
fetishes from Oceania and Guinea had for their own worlds’.281 The totemic power of 
the Arcades is hinted at in a tourist guide to Paris, written in the early nineteenth 
century when the Arcades were still new, that Benjamin cites, 
‘We have’ so says the illustrated guide to Paris from the year 1852, [provided] 
‘a complete picture of the city of the Seine and its environs’ repeatedly 
thought of the arcades as interior boulevards, like those they open onto. These 
passages, a new discovery of industrial luxury, are glass-covered, marble-
walled walkways through entire blocks of buildings, the owners of which have 
joined together to engage in such a venture. Lining both sides of these 
walkways that receive their light from above are the most elegant of 
commodity shops, so that such an arcade is a city, a world in miniature.282 
 
Buck-Morss explains that the cornucopia of commodities, exotica, and curiosities in the 
display cabinets of the Arcades were ‘appropriated by consumers as wish images within 
the emblem books of their private dream-worlds’.283 However, once the aura the 
Arcades possessed as the newest embodiment of progress dissipated, they became 
graveyards dedicated to commodities from the recent past.284 Aragon describes these 
Arcades as ‘sanctuaries’285 with a mythic dimension: 
Although the life that originally quickened them has drained away, they 
deserve, nevertheless, to be regarded as the secret repositories of several 
modern myths: it is only today, when the pickaxe menaces them, that they 
have at last become the true sanctuaries of the culture of the ephemeral, the 
ghostly landscape of damnable pleasures and professions. Places that were 
incomprehensible -yesterday, and that tomorrow will never know.286  
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The arcades, with the passing of time, and their displacement by newer and more novel 
ways of stimulating consumer decisions, were now museums for outworn commodities. 
These ‘secret repositories’,287 Benjamin believed, could reveal the historical transience of 
capitalism and the unconscious dream worlds of nineteenth-century culture.288 Their 
status as a city, ‘a world in miniature’,289 allowed them to function as allegories for Paris, 
an archetypical city of capitalism, and hence for Benjamin they provided the means to 
decipher the historico-philosophical truth of nineteenth-century modernity.290 Buck-
Morss argues that in order to do this Benjamin drew a distinction between ‘crude 
thinking’291 or materialist thinking, and certain forms of ‘abstract thinking’.292 Abstract 
thinking erased the full significance of cultural artefacts. By separating form from 
content in such a way that form becomes abstracted and content is lost to myth. The 
materialist critique, however, does not simply seek the dispersal of myth; rather, it seeks 
to hold up to the light of day the plenitude of meanings objects contain by revealing the 
meaning they embody. Buck-Morss explains the process in the following terms: 
Whereas the former [abstract thinking] drains the concrete plenitude of the 
objects, the latter [materialist thinking] burrows itself into the material thicket 
in order to unfold the dialectic of the essentialities. It accepts no generalities 
whatever, pursuing instead the course of specific ideas throughout history. But 
since for Benjamin every idea is a monad, every representation of such a 
monad seems to him to provide access to the world.293 
 
Presenting the representation of these monads in such a way that their significance 
becomes alive entails reconstructing the totality of the context in which they existed. 
The dichotomy between form and content created by myth is then dissolved. For these 
products to reveal their historical meaning they had to be re-experienced. For Benjamin 
the re-experiencing of artefacts entailed citing them in such a way that their original 
materially-situated context is revealed. Benjamin declared: ‘This project must raise the 
art of quoting without quotation marks to the very highest level. Its theory is intimately 
linked with that of montage’.294 It involved the use of juxtaposition and citation to form 
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a montage that evokes history, the result of which is that content is restored to artefacts, 
to produce an awakening of their meaning.  
 
(ii) pictura: Project x  
 
The aim of Project X ( Appendix 1) was to document the process of construction of 
visions of Perth at various building sites and projects in an ongoing manner. This 
process took place during a period of eight or so years from early 1990 to around 2001. 
These photographs were taken as we walked around the city, sometimes while on a 
specific mission to document a particular site, but more often while we went about our 
everyday life. This entailed the sensible interaction with sights, sounds, smells, and 
touch, of the places we passed through. As Richard Shusterman’s argues, this involves 
the whole body’s somatic interaction with its world, whether conscious or not. 295 This 
awareness of proprioception, the sense of the body’s relationship to itself, other objects, 
relations, and its somatic interaction with the world, also informs Edward Casey’s 
concept of implacement and how it creates landscapes.296 Casey argues that landscape is 
often understood as something beyond the bounds of experience, something natural, or 
wild, that we may look at or paint; but landscape actually surrounds us in various guises: 
‘Beyond the house and the neighbourhood lies the landscape. We tend to construe 
landscape as natural - paradigmatically, as wildness - but in fact a city constitutes a 
landscape, a “cityscape”, as surely as does the surrounding countryside’.297 
 
The relationship between the body and the landscape, either formed by human activity 
or other entities, creates an experience of ‘placescapes’: 
A landscape seems to exceed the usual parameters of place by continuing 
without apparent end; contains it, while it contains everything, including 
discrete places, in its environing embrace. The body on the other hand, seems 
to fall short of place, to be ‘on this side’ of the near edge, of a given place. 
Nevertheless, body and landscape collude in the generation of what can be 
called ‘placescapes’, especially those that human beings experience whenever 
they venture out beyond the narrow confines of their familiar domiciles and 
neighborhoods.298  
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Such an experience as ‘placescape’ is created for the tourist who strolls down St. 
George’s Terrace, the main business street in Perth. They will come upon a series of 
steel plate kangaroos carrying briefcases that, according to Art City, a guide to Perth's 
Public Art, are ‘racing back to Kings Park after a hard day at work’.299 (Plate 1.1) Further 
down the Terrace three bronze kangaroos ‘begin to bound away led by a large male’ 
(Plate 1. 2)300 Still further down the Terrace, at the southern entrance to the CBD, live 
Western Grey kangaroos in their ‘natural setting’ form part of ‘an entry statement for 
visitors’.301 After discovering this ‘wildlife’ near their hotels, the visitors may wish to 
further explore Perth, and dotted around the CBD are computer terminals to help them 
do so. These present a kaleidoscopic montage of cultural, natural, and scenic attractions 
to welcome the visitor to the ‘cosmopolitan, multicultural metropolis of Perth’, one in 
which, as the live kangaroos testify, any expectation tourists may have that the famous 
Australian wildlife will be close at hand will not be disappointed. A certain type of place 
is created that appears to be located in time and space referenced via latitude and 
longitude, wherein tourist know where they are within what is now a bounded 
landscape.302 This could be understood as similar to the process of implacement, which 
creates an inhabited landscape described by Casey: 
Body and landscape present themselves as coeval epicenters around which 
particular places pivot and radiate. They are, at the very least, the bounds of 
places. In my embodied being I am just at a place as its inner boundary; a 
surrounding landscape, on the other hand, is just beyond that place as its outer 
boundary. Between the two boundaries--and very much as a function of their 
differential interplay--implacement occurs. Place is what takes place between 
body and landscape. Thanks to the double horizon that body and landscape 
provide, a place is a locale bounded on both sides, near and far.303  
  
Yet, the creation of a landscape is not something that solely emerges from the 
interaction of body and place. It can also be created by a planned aesthetisation of 
place, to produce a simulation of implacement. In Perth this process ranges from the 
creation of new communities around specific visual themes, such as Federation Village, 
(Plate 1. 3) to the remodelling of existing urban areas around what is deemed to be their 
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distinctive ethnic and cultural characteristics. Perth’s City Vision,304 and the related ‘The 
Premier’s Vision’ are two examples.305 City Vision, for example, formulated in the mid to 
late 1980s, is set within a discourse of urban renewal, real estate marketing of a 
‘cosmopolitan inner city’ and the promotion of Perth as a base for eco-tourism.306 
Accompanying these processes has been the renewal of narratives of the pioneer, a 
return to nature in urban design, and talk of a new ‘civic space’.307 Public spaces such as 
The Perth Cultural Centre, discussed below, are prime sites for the formation of these 
plans. They become, as Jane M. Jacob argues, ‘activated spheres of practice’.308 As 
spheres of practice they offer arenas where discourses of identity, race and nation are 
staged. Nevertheless, Jacobs critiques a tendency to see the creation of aesthetic 
experiences and discourses such as these as simply a veil over deeper processes of ‘late 
capitalism’: ‘In these accounts the appropriation of vernacular histories, of ethnic 
diversity for festivals, and the use of representational discourses in themed development 
merely acts to conceal deeper economic regimes of consumption’.309 
 
Jacobs argues that David Harvey and Fredric Jameson have played an important role in 
formulating this perspective.310 According to this view the whole spectrum of cultural 
activities is appropriated into the service of a new flexible process of capital 
accumulation. Jacobs concedes that the representational discourses that are created are 
often deployed in ways that are mystifying. However, she argues, the tendency of 
accounts that draw upon Harvey and Jameson is to see such aestheticising processes as 
simply illusionary: 
Culture is certainly not centered in a productive way in these accounts of the 
aestheticized city. Rather, here is a version of a far more familiar positioning 
of culture as a “mask,” false consciousness, or a “veil” over more “real” 
processes (Harvey, 1989, p.87). …The city has become a “city of illusion” 
(Boyer, 1993, p.111), a giant theme park (Sorkin, 1992; Zukin, 1991). In this 
transformation, culture (understood as aestheticization) comes to serve a 
decidedly modernist grand narrative about the new logic of capital 
accumulation.311  
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Jacobs cites Jean Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacra, with its ‘collapsed division 
between the real and the unreal and the emergence of the hyper real’, as having a 
fundamental influence on many of these writers to identify an important consequence. 
312 Whilst Baudrillard ‘[at his most] productive contributes to uncoupling the chain of 
signification and revealing the often arbitrary alignments of sign and things’, his 
argument nevertheless results in a tendency for emphasis to be given to the play of 
signification.313 Reading off the symbolic meaning of signs and charting their 
relationship in a semiotic system of exchange takes precedence over the analysis of their 
use in any specific situation. Visual discourses are simply seen as symptomatic of a 
generalized unsettling of signification, an unsettling that is characteristic of the new 
forms of capital accumulation. Consequently, visual practice and image making are not 
seen as a meaningful practice, ‘as something which is socially produced, has politics, is 
material, and is productive’.314 In this situation aestheticising processes ‘only ever mark 
the appropriative force of post-modern capitalism’.315 Such a stance, Jacobs continues, 
ignores local histories and their context of practice within which visual regimes are 
produced and operate. What is required, Jacobs argues, if these visual regimes are to be 
understood as more than simply illusionary, is an analysis of how specific visual regimes 
act as spheres of practice in which power and meaning are negotiated. So that: 
if the visual regimes of contemporary cities are thought about as activated 
spheres of practice in which various vectors of power and difference are 
meaningfully negotiated, then the story of the aestheticization of the city will 
unfold in ways that will defy the expected.316 
 
We will now briefly outline an influential plan for the re-modelling of The Perth Cultural 
Centre as such an activated sphere of practice. The evolution of the cultural centre was 
documented in Visions or Hallucinations? Over Time at the Cultural Centre, an exhibition 
curated by Perth architect Duncan Richards. For Richards the Perth Culture Centre is a 
‘ghostly place, haunted by past ideas and aspirations’, which are seen as symptomatic of 
the overall characteristic of Perth as a city of fragments.317 It is a site that reuses, adds 
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on, and recycles former structures. With each use its form takes on new shapes, 
incorporating the old form into it as the definition of its function changes, transforming 
from bush land to a set apart colonial jail and then, as the city crept closer, this form 
provided a geometric order into which the institutions of culture were incorporated and 
in which they sought to express their meaning and function. However, in the cultural 
centre, as elsewhere, these forms were often only partially built, offering in miniature a 
model of fragmentation mirroring the form of Perth itself. As architect Martyn Hook 
notes:  
[Consider] the existing Cultural Centre environment with its collision of grids, 
unfinished buildings, fragments of visions, ill-defined edges. Consider the 
tenuous links of an apparently random development process governments and 
city planning bodies have bestowed upon it. Always something else to do, 
always a sequel.318  
 
In contrast to these partial fragments that were actually built, the visions themselves 
were often remarkably whole and coherent. While the plans themselves solidified into 
the dream of a cultural centre, only a fragment, the first stage of the Museum building, 
originally went ahead. Duncan argues in the parallel Redevelopment Framework Draft Report, 
to this exhibition, under the influence of rational planning principles, the process of ad 
hocism and reuse now become more recognizably concerned with the incorporation of 
the grid patterns themselves. Duncan believes the central problem with The Cultural 
Centre is the imposition of a 60-degree planning grid upon the original urban grid. These 
two spatial orders layered upon each other produce dissonant spatial layers:  
Thus the major spatial disharmony in the Cultural Centre results from the 
dissonance between the original urban grid to which the buildings such as the 
Museum, Hackett Hall, the Gallery Annexes and PICA relate and the 60 grid 
imposed for the Gallery, Library and the pedestrian corridor.319  
 
The pre-1970 architecture is displaced from its setting of the natural road level, and its 
plotting onto a grid configuration, whilst the post-1970s buildings, the Alexander 
Library and Western Australian Art Gallery, plotted on each axis of the 1960 re-
alignment, are out of accord with the original alignment. It was originally intended that 
the axial link between the Art Gallery and Library symbolically connect Knowledge and 
Art, bypassing an auditorium in which public gatherings and meetings would occur. 
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This oblique grid acts as an anamorphosis of the urban grid, thus making the 
connection between art, knowledge and democracy explicit in the design. The raised 
pathway, as the Framework points out has a lot in common with the Ziggurat—a sacred 
pathway that leads to and from but is not a place for lingering.320 By anamorphosing the 
grid of the street, Duncan argues, these principles are extracted and dramatized, yet the 
overall effect is to produce a rather melancholic and hostile place (Plate 1.4). Because of 
the spatial disruption caused by the implementation of the 1960 grid, the level changes 
disrupt the eye level view. The pedestrians’ gaze tends to be directed outwards, focusing 
upon their destination. The pedestrians’ intended role to become a spectator of cultural 
functions in the auditorium, or partake in public meetings as they transverse the spaces 
between the cultural institutions, is disrupted. The pedestrian then, because of the 
failure of (to use Casey’s concepts) of their ‘implacement’ within the landscape of the 
Cultural Centre, fails to inhabit the ‘place-scape’ created for them. 
 
To overcome these problems Duncan and Hook recommended that the cultural centre 
be re-modelled in terms of a ‘unique Western Australian Landscape [with its] canopy of 
trees ... strong natural colouring of ochre’s and reds...[and] shallow pans [of water] 
thereby creating a new ‘place-scape’.321 Asides from erasing the fragments from a 
piecemeal design process that has left ‘many of the buildings [as] monuments to 
intentions long dead, or as remaining fragments of large scale plans now abandoned’,322 
the social problems that have characterized the site will be also be displaced. A public 
Art Program linked to, and integral with, the re-configuration of the existing place will 
both emphasize the spatial structure and its qualities, and contribute significantly to the 
enhancement of the identity of the precinct as a particular place.323 The Art Program 
will ‘both reinforce the spatial planning concepts and animate and enhance specific 
spaces within the Cultural Centre’.324 The work will do this by interrelating with the 
layered spatial system. Towards this end, any commissions granted to artists to 
undertake this work should specify, as well as budget, site and timetable, a ‘particular 
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site specific theme for the artists’ expression’.325 These themes are described briefly—
artists will comment on the history of the site, reveal current activities within the site, 
and provide opportunities for interaction with the site. Under the heading Artworks 
Associated with Level Changes, Thresholds and Opportunities for Surprise, it is suggested that 
small sculptures be commissioned. These Vestiges’ will be essentially mnemonic and 
cartographic aids: 
A series of small-scale sculptures in the form of left behind objects (or 
sounds) which invoke images of the diverse users of the Perth Cultural Centre 
and in this way emphasise the links to adjacent precincts of the city, 
particularly Northbridge. For example, a ‘coffee cup artwork’ would refer to 
the coffee culture of Northbridge, a ‘Tambourine artwork’ would refer to the 
Salvation Army Band that plays every Sunday in the Cultural Centre.326  
 
Like so many such plans before it, Duncan, Smiths, and Hooks prescription for the 
Cultural Centre never fully eventuated, but many of the characteristics of their intended 
place making can be seen at play in the re-development of Russell Square, a park one 
kilometre north of the Cultural Centre. At this site a central rotunda and stage was 
erected and then encircled by an assortment of bronze sculptures that reference 
Australian native fauna, ethnic communities, ‘Aboriginal cultural’ and pioneer history 
(Plate 1. 5).327 In one a snake and lizard repose upon a rock, whilst a satchel, with 
boomerang protruding, rests on a retaining wall. In another a Woomera lies on the edge 
of the pool (Plate 1. 6); as well, a bush hat, towel and glasses, whose owner presumably 
has taken a momentary dip in the pool, are draped over the wall (Plate 1.7). A 
foreshortened sailing ship, referencing colonial settlement, is also represented (Plate 
1.8).  
 
Together they form an ecological tableau328 whereby art furnishes a narrative of an ideal 
‘Western Australian landscape’ in which nature, the colonial, metropolis and 
multicultural are conjoined in civic harmony.329 The images produced by Amy Heap and 
Fred Flood in Western Australia during the interwar years of a mythological pioneering 
and beneficent landscape, peopled by Bush Fairies, pioneer cottages, and happy 
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Australian Yeoman farmers, are echoed in new public spaces such as this one. In 1929, 
in celebration of Western Australia’s Centenary, The Western Mail, a popular periodical at 
the time, presented a special issue.330 It contains an image by Amy Heap, the illustrator 
for The Western Mail and text by Anthony Foulkes. In A Hundred Years of Progress (Plate 
1.9) Western Australia is described as ‘the coming State’, in which material and cultural 
progress will inevitably result in the ‘centre of gravity of the Commonwealth eventually 
shift[ing] westward drawn by the magnet of abundance and sustained success’.331 As 
historian Tom Stannage explains, these images exist within a discourse of Australian 
nationalism and rural utopianism.332 In this context, landscape views of Western 
Australia, as Stannage explains were constructed from a stock of images, that 
stressed the bounty and beauty of nature, and the harmony, tranquillity and 
enjoyment of life in Western Australia. Where struggle was portrayed, and it 
was usually rural in character, it always resulted in productive good and 
familial contentment.333  
 
In proposals such as those discussed above for the Perth Cultural Centre, an idealized 
timeless space of culture is brought together with the universal evolutionary time of 
nature. An iconic ‘Australian landscape’ is used to create a ‘public space’ defining 
identity, nation and race.334 How this realm is conceived and represented constitutes a 
‘public’, which is defined by the forms of social life that are symbolically represented 
and that are allegorically enacted. In this context the reconstruction of the Cultural 
Centre as a Western Australian Landscape—as the natural place for Western 
Australians—can be situated. However, such images of harmonious place have little in 
common with the actual experience of place for many of the inhabitants of what is now 
Perth, then and now. Recalling Casey, the experience of actual bodies disappears in 
favour of abstractions. Steve Mickler, discussing the City Vision project, that also 
incorporated plans for the remodelling of the Cultural Centre, describes how such an 
ideal of a beneficent civic space erases specific rights and identities in the name of an 
abstract concept of the ‘public realm’:  
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The whole implication of the CityVision project generally is that social 
inequities are the result of bad design, poor urban planning. If Aborigines 
present a problem, then it is a problem to be planned out of existence. Clearly 
the exclusive ethnic interests of Aboriginal people would stand outside of the 
symbolic territory marked off as ‘civic’ by Mr. Warnock and his co-visionaries. 
The harsh terms of their accommodation within the cosmopolitan dream-city 
is the surrender of any claims to exclusive interests or separate identity. The 
category of the city here is interchangeable with that of ‘the people’, whose 
paramount interests foreground all policy and decision-making.335  
 
 
The illusionary quality of this civic unity, its only seeming recognition of diversity and 
difference, Mickler, continues, amounts to little more than: 
an exotic post-colonial urban reverie in which the sensual delights of 
immigrant or indigenous minority cultures - cappuccino, souvlaki, ethnic 
carnivals and corroborees - can be made available under strictly controlled, 
health department inspected, consumer protected conditions for the Anglo-
Celtic connoisseur.336 
 
Mickler expands his critique via reference to the architectural plans for the Old Swan 
Brewery complex, (Plate 2.3) which he describes as creating an experience that ‘conjures 
up a retro-vision of imperial majesty in the high colonial period within which 
architectural authenticity is sacrificed to a “nowhen”, as purpose-built nostalgia of post 
modern urbanity’.337 Moreover, for Mickler, this structure revives,  
poignant cultural memories for the inhabitants of the formerly Swan River 
Colony. The Galleria is unmistakably simulative of the pavilion-style 
architecture of the early Victorian London, but further, I suggest refers to one 
building above all others, the Crystal Palace, built in London for the Great 
Exhibition of 1851.338 
 
Staged as a celebration of British cultural and imperial achievements, the Crystal Palace 
was described by contemporaries as a structure that was ‘incomparably fairy-like’339 and 
that left many with a ‘profound faith in the future’.340 Buck-Morss argues that this 
structure transformed nineteenth-century industrial culture into a miniature 
phantasmagoria that blended,341 ‘machine technologies and art galleries, military 
cannons and fashion costumes, business and pleasure, [that] were all synthesised into 
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 A phantasmagory was an optical illusions produced chiefly by means of the magic lantern, first given 
in London in 1802.  
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one dazzling visual experience’.342 
 
To conclude this section, Joseph Conrad’s short story An Outpost of Progress, is quite 
apposite in the context of Mickler’s reference to The Crystal Palace and the above 
question regarding, implacement, disorientation, and visions in Perth.343 In An Outpost of 
Progress, two ivory traders, Kayerts and Carlier, have been stationed at a remote trading 
post in French East Africa by their company’s steamer. These ‘two pioneers of trade 
and progress’,344 Conrad writes, spend their days gazing ‘on their empty courtyard in the 
vibrating brilliance of vertical sunshine’.345 They ‘understood nothing, cared for nothing 
but the passage of days that separated them from the steamer’s return’.346 They lived 
like:  
blind men in a large room, aware only of what they come in contact with (and 
of that only imperfectly), but unable to see the general aspect of things. The 
river, the forest, all the great land throbbing with life were like a great 
emptiness. Even the brilliant sunshine disclosed nothing intelligible. Things 
appeared and disappeared before their eyes in an unconnected and aimless 
kind of way.347  
 
‘Their predecessor had left some torn books’ which they discussed at great length. They 
became completely engrossed in the fate of the characters, the plots of the novels, and in 
discussing the protagonist’s virtues and vices.348 They also avidly read old copies of the home 
paper that, in ‘high-flown language’, devoted a column to ‘extol[ing] the merits of those who 
went about bringing light, and faith and commerce to the dark places of the earth’349 in the 
interests of what it pleased to call ‘Our Colonial Expansion’.350 The two men began to think 
of themselves in this fashion. Carlier declared one evening, ‘In a hundred years, there will be 
perhaps be a town here. Quays, and warehouse, and barracks, and - and - billiard rooms. 
Civilisation, my boy, and virtue—and all’.351 
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For Ian Watt, the protagonists in this short story share an addiction to the ‘idealising 
abstractions of public discourse, to a language that has very little connection with the 
realities either of the external world or of their inner selves’.352 Their belief in progress, and 
the ‘sacredness of the civilising work’,353 combined with their own mis-recognition of their 
abilities, brings about a kind of blindness to their circumstances and environment.354 The 
normal relations of causation are breaking down: ‘[T]hings appear and disappear in 
unconnected and aimless kinds of ways’. Kayert and Carlier are aware ‘only of what they 
come in contact with (and of that only imperfectly)’.355 The ‘large room’ they inhabit is an 
imaginary space defined by their dreams and visions of ‘civilization’, ‘virtue’, and ‘progress’ 
that they have projected onto their surroundings, making them blind to the actuality of their 
situation. The actual place of French East Africa has disappeared from sight behind abstract 
discourses. Their visualizations of how things are or could be are more akin to hallucinations 
that have little or no relation to their situation. Their awareness of place, and their 
connection to it has disappeared into a realm of idealizing abstractions of nowhere spaces.  
 
 
(iii) Conclusion: Subscriptio: Konvolut K  
 
The online work Konvolut K (2006) asked what would a contemporary form of the 
Denkbild entail? Adopting aspects of Benjamin’s methodology, this project presents a 
constellation of images and citations from research. The title Konvolut K references 
Benjamin’s Konvolut k, in the Arcades Project, labelled, ‘Dream City and Dream House; 
Dreams of the Future, Anthropological Nihilism, Jung’. The visual, auditory and textual 
threads identified in Project X coalesced around five thematics that we identified as 
evocative of Perth’s narratives: ‘Biosphere’, ‘Stasis’, ‘Strata’, ‘Construction’ and 
‘Panorama’. The programmed navigation in the online work allows visitors to access 
content in various ways such as maps, tours, scrolls, and filing cards via a series of 
nodes and navigation directions around the idea of train linkages and the tour. These 
filling cards reference various emblematic scenes of these themes. These include 
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hoardings that narrate Perth as a timeless land; public art that presents is as a site of 
beneficent nature and colonial harmony. It brings together visual, auditory, and textual 
threads with which visitors can construct their own vision of Perth, a vision, however, 
that can only be completed by a site visit to what is proudly proclaimed by its 
inhabitants as the ‘most isolated city on earth.’356 
 
One of the most fruitful nodes used the concept of construction. (Plate 2.4) It provides 
a series of templates that enable the construction of the main forms of Perth 
architecture. These forms are repeated in related nodes such as Statis, in which the built 
form of Perth is encapsulated in historical details of social conditions and politics. While 
in Biosphere the filed images portray habitats, natural and human. (Plate 2.5) 
Construction site reproduces a key text for this project. In One Way Street, under the 
heading Construction Site, Benjamin wrote:  
Pedantic brooding over the production of objects—visual aids, toys, books—
that are supposed to be suitable for children is folly. Since the Enlightenment 
this has been one of the mustiest speculations of the pedagogues. Their 
infatuation with psychology keeps them from perceiving that the word is full 
of the most unrivalled objects for childish attention and use. And the most 
specific. For children are particularly fond of haunting any site where things 
are being visibly worked upon. They are irresistibly drawn by the detritus 
generated by building, gardening, housework, tailoring, carpentry. In waste 
products they recognize the face the world of things turns directly and solely 
to them. In using these things they do not so much imitate the works of adults 
as bring together, in the artefact produced in play, materials of widely differing 
kinds in a new, intuitive relationship. Children thus produce their own small 
world of things within the greater one. The norms of this small world must be 
kept in mind if one wishes to create things specially for children, rather than 
let one’s adult activity, through its requisite and instruments, find its own way 
to them.357  
 
How objects and their chance encounters may generate meaning can be illustrated by 
the recurrent images of Governor Captain James Stirling with a construction that occurs 
through out Konvolut K. (Plate 2.6) Governor Stirling appears in the act of proclaiming 
the settlement of Western Australia in 1829. Unveiled in 1979, this statue stood outside 
the Rural & Industries Bank of Western Australia until 1994, when the 11-storey 
building was demolished and hoardings were erected around the site. For a brief period 
the statue could only be seen obliquely from a north-bound approach. The photograph 
used in the project was taken during this time, when someone, no doubt in jest, deemed 
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that even inanimate statues had to conform to health and safety regulations. Like many 
of the montage of images in Konvolut K, the chance juxtaposing of statue and hat, 
recalling the Surrealist deployment of chance integral to Benjamin’s emblematics of 
modernity, generates a possible narrative of the city.358 (Plate 2.7) Was the founding of 
Perth less a matter of colonial conquest than a business of property development? Is the 
city’s preoccupation with property investments an inheritance from its historical origins 
in the laissez faire capitalism of nineteenth century? Are the constant development, 
redevelopment, and their ensuing conflicts subconscious re-enactments of its colonial 
heritage? 
 
This may help explain the disorientation and hallucinatory role of vision in the 
development of Perth. Many scenes in Konvolut K play with the idea of physical travel in 
Perth, but navigable space is not presented as an analogue of Perth’s physical place so 
the execution always retains spatial ambiguity.359 From the opening prologue when a 
plane lands at Perth Airport, space is experienced simultaneously as representation, 
including aerial maps, urban road directories, and site elevations, and via its medium of 
presentation: the screen. But these images are as if stuck in time because of the 
ambiguity within which they exist. This rendition of place can be understood as akin to 
Paul Virilio’s description of ‘the snapshot’s image-freeze or rather image-time-freeze’.360 
This characterization is apt because the modelling of the actual place dislocates place in 
space, it fails as a marker of longitude, ensuring the experience of Perth is rendered 
ambiguous.  
 
The disorientation created between representation and place is analogously re-staged in 
Konvolut K. Ackbar Abbas’ description of the relationship between abstraction, 
representation and disappearance can help fill out how this may work. For Abbas, 
contemporary cities, (he has in mind Hong Kong but notes it can be applied to many 
modern cities), give rise to increasingly ‘abstract and ungraspable’ places. A significant 
characteristic of these ‘abstract spaces’ is the dominance of the visual; yet, Abbas 
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continues, as stereotypical depictions of identity these images, like photocopies that 
have been reproduced too many times, lose their definition. The actual multifarious 
meanings particular places hold disappear as representations, fail to represent and 
become mis-connected signs pointing to a mirage. In the words of Abbas, if place 
‘becomes more varied and multifarious, over saturated with signs and images, at the 
same time as it becomes more abstract and ungraspable’, then abstraction becomes the 
contemporary mode of disappearance.361 Abbas cites Henri Lefebvre’s concept of 
abstract space to draws a distinction between the ‘representation of space’ and the 
‘space of representation’. The first is produced as a means of representing space and 
hence conceptualizing place:  
Representations of space: conceptualised space, the space of scientists, 
planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a 
certain type of artist with a scientific bent - all of whom identify what is lived 
and what is perceived with what is conceived […] This is the dominant space 
in any society (or mode of production). Conceptions of space tend, with 
certain exceptions to which I shall return, towards a system of verbal (and 
therefore intellectually worked out) signs.362 
 
In contrast, the second is more concerned with orientation and location within space in 
order to locate oneself in space by giving form to place:  
Representational spaces: space as directly lived though its associated images 
and symbols, hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’ […] This is the 
dominated - hence passively experienced— space which the imagination seeks 
to change and appropriate. It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of 
its objects.363  
 
The space of representation displaces the representation of place so that a 
disconnection develops, Abbas believes, in which representations no longer have any 
relationship with their referent. Nevertheless, these new abstract visions paradoxically 
become more concrete as the ability of those within representation space to depict the 
actuality of their experience of place fades. Indeed, abstraction now takes the form of 
the concrete, and the perception, and hence recognition of the actual place becomes 
confused. The result is that a form of disappearance is produced; the concrete actuality 
is displaced by an abstraction made concrete:  
The more abstract the space, the more important the image become, and the 
more dominant becomes the visual as a mode. This relation between 
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abstraction and the image, however, must be understood in a specific way. 
The image is not a compensation for abstraction, an amelioration of its lack of 
the concrete; rather it is the ‘concrete’ form that abstraction now takes.364  
 
The images and spaces thereby created can be likened to immersive panoramas that 
seek to draw their inhabitants into a total experience. Such an experience envelops the 
whole being, inserting the individual in a narrative of place, race, ethnicity and nation. 
Indeed, they often resemble a staged diorama of a particular ‘ecosystem’ similar to a 
natural history museum display. Of course the creation of cultural identity with such 
plainly legible images, though, is not simply confined to the tourist industry in Western 
Australia. It is commonplace to find public spaces and whole communities where the 
visual representation of cultural, ethnic, class and national identity is explicitly 
articulated. But one way of presenting a different account of experience, and in which 
‘representation of place’ is able to produce the kind of implacement Casey describes, is 
by re-staging these ‘spheres of aesthetic practice’365 in ways that give the ‘world of 
things’ back their own life via chance encounters, and hence their ability to encapsulate 
their own history.366  
 
Benjamin adopted a physiological approach to the study of cultural history, but applied 
it to the investigation of the origins of modernity. Consequently, he widened the scope 
of analysis to include the whole spectrum of cultural artefacts. He was interested in how 
cultural products could be presented in such a way that the imbrication of concepts, 
ideas, and phenomena becomes transparent, revealing how the myths and social truth of 
his contemporary culture emerged historically, yet Benjamin’s focus was on human 
cultural artefacts. How could such a method apply to objects that are not human 
produced artefacts? That is can Benjamin’s method be extended to objects that are not 
human artefacts? Benjamin’s concept of the auratic and his account of speculation 
offers some clues. I will now briefly explore this possibility via Howard Caygill’s 
discussion of the role speculation plays in Benjamins’ account of experience.  
 
Caygill argues that Benjamin realized that what is needed for the meaning embedded in 
the artefact to come alive is a widening of the concept of speculation. This meant 
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Benjamin needed to recast Kant’s concept of experience. To do this, Benjamin placed 
speculation at the heart of experience as mediated by the Categories. Speculation should 
not be detached from the Kantian Categories of the understanding, but these should be 
expanded to include speculation as central to how the Categories operate. Caygill 
explains:  
Benjamin’s elaboration of a non-Hegelian speculative philosophy of 
experience redefined the nature and limits of critique. The Kantian view that 
critique should confine itself to securing the legitimacy of judgements in terms 
of a categorical framework applicable only within he limits of spatio-temporal 
experience no longer sufficed. The extension of the bounds of experience 
brought with it the demand for a new and extended notion of critique. 
Benjamin responded to this demand by returning to the concept of criticism 
developed by the Romantic, pre-Hegelian generation of Kant’s critics, above 
all Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis. From their example he derived a 
speculative concept of criticism guided by the method of ‘immanent 
critique’367 
 
Benjamin’s inspiration for this was the experience of colour, where ‘the paradigm of 
experience […] is not linguistic signification but chromatic differentiation’ and how it 
engendered a differentiated response to different experiential possibilities.368 Because 
the experience of colour required contextual interpretation for it to be experienced as a 
colour in the first place, its boundaries could not be pre-determined. It was thus an 
experience (recalling Whitehead’s critique of the bifurcation of nature discussed in the 
previous chapter) that occurred prior to any bifurcation into primary and secondary 
qualities. Benjamin’s description of the phenomenology of this experience from his The 
Rainbow: A Dialogue on Phantasy is cited by Caygill: ‘I too was not, nor my understanding, 
that resolves things out of the image of the senses. I was not the one who saw, but only 
seeing. And what I saw were not things but only colours. And I too was coloured into 
this landscape’.369Analogously, in contradistinction to the claim that speculation lacked 
any connection with sensory experience, Benjamin argued, in Caygill’s account, that it is 
actually a necessary, a priori condition for grasping causal relationships in the first place. 
That is, it operates as a fundamental condition of possibility of our negotiation and 
recognition of cause and effect. The experience of colour is a paradigm of experience in 
which percept and concept, subject and object are inextricably intertwined,  
In this experience two components of Kant’s account of experience —
sensibility and the understanding—collapse into each other, and the 
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experiencing subjects which would contain them dissolve into its experience. 
The opposition between the gaze and the gazed upon collapses, both 
threatening a nihilistic dissolution into a pure featureless identity beyond 
subject and object but also promising a new chromatic articulation of 
experience.370  
 
By allowing the speculative a proper claim to being grounded in experience, Benjamin 
sought to expand the range of allowable experience within the Kantian schema. 
Benjamin’s widening of the concept of the aesthetic to include the whole of the 
corporeal sensorium, his inclusion of speculation within allowable experience, (and how 
this intersects with Benjamin’s understanding of the artwork,) can be seen to come 
together in his widening of the Denkbild beyond what was primarily a literary form. It 
also includes, Caygill explains, the variety of types of visualizing technologies. These, far 
from being simply a matter of more efficient forms of mimetic copying, are 
technologies of depiction with their own associated conceptual dimensions.371 
Moreover, these visualizing modes are not simply enabled by the technologies. The 
technology represents their conceptual realization. That is, they are the practical 
embodiment of a way of seeing, be it through a microscope, telescope, film, or digital 
image. Thus the mass of images produced within modernity by then new visualizing 
technologies (in Benjamin’s time photography was aligned with mass printing 
technologies) and artistic Modernisms can be understood as modes, in Caygill words, 
‘[for] organizing experience and that visual art was a way of speculating upon the limits 
of experience from within it’.372 The artwork can not be understood as solely concerned 
with mimesis or the harmony of beauty, or form, but the possible form of experience 
itself, because its inner life is irreducible to any of these. 
 
But Benjamin’s account of the experience of colour as necessarily involving speculation 
also means his account of the experience of artefacts and artworks can be applied to 
objects that are not products of human artifice. Benjamin’s account of the auratic offers 
some clues as to what this may involve. In A Small History of Photography the auratic is 
defined as “ A strange weave of space and time: the unique semblance of distance, no 
matter how close the object may be.”373 Duration is monumentalised as the defining 
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condition of the work of art which in turn develops an aura that arises from being 
placed outside of space and time. By being consecrated into a mythic realm outside of 
contingency, such works are placed out side of Kant’s schema. But this auratic affect is 
historically produced by humans and it only escapes the conditions of existence by 
denying them. Such artworks, in the words of Caygill, “…literally refuse their future”374 
There is no escaping their contingency which like speculation is a condition of the 
apprehension of experience itself within Benjamin’s recasting of Kant’s concept of 
experience. The photographic object consequently can be understood as embodying 
this; because, as a product of contingency and speculation, which are embedded in the 
photograph itself, as a condition of their possibility, apart from desires or hopes of the 
photographer. Benjamin explains,  
No matter how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed his 
subject, the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the 
tiny spark of contingency, of the Here and Now, with which reality has so to 
speak seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in the 
immediacy of that long forgotten moment the future subsists so eloquently 
that we, looking back, may rediscover it.375 
 
The next chapter, From Beyond , continues to ask the question of how can the irreducible 
quality of things be approached outside of human-centric concerns? But now this 
question is posed more explicitly in the context of practical strategies for the production 
of photographic objects. This involves further deploying Graham Harman’s concept of 
ontography, but now coupled with Ian Bogost’s application of Harman’s concept, 
which Bogost termed ‘practical ontography’, to ask how can the ghostly inner life of 
objects be invoked? 376 
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4: From beyond 
 
That Crawford Tillinghast should ever have studied science and philosophy 
was a mistake. These things should be left to the frigid and impersonal 
investigator, for they offer two equally tragic alternatives to the man of feeling 
and action; despair if he fails in his quest, and terrors unutterable and 
unimaginable if he succeed. […] With five feeble senses we pretend to 
comprehend the boundlessly complex cosmos, yet other beings with a wider, 
stronger, or different range of senses might not only see very differently the 
things we see, but might see and study whole worlds of matter, energy, and 
life which lie close at hand yet can never be detected with the senses we have. 
I have always believed that such strange, inaccessible worlds exist at our very 
elbows, and now I believe I have found a way to break down the barriers. I am not 
joking.377 [Italics in original] 
 
H.P. Lovecraft 





This dissertation has sought to address the question of the conceptual horizon opened 
up for art practice by speculative realism and object-oriented philosophies. It has 
applied these perspectives to a number of past projects. In particular, Graham 
Harman’s object-oriented ontology has provided an explanatory model of how 
relationships between objects are governed. What could be meant by the agency of 
objects or things has been an important issue; in Jane Bennett’s words, ‘can nonorganic 
bodies also have a life? Can materiality itself be vital?’378 And if so, how can we 
understand our relationship to human produced systems and objects? How do we ‘as 
human[s] strive to understand the relationship between particular objects in the world, 
relations that go on without us, even if we may be their cause, subject or beneficiary?’379 
As Bogost notes,  
even if we accept the rejection of correlationism as overtly, selfishly 
anthropocentric, how do we deal with things that are also complex structures 
of systems crafted or used by humans?380  
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This chapter investigates the implications of this question for photographic practice in 
the context of a past film project and a future oriented photographic project. First, in a 
in A Speculative Photographic Realism?, Tom Gunning’s account of how photographs can 
be understood as creating a particular analogical presence rather than a representational 
image is discussed. My intention here is to contrast an ontological realism with 
representational realism –as the basis for thinking a new kind of photographic realism. 
Then, in A Practical Ontography, Bogost’s concept of a ‘practical ontography381 to 
explored as a strategic framework for an ontographic photography. Finally, in the 
Conclusion, concepts of contingency and the occult to discuss two projects are 
deployed.382 These are the short film A Natural History Primer (Jo Law, Redmond Bridgeman) 
and the series of photographs From Beyond and its exploration of the preternatural. 
 
 
(i) A speculative photographic realism? 
 
Photography is a product of a complex human-centred practice and hence entirely 
entrapped within correlationism. At the same time, it is a complex of objects and 
interactions that cannot be said to simply reflect human vision. Camiel Van Winkel 
argues that from the mid 1960s to the late 1970s conceptual photography deployed 
these qualities of photography—of being both clearly a human centred representational 
medium and an objective recording device—as ‘an unthinking and, and in a sense 
“blind” machine that is able to produce some kind of picture under any 
circumstances’.383 Photography, Van Winkel explains, understood as a specific medium, 
was just incidental. The artist deployed it, not as the material of his or her expression, 
but as a vehicle for the analysis and critique of the language systems, forms of 
representation and discourses that were believed to constituted photography and 
representation more broadly. Winkel notes that today this objective machine-like quality 
continues to cement its role but, rather than as an autonomous aid in the critique of 
representational forms and discourses, its objective qualities are now central to 
photography’s role within contemporary art as the medium that most clearly addresses 
the question of realism. That is, for Winkel, photography tackles the question of 
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contemporary experience and its multiple modes of knowledge via an inherently 
speculative approach that arbitrates between the poles of realism and anti-realism.  
 
The contemporary status of conceptual photography as arbitrating between realism and 
anti-realism is evident in photographic theorist and historian Tom Gunning’s essay 
What’s the Point of an Index? Or Faking Photographs.384 Gunning argues that the common 
critique of photographic realism, upon the basis that there has been (with the advent of 
digital photography), a loss of indexicality misses the point regarding the nature of 
photography’s encounter with experience:  
I am positing a phenomenological fascination with photography that involves 
a continuing sense of the relation between the photograph and a pre-existing 
reality. While this is precisely what ‘indexicality’ supposedly involves, I am less 
and less sure this semiotic term provides the proper term for the 
experience.385  
 
The argument for the loss of the analogical character of photography fails, Gunning 
argues, because the analogical relationship between the image and its object remains no 
matter whether there is any supposed loss of indexicality. He explains that to argue 
otherwise is to misconstrue the history and nature of photography and the nature of 
evidential standards. Gunning suggests that the claims of occult and spirit photography 
paradoxically represent an example of the analogical claims of photography and the type 
of realism it is capable of. Their claims, Gunning says, have an ‘irrational appeal’ that 
can be explained in part by their wild speculation, their willingness to make realist 
claims in the first place; but the real cause of their fascination, Gunning continues, does 
not lie in their success or failure of this attempt, but in how their very fakery marks an 
escape from the criteria of photographic representation as being properly subject solely 
to a human epistemological test.386 Occult and spirit photography, Gunning explains, is 
a mode of photography:  
that seem[s] designed to flout the truth or even the accuracy claim associated 
with photography. While I would not deny that forms of photography can 
exist in which this flouting triumphs to such a degree that any referential role 
seems to vanish, I think that in most instances such photographs actually 
strive to present a contradiction, an oxymoron, an impossible presence, 
invoking photographic accuracy or truth even while contradicting it.387  
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To develop this point Gunning cites Andre Bazin’s argument that the photographic 
truth to nature possessed by photography has implications for how realism is 
understood. Bazin agued: 
Originality in photography […] lies in the essential objective character of 
photography. For the first time, between the originating object and its 
reproduction there intervenes only the instrumentality of a non-living agent. 
For the first time an image of the world is formed automatically, without the 
creative intervention of man.388 
 
The inscription or representation of an object via the agency of light upon some form 
of substrate, lends the photographic image a degree of objective truth. This truth 
attested not only to how things appeared but also to their realism; that is, their existence 
apart from any human knowledge of them. Such claims have been widely critiqued, but, 
for Gunning, Bazin was not referring to the indexicality of photography as a code or 
cipher for a pre-existing reality. This, Gunning continues, misconstrues the implications 
of Bazin’s argument: 
For Bazin, the photograph is not a sign of something, but a presence of 
something, or perhaps we could say a means for putting us into the presence 
of something, since clearly Bazin realizes that a photograph differs from its 
subject. […] is the indexical relation to a referent enough to truly explain what 
Bazin describes as photography’s ;irrational power to bear away our faith’?389  
 
Realism is thus not reflected in the representational characteristic of photography, its 
indexicality, but in its speculative encounter with the real as presence:  
An indexical relation falls entirely into the rational realm. Likewise Barthes 
describes the power of photography as ‘A magic, not an art’. When Barthes 
describes a photograph as an emanation of a past reality rather than a copy of 
something, he underscores the way a photograph relates to a single individual 
object and a unique moment in the existence of that object.390  
 
The analogical significance of photographs remains, whether digital or analogical. 
Analogy remains at the centre of the photograph as a form of speculative encounter 
with the presence of things. In Gunning’s words: 
Thus photographs are more than just pictures. Or rather, they are pictures of a 
special sort, ones whose visual accuracy invites us to a different sort of 
observation. The photograph does make us imagine something else, 
something behind it, before it, somewhere in relation to it. Barthes indicates 
this, I believe, by his claim that the photograph and its referent “adhere”. And 
yet even Barthes, the semiotician, differentiates this adherence of the 
photograph from its referent from the way other signs refer. Photography, 
Barthes first told us in an early essay, was an image without a code, thus 
outside of ordinary semiotics. He later told us, reaffirming his earlier position, 
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that photography was not a copy of reality but rather its emanation. In his 
self-described ‘realist’ position, Barthes shares Bazin’s belief that a photograph 
puts us in the presence of something, that it possesses an ontology rather than 
a semiotics.391  
 
But what does analogy involve, and how could it be applied in this situation? According 
to Barbara Maria Stafford, analogy is a universalising mode of thought, ‘a reciprocal 
relation between two proportions’392 that links the otherwise disparate and unrelated.393 
It is often engendered by an encounter with the previously un-encountered. It has a 
world-forming role that, Stafford believes, 
goes back to Greek mathematics, where it referred to proportion or due ratio 
among numbers in a set. This rational sense was extended by Aristotle, 
amongst others, to embrace non-mathematical relations in areas like justice, 
virtue, poetics. By means of a disciplined inferential logic, one might establish 
measurable connections between incongruent phenomena through a stepped 
system of predication. The essence of the Parmenidean One, for example, 
could be hypothesised by abstracting from the excellences of the many that 
descended from it as first course and could then be reattributed, in purified 
numerical form, to their superior source.394  
 
Analogy is a form of logic that navigates ‘random and multiple pathways [by 
making possible] associative links’.395 The relational encounter amongst members 
of a potential set, which describes any collection of things with self-same similarity, 
is discerned by a form of inferential connections that draws out or identifies those 
features that mark something as belonging to a specific set. It is a mode of rational 
extension and connection, a way of thinking that relies on the recognition of 
similarities. It is, Stafford continues, a fundamentally visual logic that may form the 
basis for propositional logic, but cannot be tested by this same logic. For this 
reason, drawing visual analogies has long been derided as unscientific, yet, she 
argues, it has played a key role in both art and science. By facilitating connections 
between otherwise seemingly disparate phenomena, analogy is able to situate 
vision, movement, objects and bodies into new relationships because of its 
recognition of their interconnections. From this perspective, the photographic 
apparatus, in its blind mechanical recording of information, can not be understood 
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as a view from outside but as being interwoven with the environment that enables 
it to exist in the first place, as Gunning claims:  
It is photography’s resistance to significance, its excessive “noise” which 
characterizes its realism, as well as its sense of uniqueness and contingency, 
values especially prized in Barthes’ account of photography and essential, I 
would claim, to our fascination with photographs as a different sort of 
picture.396  
 
Gunning concludes: ‘The description of a photograph as putting us into the presence of 
something (and for Barthes especially, the presenting of a past time and place) needs to 
be explored outside the concept of the index’.397 But what kind of strategy would 
provide a developmental framework for inter-object encounters to engender speculative 
yet realist photographic images? The next section draws upon Bogost’s expanded 
understanding of Harman’s account of onto-graphy, which he terms ‘practical 
ontography’, to investigate these dimensions of photography and their possible 
significance for photographic practice. 
 
 
(ii) A ‘Practical Onto-graphy’ 
 
Harman’s object-oriented ontology places the object, broadly conceived, at the centre of 
ontological speculation. In order to do this, Harman broadens Kant’s question of how 
human cognition constitutes the non-human, to ask how objects, including humans, 
interact and yet remain discrete entities? Harman termed this approach to analysis 
ontography.398 Harman describes the meaning that this term holds for him in the 
following way: ‘“Ontography” would deal with the limited number of interactions that 
can occur between objects’.399 Bogost understands Harman’s ontography as involving a 
descriptive and analytical process: ‘As Harman puts it in his application of the term, 
ontography is ‘a name for the exercise of describing and classifying pairings of 
objects’.400 Building on Harman’s employment of the term, Bogost seeks to broaden its 
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application to include the experience of the interactions and encounters between 
objects, not solely the analysis and description of these interactions and encounters. He 
describes his method as an ‘alien phenomenology’—a phenomenology of the object via 
an ontography practiced with the objects themselves—which he calls a ‘practical 
ontography’. It’s not a phenomenology that seeks to solely characterize human 
experience, but asks ‘what do objects experience? What’s their proper phenomenology? 
In short, what’s it like to be a thing?401 It takes ‘seriously the idea that all objects recede 
interminably into themselves, and human perception becomes just one amongst many 
ways that object might relate. To put things at the centre of a new metaphysics also 
requires us to admit that they do not exist just for us’.402 
 
To develop how Bogost’s concept of an alien phenomenology would invoke the 
presence of objects as irreducibly alien to a human phenomenology.403 and how could 
be applied it would be useful the terms ‘unit’ and ‘unit operation’ that Bogost adopts 
rather than Harman’s ‘object’. Bogost explains: ‘I have absconded with ‘unit operation’ 
from chemical engineering, which refers to the steps in a process (extraction, 
homegenization, distillation, refrigeration, etc)’.404 Units form systems of interrelated but 
separate components. These units do things, their ‘unit operations’, but units are not 
reducible to these operations. They account for one another via a fractal relationship in 
which self-similarity engenders wonder and speculative engagement, but they never 
become another object: 
The point is this: things are not merely what they do, but things do indeed do 
things […] A unit is never an atom, but a set, a grouping of other units that act 
together as a system; the unit operation is always fractal. These things wonder 
about one another without getting confirmation. This is the heart of the unit 
operation: it names a phenomenon of accounting for an object It is a process, 
a logic, an algorithm if you want, by which a unit attempts to make sense of 
another.405 
 
Bogost refers to Alfred North Whitehead’s account of prehension to help explain what 
he means here. Prehension is the technical term Whitehead employs to describe the 
affective relations between what he calls actual occasions, which is Whitehead’s term for 
embodied moments of existence. Each society of actual occasions—be it a hydrogen 
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atom, sunflower, or chimpanzee—prehends (which means to lay hold, seize, and 
transform) sets of variables from its surrounding reality. The surrounding landscape of 
activity, then, is not other than the actual occasion but becomes a constitutive feature of 
that actual occasion itself. In this way, the prehended landscape is not itself separate 
from the actual occasion doing the prehending—the occasion and the prehension are 
unified in what Whitehead calls a ‘concrescence’.406 The process of prehension can help 
explain how different objects or, in Whitehead’s terms, actual occasions, interact and 
experience each other. Whitehead draws a distinction between positive ‘pre-hensions’ 
that are actively within the awareness of a specific entity and negative prehensions that 
are those modes of awareness unavailable to a particular entity or that are blocked by a 
particular set of circumstances. Adam Robbert explains this in the following way:  
Take the interactions between the sun, a plant, and a human for example. The 
relationship between plants and the sun is different from the relationship 
between humans and the sun. For both plants and humans, the sun is a factor, 
or datum, in experience. However, plants can translate sunlight directly into 
energy for photosynthesis, humans cannot. The plant prehends sunlight in a 
different way than humans do, even as both are interacting with the same sun. 
In both cases there are more ways to prehend sunlight than what is available 
to either plants or humans; and in this sense there is always more sun than 
what is prehended by any one particular entity. There are thus negative and 
positive prehension occurring insofar as humans are unable to participate with 
the sun in ways that plants can, and vice versa; humans are unable to 
photosynthesize solar energy, but might, for example, be able to relate to the 
sun as a psychological symbol of clarity or insight in a way not possible for 
plants. Prehension is a complex and interdependent process; a consequence of 
what Whitehead calls ‘the ontological principle’.407  
 
Prehension in this context describes the encounter between units and within units in 
such a way that similarities and dissimilarities are accounted for. Consequently, 
speculative interaction within and between units involves the formation of algorithmic 
structures due to the affinity (or lack of) between units and unit operations. Forms of 
speculation are fundamental here, yet, as Bogost argues, how speculation is commonly 
understood within philosophy and beyond is restricted to questions of human 
epistemological verification:  
What is the meaning of Speculation? And how does it apply in practice? In 
philosophy, ‘speculation’ has a particular meaning that must be overcome. 
Traditionally, speculative philosophy names metaphysical claims that cannot 
be verified through experience or through science. It is here that the loosey-
goosey abstractions of scruffy-bearded, sandal-wearing philosophy takes root, 
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in questions like what is being? What is thought? Speculative philosophy is 
sometimes contrasted with critical philosophy, which involves the testing and 
verification of theories.408  
 
What is needed is an understanding of speculation as fundamental to thought and as 
implicated in experience. Whitehead’s concept of prehension, very briefly described 
above, captures the speculative encounter not only between humans but also between 
objects. From this perspective, Bogost cites Alphonso Lingis’ account of how an 
imperative operates at different levels to help fill out the phenomenology of the unit 
and unit operations: 
[T]hings constantly machinate within themselves and mesh with one another, 
acting and reacting to properties and states while still keeping something 
secret. Alphonso Lingis calls these behaviours the imperatives that structure 
the perception of things.409 
 
Nevertheless, the encounter between units cannot be a window looking out to an 
outside, it is necessarily like all objects: to use Whitehead’s term, a concrescence of 
perspectives. Bogost describes it as more akin to a mirror, but not a clear modern one: 
rather one that bends light, and offers a distorted image, an image that is necessarily 
compounded by the object that does the looking as well as the situation or environment 
within which the looking occurs:  
A speculum is a mirror, but not in the modern sense of the term as a device 
that reflects back the world as it really is, unimpeded and undistorted […] A 
mirror was an imprecise device, usually a convex disc of polished metal that 
reflected enough light to give a viewer a rough sense of the figure placed in 
front of it.410  
 
Bogost is in part arguing for the validity of the contention that representational realism 
can have consequences for, intersect with, and even produce an ontological realism. 
While representation is entirely within a correlationist framework, it is a view from a 
specific human perspective using technologies that enact or give form to that 
perspective, yet the photographic image is also automatic, autonomous in the way that it 
records what is in front of the lens: 
On the one hand, it offers a view of the world that is representational as ‘a 
way of looking’, thanks to the photographer’s framing and choice of exposure. 
On the other hand, it offers an automatically encyclopedic rendition of a 
scene, thanks to the photographic apparatus’s ability to record actuality.411  
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This superfluity of detail, for Bogost, this amassing of information, signals the 
photograph’s ontographic capacity. Its analogous relationship with the list exemplifies 
the inter-objectivity of things because it partially escapes the view from a particular 
place - it presents the abundance of things, of objects, before they have been placed 
into some kind of order according to the relations between one object, here the 
anthropomorphic viewpoint, and the multiplicity of units and their inter-objectivity. In 
this way unordered lists can exemplify the life of things: 
Let’s adopt ontography as a name for a general inscriptive strategy, one that 
uncovers the repleteness of units and their inter-objectivity. From the 
perspective of metaphysics, ontography involves the revelation of object 
relationship without necessarily offering clarification or description of any 
kind. Like a medieval bestiary, ontography can take the form of a 
compendium, a record of things juxtaposed to demonstrate their overlap and 
imply interaction through collocation. The simplest approach to such 
recording is the list, a group of items loosely joined not by logic or power or 
use but the gentle knot of the comma. Ontography is an aesthetic set theory, 
in which a particular configuration is celebrated merely on the basis of its 
existence.412 
 
An alien phenomenology is glimpsed in the onto-graphic list because it is a compilation 
of these phenomenologies: ‘An ontograph is a landfill, not a Japanese garden. It shows 
how much rather than how little exists simultaneously, suspended in the dense 
meanwhile of being’.413 A realism of the multitude is created in which representational 
realism conjures up the ontological realism of units, not by showing how they really are 
in themselves, as this is impossible, but the multitude of being:  
Ontography is the practice of increasing the number and density, one that 
sometimes opposes the minimalism of contemporary art. Instead of removing 
elements to achieve the elegance of simplicity, ontography adds (or simply 
leaves) elements to accomplish the realism of multitude. It is a practice of 
exploding the innards of things - be they words, intersections, shopping malls, 
or creatures. This ‘explosion’ can be as figurative or as literal as you like, but it 
must above all reveal the hidden density of a unit.414 
 
Bogost describes two modes of ontographic practice: metamorphism and carpentry. 
Together, these can demonstrate the plenitude of objects, and the multiplicity of their 
interactions. Metamorphism is the sideways allusion to the being of objects. It employs 
a strategy of dismorphism, of not showing how things are but of alluding to how they 
could be despite, in the language of Harman, their withdrawn quality. As discussed in 
Chapter Three in the context of Walter Benjamin’s deployment of the Denkbild, the 
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metaphor as an emblem creates a rebus, a puzzle for deciphering withdrawn qualities, 
for solving hidden meanings. It requires and instigates careful observation and 
attention. Nevertheless, it does this without the twin conceits that reality is either wholly 
inaccessible (because of the anthropocentrism that objects conform to the mind of the 
subject and are essentially products of human cognition) or accessible (because human 
subjectivity has a unique access to things outside of its own enabling conditions). This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the short film, The Natural History Primer (Jo Law, 
Redmond Bridgeman), and its exploration of contingency. The second part discusses a 
project titled From Beyond. The intention of this project is to test the hypothesis that a 





The Natural History Primer (Appendix 3) 
Robin Mackay, in the Medium of Contingency, draws on Meillassoux’s account of 
contingency and Reza Negarestani's concept of ‘anonymous materials’ to assert that 
there needs to be a rethinking of the role of chance in creative endeavour.415 He argues 
that when it is situated within a correlationist context, the role of chance is understood 
as a form of human mastery over material, such as calculated happenstance. Tropes of 
artistic production including openness, raw materials, process and situation, are 
celebrated as producing an aesthetic affect. Mackay calls for a dissolution of these 
meaning-making practices via forms of complicity with ‘anonymous materials’ that cede 
to contingency its rightful role as the pivotal medium in art works. Mackay cites 
Negarestani’s philosophical novel Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials as 
exemplary. In this novel, as Negarestani explains, the plot twist becomes a wholly 
contingent event that drives the narrative:  
The so-called plot twist seizes the reflective space of narration or simply turns 
the ‘knowing’ of the narration into the narrative object of contingencies and, 
therefore, subjects the narration to an inquisitive speculation from the 
perspective of complicity between objective resources, which in radically 
contingent ways play their influence over the narrative causality. What used to 
be ‘knowing’ is now, all of a sudden, revealed to be a literary gimmick 
facilitating a plummet into what was always already there but could not be 
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reflected upon—a short-lived resolution (dénouement) degenerating into a cosmic 
conspiracy at the speed of a trashy airport thriller.416 
 
Causative direction propelled by authorial authority does not determine narrative 
causality. Rather, narrative possibilities possess hidden causative powers unrelated to 
their human conception: 
narrative viewpoints harbour a twist that might creep on them at any moment 
for no reason whatsoever, confiscating their narration on behalf of a chasmic 
reality that can be narratively fabricated by the complicity of cosmic 




For Mackay, making oneself ‘a good meal’ for these anonymous materials means 
embracing a concept of the non-calculable uncaused event.  
in parallel with the theoretical clarification of the meaning of contingency, this 
‘practice’ must dissolve certain clichés that have crystallized around the artistic 
engagement with contingency. We always risk relapsing onto models that fail 
before contingency: models that return us to the metaphysics of chance and 
calculation, or which affirm the privilege of meaning making over material 
contingency. Negarestani; whose book Cyclonopedia is subtitled ‘complicity 
with anonymous materials, asks what sorts of rigorous conceptual preparation 
is necessary in order to make ones work—or oneself, a good meal for these 
anonymous materials.418 
 
The question is not how to present a true representation of something so as to generate 
meaning, or demonstrate sensitivity to material. Rather, it is how to allow contingency a 
role - or should that be not allowing - but asking what role does the dynamic, 
ambivalence, and contingency of materiality play in the work’s ‘life.’ In this way the plot 
twists can be understood as realist interventions driven by the speculative encounter 
between Harman’s object, Bogost’s units, or Whitehead’s actual occasions. 
Negarestani’s explanation of the twist as a contingent, speculative and realist 
intervention in narrative causation suggests this: 
the twist as the force of the realist speculation (realist in the sense that it is 
asymptotic to the contingent reality that drives the universe) approximates the 
function of the philosophy of Speculative Realism in which speculation is not 
driven by our grounded experience or reflection but by the exteriority and 
contingency of a universe that always antedates and postdates us (that which 
thinks us from the other side).419 
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But how can these accounts of material agency coupled to contingency intersect with 
creative endeavour in practice? That is, how can complicity with them help engender 
Bogost’s practical ontography? How could they help organise or structure objects or 
units so that narrative meaning is not simply imposed? The question of structure and 
allowing materiality its own agency arises in natural history films. These, for example 
David Attenborough’s, are commonly given narrative order by a (if in the case of 
Attenborough, a mild mannered) God-like authorial voice.420 What happens if this 
narrative device is rejected and something akin to Negarestani’s proscriptions is 
attempted?  
 
This is the type of question The Natural History Primer, a disparate collection of footage, 
assembled over a number of years and shot using various media, including Super 8, 
16mm and digital video, asked. Towards this aim Hollis Frampton’s film work, Zorns 
Lemma (1970), and its use of algorithms was instructive. 421 The footage that comprises 
The Natural History Primer was filmed in the Waychinicup National Park located in the 
Great Southern region of Western Australia. It consists of a series of short scenes 
depicting many of the creatures that inhabit this part of the world without naming them 
or providing any contextual narrative or dramatic structure. The Natural History Primer 
arose from a project that researched algorithms as conceptual models, experimentations, 
and strategies in developing innovative screen works. “Using both natural algorithms 
(e.g. DNA, fractal geometry) and artificial algorithms (e.g. programmable languages)” to 
act as construction agents, we investigated how pre-ordered ‘sets’ can be strategically 
used to generate meaningful patterns. By patterns we do not mean visual similarity but 
coherent forms that make visible the otherwise invisible relationships and formations 
ranging across the human—the tele-visual, political, social, cultural, and the non-
human—things, natural systems, the Great Andromeda Nebula, and the model 
organism Aplysia californica.  
 
                                                 
420 A counter example to the natural history film directors narrative authority over their material is the 
natural history films of artist and scientist Jean Painleve (1902-1989). See Andy Masaki Bellows, Marina 
McDougall, and Brigitte Berg (eds.), Science is Fiction: The Films of Jean Painleve (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2000). 
421
 Allen S. Weiss, ‘Frampton’s Lemma, Zorn’s Dilemma’, October, 32 (1985), 120. 
 
 126 
In their most basic terms, algorithms are procedures or sets of instructions - a recipe of 
sorts where the principal ingredients may be numbers or data. Numbers and data are 
objects that can be organised or grouped into sets by a common thread (e.g. 
characteristics like prime, or multiples of a numeral). An algorithm can also generate 
sets. The best-known manifestations are the Julia Set (produced by using the simple 
equation of z = z2 + c) and the Mandelbrot Set (mapping of the Julia Set). ‘Algorithms 
means the rules of performing complex calculation by a sequence of simpler ones’, and 
iterations are a necessary part of algorithms.422 Our interest lies in how algorithms can 
be utilised to manipulate data or building blocks (such as audiovisual images) to 
construct new configurations of aural and visual language. Pattern creation (and 
recognition) is one of the central functions algorithms perform. Their transformative 
ability—taking one level of abstracted information and translating it into another—
enables them to play a key role in the mediation and interaction between different 
types of information. The use of algorithmic generative techniques developed into a 
distinct genre in electronic art. One of the most influential early works was Karl Sims’ 
Galapagos (1997), inspired by Richard Dawkins’ Biomorph Breeder experiment, which uses 
a particular understanding of evolutionary theory to produce self-replicating images 
that evolve according to human aesthetic selection. But this particular Galapagos is 
primarily a human thing; the ‘phenotypes’ produced owe their form to Dawkins’ 
concept of ultra-Darwinism mediated by human aesthetic choices.423  
 
Some important distinctions to Sims’ rule-driven work, and our aims in The Natural 
History Primer, can best be described with reference to Canadian filmmaker Hollis 
Frampton’s film Zorns Lemma. This film borrowed its title from Max Zorns Lemma, a 
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specific type of set.424 A Lemma is a proposition that is assumed to be true in order to 
test the validity of another proposition. The first section of the film consists of a dark 
screen and a reading from an eighteenth-century Massachusetts elementary school 
lesson book titled The Bay State Primer. The second part of the film lists objects, 
primarily via New York street signs, to axiomatically create sets and subsets of words 
and images determined by a system of substitution and progressions ordered by the 
twenty-six letter alphabet of the English language used in the primer. In the third 
section of the film a chorus of six voices in turn read from neo-Platonist Robert 
Grosseteste in On Light, or the Ingression of Forms. Each word is read in time to a 
metronome to methodically spell out Grosseteste argument that light is the infinite 
form that gives form to all matter. While this recitation is occurring a couple, 
accompanied by a cantering dog, slowly walk into the distance across a snow-covered 
field. This static shot lasts as long as they take to vanish into the snowfield, leaving the 
viewer with the almost entirely white cinematic screen. 
 
Frampton employs Zorn’s Lemma and Grosseteste’s philosophy as axiomatic 
structures to explore how within a subset of two open systems, language and the 
infinite frames of film, creative order is possible. By harnessing set theory’s potential to 
structure abstract representation of perceptions intersecting planes in infinite 
combinations, Frampton hoped to bring narrative and non-narrative montage structure 
into new configurations using image, sound and text as primary materials. For 
Frampton, Zorn’s Lemma acted as a procedural guide, a way of testing a proposition 
that would open up new conceptual possibilities. His intention was not to use a pre-
existing set to programmatically organise data. If he did so, his film would be 
illustrative in the way that Sims’ work arguably simply models a human-centred notion 
of geno-centrism. 
 
Frampton’s engagement with set theory was part of a broader strategy that explores 
how a materially focused practice (here structural film) can engender the emergence of 
new and infinitely creative works by allowing the material itself its own contingency in 
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contrast to human-centred calculation or choice.425 Thus, his investigation of visual and 
auditory patterns is not simply a combination of choices picked from sets of pre-
existing data, but is genuinely novel.426 His aim was to allow another pattern that 
established a new type of filmic structure distinct from Eisenstein’s theory of montage, 
whether consciously or not a dominant procedural guide to filmic structure, with its 
emphasis on the principle of juxtaposition as reflective of a pre-given set of truths, 
whether of dialectical materialism or the superiority of Mazda cars.427 Brian Massumi’s 
point regarding the importance of both allowing things to be themselves and an 
aesthetic of awareness of their potential by paying attention to the non-reducibility of 
situations is apt here: 
Experiencing [the] potential for change, experiencing the eventfulness and 
uniqueness of every situation, even the most conventional ones, that’s not 
necessarily about commanding movement – it’s about navigating movement. 
It’s about being immersed in an experience that is already underway [...] It’s 
more like surfing the situation, or tweaking it, than commanding or 
programming it.428 
 
We see this ‘not programming’ as crucial. This ‘not commanding’ can be taken as a 
‘not scripting’, a ‘not storyboarding’, approach to practice. It is an open-ended ‘make it 
up as it goes along’ approach that allows an immersion in the situation at hand, with its 
specific needs, thus allowing new things to happen. Such an approach is founded more 
on a principle of re-activity, in the sense of active engagement with particular 
encounters, than a concern with manufacturing a stimulus/response inter-activity 
between audience and artwork. The Natural History Primer can be thought of as this kind 
of response, a type of primer that generates a list of things as a reaction to the more 
than human nature of one of the most biologically diverse places on the planet.  
 
 
From Beyond (Appendix 4) 
Each day an uncountable number of images are produced. Recorded, snapped, 
uploaded, downloaded, deleted, printed, glanced at, shared, hoarded or forgotten, this 
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almost infinite multiplication of images forms a global photosphere.429 But what is the 
relation between this photosphere and the planet below? In The Dust of This Planet,430 
Eugene Thacker understands correlationism as the latest formulation of the question of 
the relationship between the human and the planet, which he describes as ‘simply that 
which remains “after” the human’.431 Thacker describes a tripartite situation between: 
(1) the-world-for-us432 which is ‘the world that we, as human beings, interpret and give 
meaning to, the world that we relate to or feel alienated from, the world that we are at 
once a part of and that is also separate from the human’;433 (2) the world-without-us, which 
‘may co-exist with the world-for-us, indeed the human being is defined by its impressive 
capacity for not recognizing this distinction’;434 (3) and finally the planet, which can be 
thought of as the non-human world, ‘this is the world in some inaccessible, already given 
state’435 […] the world-without-us is the subtraction of the human from the world.’436 The 
first two of these modes can be understood in the following way: (1) World (as it is for-
us) connotes the experience of being-in-the-world as a certain kind of being, while (2) 
Earth (the world in-itself) represents the cumulative view of the physical and life 
sciences. Both World and Earth are different renderings of sensual objects in Harman’s 
language. (3)The third mode of the ‘Planet’ (the world without us, beyond all access) 
can be understood as corresponding to the world beyond all access, or Harman’s real, 
yet withdrawn, objects.  
 
The genres of supernatural horror and science fiction provide a guide to thinking about 
the planet, the world-without-us, Thacker explains:437 
In a sense, the world-without-us is not to be found in a ‘great beyond’ that is 
the exterior to the World (the world-for-us) or the Earth (the world-in-itself); 
rather, it is in the very lapses, or lacunae in the World and the Earth. The 
Planet (the world-without-us) is, in the words of darkness mysticism, the ‘dark 
intelligible abyss’ that is paradoxically manifest as the World and the Earth.438 
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For Thacker, horror or weird fiction such as H. P Lovecraft’s short story From Beyond., 
exemplifies the human encounter with fear, but not of multi-pedal bug eyed monsters, 
but of the unknown, wholly alien, (Bogost’s alien unit?), the world-without-us, and the 
planet below:  
I would propose that horror be understood not as dealing with human fear in 
a human world (the world for us), but that horror be understood as being 
about the limits of the human as it confronts a world that is not just a World, 
and not just the Earth, but also a Planet (the world-with-out-us.)439 
 
The unnamed narrator of From Beyond recounts the experiments of one Crawford 
Tillinghast, who created a technical apparatus—a ‘detestable electrical machine, glowing 
with a sickly, sinister violet luminosity’.440 The function of this machine is to stimulate 
the pineal gland which Tillinghast has discovered is capable of ‘transmit[ting] visual 
pictures to the brain […] from beyond’.441 In this short story, Thacker claims, the magic 
circle is no longer simply a gateway to the supernatural, but has now become a 
technological means capable of dissolving the boundaries of space and time. It would 
liberate the limitations imposed by, as Tillinghast’s laments, our ‘five feeble senses’ that 
ensure we ‘see things only as we are constructed to see them and can gain no idea of 
their absolute nature’.442 The boundaries between mind and matter would be broken 
down via a super-sensibility akin to the omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence 
of a God, enabling humans to ‘overleap time, space, and dimensions, and without 
bodily motion peer to the bottom of creation’.443 
 
Thacker emphasised how Lovecraft’s fiction stages horror as essentially an encounter 
with the unknown world with-out-us inaccessible to human thought - a hidden realm. 
Parallel to Thacker’s emphasis, is Harman own discussion of Lovecraft and the occult. 
Harman’s account will now be discussed for its ability to further clarify some of the 
implications such gaps hold. In Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy,444 Harman 
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describes Lovecraft as a writer of ‘gaps and horror’.445 For Harman, Lovecraft’s fictive 
world generates gaps that perplex cause and effect to produce a bafflement of the 
common sense relationship between things. Objects take on a monstrous life that 
confounds ‘the power of language to describe them […] and the qualities they 
possess’.446 Lovecraft renders reality weird, it becomes alien to human life, things are 
experienced as ‘anything but bundles of qualities’.447 Harman is thinking here of David 
Hume and his critique of causation. For Hume, the only bases for the apprehension of 
causal relationships between events are perceived qualities that, via a process of habitual 
association, lead to inductive inferences of cause and effect. This human-centred world, 
Harman recounts, is very different from Lovecraft’s dissection of the geometry of 
existence: ‘While for Hume objects are a simple amassing of familiar qualities, Lovecraft 
resembles Braque or Picasso slicing an object into vast cross-sections of qualities, 
planes, or adumbrations, which even when added up do not exhaust the reality of the 
object they compose’.448 Lovecraft’s worlds exist at the intersection of these planes. 
They can be understood as the multifaceted concretions of Thacker’s, the world-for-us, 
the non-human-world, and the world-without-us. It is within this geometry that Lovecraft’s 
cosmologies are generated. Horror is engendered when humans encounter, often only 
by inexplicable chance, an entire world-without-us, the planet, that barely notes their 
existence. When such an encounter takes place it is indescribably alien, even 
unrepresentable. The narrator in the The Dunwich Horror declares:  
It would be trite and not wholly accurate to say that no human pen could 
describe [the dead creature on the floor], but one may properly say that it 
could not be vividly visualized by anyone whose ideas of aspect and contour 
are too closely bound up with the life forms of this planet and of the three 
known dimensions.449  
 
It is for his evocation of the gaps between the thing and its description, between 
perception and what is perceived, and between objects themselves that Harman finds 
Lovecraft’s writing compelling: a form of realism, but of weird realism - particularly 
from an anthropocentric perspective. As discussed in the Overview, for Harman the 
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innate withdrawal of objects from other object engenders a weird reality. This reality is 
external to empirical sense datum, which is the human encounter with its sensuous 
surface. Objects withdraw from each other absolutely but this means that the question 
of the encounter with reality becomes a question of speculative interaction between 
objects to produce a weird reality. As Harman explains: 
My thesis is that objects and weirdness go hand in hand. An object partly 
evades all announcements through its qualities, resisting or subverting efforts 
to identify it with any surface. It is that which exceeds any of the qualities, 
accidents, or relations that can be ascribed to it: an ‘I know not what’, but in a 
positive sense. Against frequent efforts to dismiss objects as fantasies 
assembled by humans from a pre-given surface of experienced contents, I 
contend that reality is object-oriented. Reality is made up of nothing but 
substances—and they are weird substances with a taste of the uncanny about 
them, rather than stiff blocks of simplistic physical matter. Contact with reality 
begins when we cease to reduce a thing to its properties or to its effect on 
other things. The difference between objects and their peripheral features 
(qualities, accidents, relations) is absolute.450 
 
Harman’s account of weird realism broadens our understanding of what realism may 
entail.451 It would be a realism of a speculative encounter between objects and their life 
that would not claim to show absolutely how things really are but would argue for the 
validity of speculation regarding how they might be. It would be a weird realism that 
invokes the presence of objects apart from, or anterior to, human knowledge of them. 
One name for this could be a preternatural realism. Celina Jeffery explains the 
difference between preternatural, supernatural and natural:  
Preternatural or Praeter naturam came to denote that which is ‘beyond nature’ 
and its ontology has been dependent on two sister concepts: the supernatural, 
or Supra naturam, signifying that which ‘above nature’, and nature, or natura, 
which is defined by the habitual patterns of the world.452 
 
The preternatural operates between the two realms of the natural and supernatural. It 
aligns with the second of Thacker’s modes - the world-without-us. A speculative yet realist 
photography could adopt a parallel strategy. It would, in a similar way to Bogost’s 
strategy of practical ontography, act as a correlate of ontological speculation with the 
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aim of creating a realist and speculative photography.453 Like evidential photography, 
which sought to record visual evidence of some event or object, it would harness the 
‘blind sight’ offered by the camera, but its aim would be to instigate an encounter with 
the shadowy presence of objects stripped of their correlationist context.  
 
The subtitle of Bogost’s book, What it’s like to be a thing? Intentionally echoes a well-
known thought experiment proposed by Thomas Nagel in his essay What’s It like to be a 
bat?454 Referring to this essay, Levi R. Bryant argues for realist wildness ontology:  
The dominant paradigm of critical theory tends to reduce the world to an 
alienated image of ourselves in a mirror wherein we do not recognize 
ourselves. The task thus becomes to show that what seems to issue from the 
mirror in fact issues from us. The world thus becomes our own text. [But] If 
we are to think climate change, if we are to think technology, the paradigm of 
the world as screen is not enough […] The analytical philosopher Thomas 
Nagel infamously asked ‘what is it like to be a bat?’ […] Beyond human 
conceptual content and meaning, there is an entire other world of rocks, 
quarks, wolves, buildings, cities, technologies and aardvarks […] Wildness 
ontology is an invitation to explore the world of alterity, to adopt the point of 
view of these other entities.455 
  
For Bryant, being able to productively explore this wildness means recognising the 
validity of a democracy of objects and to inhabit the wildness of things as an equal. 
Between these objects the preternatural operates as the mode of aesthetic interaction.456 
In one of its modes it would characteristically be neither a science nor an art, but entail 
a sensible encounter with objects that is akin to science and art and their ability to evoke 
a ‘things haecceity’:  
Neither science nor art, but also science and art, it is the preternatural that 
exposes us to the alterity of things. As art, the preternatural is that special 
form of sensibility, that aiesthesis, that allows us to discern the thinglyness of 
things, their being-for-themselves, rather than their being as sign, omen, 
meaning, or use for humans.457 
 
Inhabiting this dimension involves paying attention to the meaning that an object holds 
not just for us but also for itself. This kind of attention emerges most clearly when we 
pay attention to the experience of the encounter with other entities. One of the forms 
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of attention is a process of depiction that, paradoxically, rather than revealing a self-
reflection, often unveils the ‘decontexualised’ thing:  
The meaning of the object for us begins to drop away in the activity of 
drawing and painting and the thing appears like a phantom in all its alienness. 
Similarly, in the activity of drawing, painting, and photography, the context of 
the thing is bracketed, subtracted, and the thing makes its appearance in a 
decontextualized way.458 
 
But could attention-paying work in this way? If it is to be successfully carried out, 
depiction demands that attention is paid to the object itself. The more down to earth 
arena of perceptual science may hold part of the answer. Alva Noë’s research into visual 
perception suggests some of the reasons why this might be important for any sentient 
object that exists within the wildness of things. Owing much to James Gibson’s 
ecological theories of visual perception, briefly discussed in Chapter Two, Noë’s 
research is relevant here for the way it facilitates a rethinking of the relationship 
between experience, vision, and the visual depiction of experience. Noë, in Action In 
Perception, explains that picture making—he includes photography and drawing in this—
is a particularly sophisticated method of negotiating visual experience. It is not, nor 
could it be, he is at pains to point out, simply expressive (he means reflective) of 
experience. To be so would entail stepping out of an event as it occurs. Rather, it 
involves something more like a construal of experience after the event. Noë explains, 
‘experience itself is transparent. There’s no experiencing it. There’s only encountering 
the world—content—as you experience it. [The task ] is rather to catch experience in 
the act of making the world available’.459 Here Noë appears to be referring to Gibson’s 
concept of affordances, whereby the world is available for perception not because it is 
simply there to be observed but because the environment affords the basis for any form 
of perception to occur in the first place.460 It relates to experience as an encounter with 
a situation that affords a construal of that experience after the event. The encounter 
between the eye and the environment it inhabits allows perception to be structured. 
Because it is ecologically embedded within the encounter, as an event between two or 
more objects, perception structures experience. Picture making is particularly adept at 
this task. While it is often thought of as representational, which is understood as a type 
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of mimetic or reflective process, Noë believes it is more correct to think of it as 
constructive activity, an activity nested within an ecological framework in which the 
parts dynamically interact via feedback, not by matching representations to objects in 
some internal filing system, but by constructing images from the parts afforded by an 
environment of which the seeing organism is an integral dynamic part, and within which 
it co-evolved. Experience is given form via its conceptual picturing so that, in the words 
of Noë, picturing is ‘like experience itself […] an activity of reflection on what you see 
and what you have to do to see’.461 
 
                                                 





Tillinghast had once been the prey of failure, solitary and melancholy; but now 
I knew, with nauseating fears of my own, that he was the prey of success. I 
had indeed warned him ten weeks before, when he burst forth with his tale of 
what he felt himself about to discover. He had been flushed and excited then, 
talking in a high and unnatural, though always pedantic, voice. “What do we 
know,” he had said, “of the world and the universe about us? Our means of 
receiving impressions are absurdly few, and our notions of surrounding 
objects infinitely narrow. We see things only as we are constructed to see 
them, and can gain no idea of their absolute nature.462  
 
H.P. Lovecraft 
From Beyond (1934) 
 
 
Tillinghast’s encounter with an absolute in From Beyond was somewhat different from 
my own encounter. To use H. P Lovecraft’s attenuated diction, this event occurred on a 
foetid winter’s day an eon ago on which, as a somewhat eldritch student, I came across 
a page in a dusty journal with a simple black line running around its borders, captioned 
in Gothic script: The Absolute. The page was empty, devoid of any image whatsoever. 
The journal was titled Mind: A Quarterly of Psychological and Philosophical Research.463 Its 
dismissal of the concept of the absolute would have met with amused, yet restrained, 
agreement amongst its sober subscribers. Its stated purpose, after all, is to research, in a 
properly scholarly manner, using empirical and evidential methodologies, the nature of 
consciousness. For Mind, the existence of any absolute, or not, is not a question that can 
be answered in any sensible and verifiable way. Yet, nevertheless, the absolute can be 
said to haunt Mind. Its inaccessibility, discussed in the Overview in relation to the 
empiricists John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume, was a founding principle 
upon which journals such as Mind helped define their empiricism. The question of the 
absolute, of bridging a gap between mind and matter, has also been a central concern in 
this dissertation, but it has not been in search of an unspeakable, ineffable wholly other. 
Rather, the absolute is understood in terms of its root meanings of being separate, apart 
and disconnected from human contexts, and whether, despite this, it is knowable in 
some way. From this perspective, this project asked how can we understand a self-
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sufficient art-object apart from relational or social contexts, and whether this can 
broaden the conceptual horizons for photography and its relationship to realism. I will 
now review where this speculative investigation has taken this dissertation and then 
suggest further areas for research.  
 
This dissertation examined Speculative Realist and object-oriented philosophies and 
how they have focused attention on how objects are understood and experienced. Its 
intention has been to examine the aesthetics of these encounters and investigate the 
implications this has for creative endeavour. While it has addressed this question it has 
not attempted to arbitrate between the poles of realism and anti-realism. The 
implications of these philosophies for objects or entities that are complex structures or 
systems made by humans have been a central importance, with photography taken as 
the site of such a complex system. Drawing upon the writings of Quentin Meillassoux, 
Graham Harman, Ian Bogost, and Timothy Morton, amongst others, it argued that the 
photographic image can act as a speculative medium that, via metaphor and allusion, 
bypasses what Meillassoux describes as correlationism. A recurrent theme of this 
discussion is how photography paradoxically encapsulates both an anti-realist 
epistemology (that defines the limits and extent of human knowledge) and a realist 
ontology in which knowledge of reality is thought possible independently of our 
conceptual and perceptual frameworks. 
 
These perspectives inform a retrospective analysis of three projects in the first three 
chapters of this dissertation. First, The Object versus Post Object Question in the Australian Art 
World during the 1970s reconsiders previous research on a historical debate on the status 
of the artwork as self-sufficient object or relational social process. This dissertation was 
particularly interested in the imaging of nature. In this context the second chapter, 
Something to be Seen, A Picture on a Screen, asked why is an anthrodecentric approach to the 
photographic image desirable and what would it look like? The third chapter, Photo| 
Vision: Photographing Place, asked how do correlationist perspectives inflect 
representations of place? This is discussed in reference to Walter Benjamin’s expanded 
concept of the Denkbild (thought-image) and in the context of the project Konvolut K (Jo 
Law, Redmond Bridgeman). The fourth chapter, From Beyond (title from H.P Lovecraft’s 
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short story of the same name), examined how these perspectives may inform future and 
current creative endeavour.  
The terrain covered in this dissertation will now be revisited in more detail:  
 
In the Overview, I discussed how for Quentin Meillassoux the Kantian Copernican 
revolution was only apparently a move from a human-centric model of knowledge. In 
fact, he argues, the Ptolemaic view, in which the world and human perspective was the 
centre of the cosmos, persisted but now the framework of knowledge was the necessity 
that certain human epistemological conditions must be fulfilled to validate knowledge 
claims. He described this framework as correlationism:  
By correlationism, I thus understand, in a first approximation, every 
philosophy that maintains the impossibility of acceding through thought to a 
being independent of thought. We never, according to this type of philosophy, 
have access to any intended thing (understood in the most general sense) that 
is not always - already correlated to an act of thinking (understood, again in 
the most general sense). Consequently, correlationism posits, against all 
materialism, that thought cannot escape from itself so as to accede to a world 
not yet affected by the modes of apprehension of our subjectivity.464 
 
The central question then becomes one of the nature of the correlation between human 
thought and knowledge of being outside of thought. Meillassoux claims this has had a 
perverse result because it legitimised fideistic declarations as the only possible claims of 
absolute knowledge of something. The Enlightenment attack on faith had, ironically, led 
to the affirmation of faith as the only subjectively apprehended certainty, and an 
emphasis upon intersubjectivity as the only level of certainty that science could aim for. 
Meillassoux’s novelty is not to simply dismiss the arguments of correlationism but to 
show how, if correlationism is to avoid the charge of being another justification for 
fideism, it must rest upon an absolute - that something is known, separate from human 
knowing:  
My thesis (which may seem bizarrely classical) comes down to saying that 
thought is capable of the ‘absolute’, capable even of producing something like 
‘eternal truths’; and this despite the various destructions and deconstructions 
that all traditional metaphysics have undergone over the last century and a 
half.465 
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In this way, Meillassoux’s aim is not to discard correlationism, which he argues would 
be to simply step back into a pre-critical realism, but through clarifying the basis for 
correlationist argument reassert the truth claims of a materialist speculative science—
‘materialism is a speculative thesis […] it affirms that one can think that which is 
independent of all thought, of all subjectivity’.466 While Graham Harman’s object-
oriented philosophy derives from a different philosophical background of Heideggarian 
phenomenology, he has developed in fruitful dialogue with Meillassoux’s account of 
correlationism. Yet Harman’s argument on the nature of correlationism and realism is 
markedly different from Meillassoux’s. For Harman objects, by which he means all 
entities, whether material or not, have equal ontological status, and are irreducible to 
what can be know about them. The question of what humans can know about objects is 
displaced by the question of how do objects interact? For Harman, the question of 
realism thus takes on new dimensions. It is no longer a human epistemological question 
of whether something exists and can be known apart from, or outside, the necessary 
correlate between human thought and things. The question is rather what is the nature 
of the interaction between objects?467 
 
In the context of this question Timothy Morton’s expansion of the concept of ecology 
and aesthetics is relevant to my thesis because of how he rethinks the relation between 
objects or things. Morton formulates a model of ecological interaction in which all 
entities, through being awarded equal ontological status, interact via a poetics of the 
experiential event. There is no outside, only what he terms the mesh, in which ‘the 
ecological thought’ itself becomes aware of its own embedded irreducible condition. 
Thereby Morton is able to broaden the meaning of aesthetics by making it a central 
causative principle of the interaction between objects. Rather than a principle of 
sufficient reason being searched for, whether of a materialist or idealist origin, as the 
root cause of things, causation becomes a multifaceted, multidirectional, interaction 
between all entities. Morton’s description of the demonic dimension provides a clue of 
what this may mean. He describes a broadened account of agency in the cosmos of 
inter-objective space: 
What would it mean not to eliminate the demonic dimension from causality? I 
do not encounter patterns and relations that are resolved in my mind into 
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paintings, mud and glasses. These things encounter me directly, as themselves. 
But more precisely, every entity throws shadows of itself into the inter-
objective space, the sensual space that consists of relations between objects, 
carving out its own version of Plato’s cave.468 
 
In Chapter One, we sought to ground this discussion and explore some of its 
implication by considering the object versus post-object debate that occurred in 
Australia during the 1970s as a case study of the fraught status of the art object. The 
choice between the object and post-object was often seen as simply a choice between a 
concept of the artwork as an abstract, disembodied, imperial Kantian form that was in 
reality a means of social and political domination, and an analysis of the work that art 
does and its social role. Thus, social authenticity, and hence legitimacy, was thought to 
be the appropriate criterion of artistic judgement. Yet it soon became apparent that a 
subjectivist set of criteria remained in place. The source of this subjectivism is then 
outlined in relation to an understanding of authenticity as wholly defined within a 
solecism of the individual’s internal judgement of taste - a seeming return to what was 
widely believed to be Clement Greenberg’s position. 
 
In the conclusion of this chapter we touched upon how a focus on a realism of 
experience suggested by historian Bernard Smith acts as one possible arena for 
reconsideration of these relations and the subjectivist position. As Morton notes, 
‘Realism is often considered a rather dull affair, with all the panache and weirdness on 
the antirealist side of the debate’.469 Morton presents a counter version of realism that 
offers a non-human-centric account of relations and objects that does not fall into 
subjectivism, an explanation that may enable a reconsideration of realism as a form of 
causal encounter and exploration with a reconcieved aesthetics at its centrer. Magic is 
understood as signalling a rejection, contra Meillassoux and Kant, of the principle of 
non-contradiction, and endorsing an anything is possible approach as an emergent quality 
of the actual (as the existing state of affairs). Morton explains his intention of his book 
Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality in the following way:  
Realist Magic is an exploration of causality from the point of view of object-
oriented ontology. I argue that causality is wholly an aesthetic phenomenon. 
Aesthetic events are not limited to interactions between humans or between 
humans and painted canvases or between humans and sentences in dramas. 
They happen when a saw bites into a fresh piece of plywood. They happen 
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when a worm oozes out of some wet soil. They happen when a massive object 
emits gravity waves. When you make or study art you are not exploring some 
kind of candy on the surface of a machine. You are making or studying 
causality. The aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension.470 
 
In order to explore these issues further a number of approaches to the imaging of 
nature were discussed in the second chapter. These included Kinji Imanishi’s holistic 
account of ecological interaction between living and non-living things and James J. 
Gibson's model of ecological approach to visual perception. Alfred North Whitehead’s 
analysis of what he termed the ‘bifurcation of nature’ is then described.471 Whitehead 
seeks to rectify any anterior separation of percept and concept resulting in a bifurcation 
of nature via his ‘ontological principle’.472 In the context of Whitehead’s analysis, I 
sought to delineate some characteristics of an anthrodecentric approach to 
photographic practice. Alphonso Lingis’ concept of levels of existence is then explored 
as a possible example for how an anthrodecentric photography could be thought. 
 
To investigate the question of an anthrodecentric photograph in the context of an 
actual photographic project, in Chapter three, Project X (Redmond Bridgeman, Jo Law) 
and its related endeavour Konvolut K is considered. These projects are situated in relation 
to Walter Benjamin’s deployment of Denkbild as a speculative strategy for describing 
contemporary experience. This chapter considers how Benjamin’s approach to objects 
can be situated in relation to contemporary object-oriented approaches to creative 
endeavour.473 From this perspective, it is argued that Benjamin’s speculative account of 
objects offers a precursor account of the irreducibility of meaning that objects hold, 
which, although it was developed in relation to human artefacts and their emblematic 
meaning for humans, can be applied more broadly to objects that are not human 
artefacts.  
 
The question remained, though, how could a suitably dynamic and fruitful approach to 
objects, which treats them as ontologically equal, be embedded in photographic 
endeavours? In the Fourth Chapter, in the context of the foregoing object-oriented 
                                                 
470 Ibid. 
471 See Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature: Tarner Lectures delivered in Trinity College (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1920). 
472 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (2nd edn. New York: Free Press, 1979), 3-18. 
473 Ether Leslie, Walter Benjamin (London: Reaktion Books, 2008), 216-234. 
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perspectives, the emphasis shifts to consider a speculative framework for photographic 
endeavours. This chapter, and the work in progress described in its Conclusion, do not 
operate as an exegesis of current work. Rather, they are concerned with a possible 
conceptual framework for a strategy of engagement with current and future 
photographic projects. In pursuit of this objective, Tom Gunning’s account of 
photographic realism as engendering a presence that displaces the epistemological 
critique with a photographic ontology of presence, is deployed. 
 
Two projects are then surveyed that encapsulate many of these issues. The aim of the 
first discussion is to formulate an understanding of the interplay between chance, 
objects, and structuration via an analysis of the short film The Natural History Primer (Jo 
Law, Redmond Bridgeman). This discussion draws on both Meillassoux’s account of 
contingency and Reza Negarestani’s concept of ‘anonymous material’. The second 
project is concerned with strategy for depicting presence. Harman’s account of 
ontography, Ian Bogost’s application and expansion of Harman’s concept in his own 
development of a ‘practical ontography’, and Eugene Thacker’s analysis of the occult 
are deployed here.  
 
This dissertation sought to explore how speculative realist and object-oriented 
philosophies can broaden the conceptual horizon for photography. 474 In terms of the 
aims of this dissertation, occult and spirit photography, and the various obsolete or 
dead visualising technologies associated with them, offer a model of photographic 
practice (as outlined in my discussion of Bogost’s argument in Chapter Four) in which 
an after image and seeing intersect to describe a mode of seeing that is open to 
speculative possibilities. Therefore, if photography exists in its own right as an 
autonomous entity apart from human interpretations, acted upon and acting upon other 
entities, then historical occult photography, with its ambition of making visible fluidic 
vapours, ectoplasms, and various materialisations from a beyond, is an area for future 
research.475 Deploying largely ‘dead’ technologies476 and exploring how their spectral or 
                                                 
474 For a ‘retrospective’ delineation of many of these directions see Graham Harman, ‘The Current State 
of Speculative Realism’, Speculations, 4 (2013), 74-84. 
475 For a survey of current forms of re-enactment and the significant role it is playing in contemporary art 
see, for example, Inke Arns and Gaby Horn (eds.), History will Repeat Itself: Stategies of Re-enactment in 
Contemporary Media Art, and Performance (Phoenix Halle: HMKV, 2007). 
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ghostly status haunts the current forms these technologies take;477 the aim of this 
‘practical ontographic’ research would be to investigate the hypothesis that historical 
occult photography can conjure up the realist conceits of photography; and thereby test 
the limits set by correlationism. 
                                                                                                                                          
476 Including cyanotypes, electro-photography (Kirilian photography), ambrotypes and silver gelatin 
photography.  
477 Benjamin’s concept of Geschichtsphilosophie, ‘philosophical history’, helps describe the role of obsolete 
technologies. Geschichtsphilosophie entails not simply the analysis of the documents of history, but their 
material traces – the forms of life they once embodied. Therefore, like ossified remains of past forms of 
organic life, such as fossils, outmoded technologies are the concrete forms that have now become 
emblematic of particular ways of seeing, acting, and thinking. Nostalgia, Benjamin argued, replays these 
forms in an attempt to displace, or perhaps more accurately forget, the present. In contrast, a critical 
approach, in the sense of their conditions of existence as both materialist practice and visualising mode, 
counters this form of forgetting by re-situating outmoded technologies and their products within a new 
field. For a survey of current forms of re-enactment and the significant role it plays in contemporary art 
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A. Diorama of animals donated to the museum housed on the 3rd floor of the National 
Museum Of Nature and Science, Ueno, Taito-ku, Tokyo. Once an hour The African 
Savannah (5 min) plays. 
 
B. Children’s playground Toyama Park, Okubo, Shinjuku – Ku. Tokyo. 
 
C. Owl, Inokahira Park Zoo, Kichijoji, Tokyo.  
 
D. A cat: resident in a small park in Takadanobaba 3-chome, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo. 
 
E. An antique toy dog at Picon Cafe Gotokuji, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo 
 
F. Plastic Boxer, Takadanobaba 3-chome, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo.  
 
G. Hawk Moth, NSW, Australia 
 
H. Orb Weaver, NSW, Australia 
 
I. Isamu Noguchid’s children’s playground Merenuma Koen, Hokkaido. For more 
information http://www.photonicsmedia.net/botanising/1150 
 
J. Noguchid’s children’s playground Merenuma Koen, Hokkaido. 
 
K/L. Lok Fu, Hong Kong 
 
M. Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong 
 
N. Bibbulmun Track, Western Australia 
 
O. Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong 
 
P. Waychinicup, Western Australia 
 
Q. Grandeur Terrace, Hong Kong 
 
R. Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong. 
 
S/T. Two Peoples Bay, Western Australia 
 




V. Mandurah, Western Australia.  
 
W. Sea Horse, NSW 
 
X. Octopi, Wan Long Oriental Supermarket, Wollongong. 
 
Y. Sea Bass, Sha Tin, Hong Kong 
 
Z. Found photograph Circa 1910, Niagara Falls in Winter  
 
